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 In this dissertation, I develop and defend a revised satisfaction account of the 
Christian doctrine of atonement based primarily on the thought of St. Anselm of 
Canterbury. The project thus has both a historical and a normative dimension, since I 
offer an interpretation of Anselm, and then derive from it an account of the atonement as 
a candidate for how Christians ought to think about and understand what God has 
accomplished in Christ on our behalf.  
I begin, in Chapter 2, by examining the most common way of framing the 
doctrine of atonement today, which I call the “atonement theory paradigm”—a paradigm 
into which Anselm is supposed to fit neatly. The atonement theory paradigm assumes that 
a set of traditional concepts applied to Christ’s work stand for theories of atonement 
which are fundamentally alternatives to one another. According to this paradigm, at a 
face-value reading, either Christ saves by defeating oppressive forces and liberating us 
from them (Christus Victor), or he saves us by offering himself to the Father as a perfect 
sacrifice, or he saves us by providing a saving teaching and example of the proper love of 
God (moral exemplar), etc. What follows from this is that one either has to select one 
such theory or else interpret them more loosely and metaphorically, holding them 




approaches is ideal from the perspective of Christian theology; all things being equal, it 
would be preferable to hold together such deeply-entrenched theological claims with their 
full force. Thankfully, they do not actually contradict one another in any obvious way.  
In Chapter 3, I proceed to develop a detailed interpretation of Anselm’s Cur Deus 
Homo which understands him not to be presenting an alternative theory to other supposed 
theories of atonement but to be identifying an underlying logic according to which all of 
the main traditional ways of talking Christ’s work can be understood as fitting and 
necessary. That is, I argue that Anselm does not fit the atonement theory paradigm, and 
that he presents us with a way of understanding Christ’s work that avoids the weaknesses 
of that paradigm. Attending to the details of Anselm’s text, as well as to several of his 
earlier treatises, it becomes apparent that many prominent criticisms of his theology of 
atonement hinge on fitting it into the atonement theory paradigm, and hence my 
reinterpretation helps to show where such critiques miss the mark.  
Moving from there, in Chapter 4 I develop a revised satisfaction account that 
moves beyond a reproduction of Anselm. I do this by attending to another medieval 
theologian who made use of Anselm’s concept of satisfaction, namely St. Thomas 
Aquinas. Thomas differs from Anselm on some important points, including especially the 
question of whether God made use of the means of satisfaction to bring about the 
salvation of human persons by necessity, or as a contingent choice from among other 
genuine alternatives. Thomas also provides a helpful elaboration to Anselm, since his 
account of Christ’s Passion in the Summa Theologiae is more systematic and 
comprehensive than Anselm’s treatise. Thomas thus helps to show more clearly than 




concept of friendship with God, and his connection of satisfaction with the maintenance 
of such friendship (through the sacrament of penance) helps to make it more clear than it 
is in Cur Deus Homo how a satisfaction account of atonement relates to the spiritual life 
of a Christian striving to grow in holiness and in the love of God. By considering these 
differences and elaborations, I arrive at a revised satisfaction account that is based on 
Anselm but has a greater breadth than one could get from Anselm’s text by itself.  
Finally, with this revised account of the atonement in hand, in Chapter 5, I 
consider one prominent form of critique normally applied to satisfaction accounts by 
contemporary theologians. According to many feminist, womanist, and other liberationist 
thinkers, accounts like the one I develop here are harmful to oppressed persons, such as 
those undergoing spousal abuse, because they provide a motive for thinking that 
passively accepting such suffering is Christ-like. I examine how the inference involved in 
this critique works, and then argue that if we attend to the details of our satisfaction 
account, we can see that it does not hold.  
On this account of satisfaction, God does not value suffering for its own sake, but 
only for the sake of some good end, ultimately justice. On the contrary, our account 
suggests that whenever possible those who perpetrate injustice ought to try to make 
satisfaction, and that the satisfaction assigned ought to be of the sort which would teach 
wrongdoers to will what they ought to will towards the ones wronged. I consider two 
cases to elucidate this response: the case of spousal abuse, and the case of calls for 
reparations for slavery in the United States. In both cases, I argue that the logic of the 
satisfaction account developed here runs in the opposite way to that supposed by the 




justice for the wrongdoers to perform an act of satisfaction rather than be forgiven 
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A SKETCH OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
Many of our holy Fathers and teachers, following the Apostles, speak frequently and on a 
grand scale about the logical principles of our faith. Their aim in doing so is to . . . 
nourish those who, with cleansed hearts, already take delight in this same logic of the 
faith . . . 
I consider that the understanding which we gain in this life stands midway between faith 
and revelation. . . . the nearer someone comes to the attainment of this understanding, the 
nearer that person approaches to revelation, for which we all pant in anticipation. . . .  
I am attempting for a little while, insofar as the heavenly grace deigns to allow me, to 
arise to contemplate the logic of our beliefs; and when I discover something which I used 
not previously to see, I am happy to disclose this to other people, my object being that I 
may learn through the judgment of others what I may confidently hold on to.  
   Saint Anselm of Canterbury, Cur Deus Homo, Commendatio1 
 
The Question and its Answer 
Christians have long proclaimed that in the life, teachings, death, resurrection, and 
ascension of Jesus, God accomplished an astonishing work on our behalf. Through these 
events, God has decisively overcome the damage wrought by sin and restored us to our 
intended relation to Him. The question of this dissertation is this: how are we who believe 
this to understand it? How is that God has worked in Christ to achieve our salvation? In 
                                                 
1 Translations of Anselm are taken from Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works, ed. Brian Davies and G. 
R. Evans, Oxford World’s Classics (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) unless otherwise 
indicated. I will occasionally supplement with Latin, taken from Anselm of Canterbury, S. Anselmi 
Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera omnia, ed. Franciscus Salesius Schmitt, 5 vols. (Edinburgh: Thomas 




scripture and the Christian tradition, a variety of concepts have been used to describe 
what exactly has happened: we have been healed, ransomed, redeemed, taught, and 
liberated. Our debt has been satisfied, our punishment averted, the oppressive forces of 
sin, death, and the devil defeated, our sin atoned for, our damaged natures healed, and our 
proper relationship to God restored. The question, then, is what to do with this cluster of 
claims. It would seem that either some or all of these ways of describing what Christ has 
accomplished can be accepted, while perhaps some might be set aside or replaced with 
new ones. We need to discern to what extent they can be held together. We hope to be 
able to say something about what they each mean, and how they relate to one another. 
For much of the modern era, these different ways of speaking have been thought of as 
distinct theories, models, or metaphors for an event called the atonement. We will 
consider whether this way of framing the matter is entirely felicitous in due course. For 
the moment, it is only necessary to be clear that, although it might be reasonable to think 
of atonement as simply one facet of Christ’s work,2 here, as a terminological matter, I 
will use the term “atonement” to refer to whatever it is that Christ accomplishes towards 
the salvation of human persons. By atonement, then, I mean not simply to some single 
facet or aspect of Christ’s saving work, nor to any particular single concept such as 
expiation or propitiation, but rather as a sort of stand-in term for what may turn out to be 
multiple discrete facets.  
By drawing whatever Christ accomplishes under the one term of atonement, I do 
not intend to impose a conceptual unity too easily. As far as the question is concerned, we 
                                                 
2 I am grateful to Peter Martens for making this point with admirable clarity in an unpublished paper 




might well say that the atonement consists of multiple discrete acts: perhaps Christ does 
X, and Y, and Z, and we can say nothing more about their interconnection than that X, Y, 
and Z, are all things Christ does for the salvation of human persons. Nor do I mean to 
assume that what Christ accomplishes has some connection to intuitive meanings of the 
word “atonement.” It could be, as far as the question is concerned, that Christ simply 
heals us, or sets us an example to follow, and does nothing else—no offering of 
propitiation, or satisfaction, or bearing of punishment. The point is simply to begin with 
the term more or less as it has come to be used as a starting point.  
My thesis is this: we should understand what Christ has done as a multifaceted 
work of satisfaction: Christ makes an offering to God which fulfills everything humanity 
owed to God, which is to say, everything which God intended humanity to give to Him, 
repairing the damage caused by sin, and establishing humanity in the role for which God 
created them. Satisfaction, I will argue, does not replace other concepts like victory, or 
moral example, or healing, but instead provides a sort of organizing logic and unity for 
them, rendering them intelligible, coherent, and beautiful.  
The concept of satisfaction as applied to Christ’s work comes chiefly, of course 
from St. Anselm of Canterbury, and thus my thesis thus involves defending his great 
treatise, Cur Deus Homo, as substantially (though not entirely) right. This project thus 
involves a sympathetic reinterpretation and defense of Anselm, and one which I hope 
renders his thought plausibly and attractively. Even so, I am not simply reporting and 
repeating what Anselm has said. Instead, my goal is to build on his thought in a 
constructive way, with some effort to distinguish between the core satisfaction account I 




expand on Anselm’s thought, and to show where one might hold to a satisfaction account 
in the sense I am defending while rejecting Anselm’s reasoning about it on this or that 
point. Thus, my goal is to develop and defend an approach to the doctrine of atonement 
which is Anselmian without being exactly Anselm’s. The result, to the extent it is 
successful, will be a contribution on both historical and systematic fronts.  
Background Assumptions and Desiderata 
 What will count as a good answer to the question I have laid out depends on 
background assumptions about what theology is and how it is done. While I cannot spell 
out an entire theological methodology, and can offer little defense of what 
methodological commitments I do make explicit, it still seems worthwhile to offer some 
sense of the perspective from which I approach the topic, and what sort of desiderata I 
intend my answer to fulfill. My intent is not to limit the applicability or usefulness of this 
project to people who share all of these commitments, but simply to own up to where the 
project is coming from, and what sorts of things I will tend to take for granted.  
 I approach theology as an unapologetically confessional discipline. Like Anselm, 
my aim to grow in the understanding of that which I believe. More precisely, it is my 
hope to understand (as I seek to believe) what it is that the Church teaches, since it is to 
the Church that God has entrusted saving knowledge of Himself and His acts. Theology 
seeks to understand God (in the way appropriate to the human creature), and the 
theologian must proceed on the basis of what God has generously chosen to share, 
through the means He has chosen to share it.3 It is thus in the nature of the case that 
                                                 
3 C.f., Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Iq1a1. Thomas’s account of theology is apt. As he notes, 
while it may be true that some knowledge of God is available through natural reason, it can only be 




theology proceeds from premises that reason could not demonstrate, but which are known 
through the virtue of faith—faith being the virtue of steadfastly believing what God has 
revealed on the basis that He is the one who revealed it.   
From this way of formulating the task of theology the question of what I mean by 
the Church, and what God has revealed to it, arises immediately. I answer this question in 
a self-consciously ecumenical and catholic way: without offering a definition, I suggest 
that the Church can at least be picked out in a preliminary way as the historically-
extended community of those who have received and passed on the Gospel of Jesus 
Christ, the community which, indeed, is described by that Gospel and a constitutive 
element in it.4 They have received it, moreover, through a rich and diverse canonical 
heritage: scriptures, creeds, liturgies, sacraments, saints, teachers, and so on.  
Indeed, the various elements of this heritage are rightly understood as the 
medicine of the Holy Spirit, the means of grace by which human persons are healed and 
brought into union with God.5 The Church thus described is, of course, visibly and 
tragically divided, and various parts of its heritage remain contested—this is an important 
feature of our divisions, both as cause and as effect. Even so, the swath of that heritage 
which historically precedes the Church’s most significant and enduring divisions 
(especially the schism between East and West and the Protestant Reformation) remains in 
a distinctive way available to the entire Church. This roughly shared heritage provides the 
                                                 
these means (for instance, that He is Triune). But since God intended human persons to come to know Him 
as their first and final cause, He has revealed these things through the testimony of the Church.  
4 On this last point, see Bruce D. Marshall, “The Church in the Gospel,” Pro Ecclesia 1, no. 1 (September 
1992): 27–41. 
 
5 See Jason E. Vickers, “Medicine of the Spirit: The Canonical Heritage of the Church,” in Canonical 
Theism: A Proposal for Theology and the Church, ed. William J. Abraham, Jason E. Vickers, and Natalie 




divided Church with a partially-realized sort of unity, although we continually fail to act 
in accordance with it, and perhaps we lack the wisdom to see how to do so. 
In any case, Christians ought to see this complex and multifaceted heritage as the 
means through which God has worked to bring us into union with Himself. An essential 
part of this union is related to our minds: He has enabled us to come to know the truth 
about Him. For that reason, we must strive to understand this heritage (and especially the 
parts which constitute an explicit teaching tradition, such as the Christian scriptures and 
creeds) as testifying coherently to a single reality, namely the one God, in such a way that 
we who accept this testimony might come to love and worship Him in truth. We must 
resist the temptation to flatten out the diverse voices within that tradition too easily, 
minimizing genuine tensions rather than attending to them honestly. Nonetheless, we 
have here a basic motivation to prefer, ceteris paribus, a theology which holds together 
diverse elements of traditional Christian teaching over one which is narrowly selective of 
elements within that tradition. I shall argue below that an Anselmian satisfaction account 
of the atonement is more properly of the former sort rather than the latter; here I simply 
lay out my basis for finding this to be a good and valuable feature for a theology of 
atonement.  
More substantively, I take it that the most (and perhaps only) plausible way to 
take the elements of the canonical heritage which constitute a tradition of teaching as 
means of grace which unite us to God includes believing the most central elements of that 
tradition to speak truly about God.6 I accept, therefore, the content of the Nicene-
                                                 
6 I am not presenting this as an inference, so that one is epistemically justified in believing that the central 
teaching elements of the Christian tradition speak truly about God just on the basis that this is the most 




Constantinopolitan Creed and the Chalcedonian Definition. I take it that this commits me 
broadly to classical Trinitarian theism, and to a classical Christology along with it. That 
is, I am operating under the view that the classic divine attributes of omnipotence, 
omniscience, aseity, eternality, simplicity, and so forth, are appropriately said of God, 
that God is Triune, being three Persons in one being or nature, and that Christ is on divine 
Person, Son, possessed of two natures, divine and human. So, naturally I will appeal to 
such doctrinal claims as premises in for thinking and arguing about the doctrine of 
atonement.  
All of that said, the way this teaching tradition functions is not simply to provide a 
set of answers as an end to discussion, nor even to cut off questioning of its claims. 
Perhaps no one shows more clearly than Anselm that rigorous questioning can be an 
extremely generative exercise from the point of view of faith. The elements of the 
canonical heritage which aim at teaching do so by way of healing our minds and hearts, 
and they do so in a way appropriate to human nature: as we say the Creed, sing and pray 
the Psalms, hear the narratives of scripture and sermons expounding them, and reflect on 
the writings of great teachers of the Christian past, we are invited to work out together a 
way of understanding what we are saying. In this life, our understanding is always partial, 
and yet we hope by the grace of God that our reasoning together might lead us deeper and 
deeper into the Truth that is Jesus Christ. It is in this spirit, and to this end, that I seek to 
                                                 
the question of how one might be justified in making this inference, and instead focusing on the specific 
role these elements play within the larger soteriological function of the canonical heritage, however it is 
that one might be justified in accepting that in fact what that heritage teaches about God is true. I follow 
William Abraham’s canonical theism in prioritizing the ontology and soteriology over epistemology when 
it comes to elements of the canonical heritage. See William J. Abraham, Jason E. Vickers, and Natalie B. 





take up the question of how we should understand the doctrine of atonement, and to make 
a case for a positive and constructive reception of Anselm’s reflection on it.  
A Sketch of the Argument 
I develop the argument for my thesis in this way. First, in Chapter 2, I offer an 
analysis of the most common way of thinking about the doctrine of atonement in the 
modern and contemporary theology, which I call the atonement theory paradigm. The 
atonement theory paradigm involves the assumption that, if taken straightforwardly, the 
various concepts and models attached to Christ’s saving work in scripture and tradition 
(for example, Christus Victor, sacrifice, or moral exemplar) are fundamentally 
alternatives to one another. This assumption then leads to two rough options: on the one 
hand, we might simply choose one strand within the tradition as true or legitimate, or, on 
the other, we might say that none of them are straightforwardly true, but all are instead to 
be held in a looser way, as metaphors rather than literal claims.  
In the chapter, I consider selected examples of both alternatives: in the former 
category, Gustaf Aulén and Kathryn Tanner, and Joel Green, Mark Baker, and Scot 
McKnight in the latter. I argue that the basic premise driving both approaches (the 
atonement theory paradigm) does not withstand scrutiny: there is no obvious 
contradiction involved in saying that Christ saves by defeating the devil, by offering a 
perfect sacrifice to the Father, by his teaching and example, and so on. Indeed, these 
things tend to appear right next to one another in scripture and in the patristic writings. 
Thus, for the project of faith seeking understanding, we ought not settle for either 
alternative, but instead should press for a way of understanding these elemental 




or facets of a single, wonderful, and supremely fitting divine act.  
 In Chapter 3, I develop a reading of Anselm as engaged in exactly this sort of 
project, and thus as not adequately captured by the atonement theory paradigm. This 
might seem surprising, because it contrasts with common readings of Anselm. Both those 
who approve of his theology and those who do not often understand Anselm to be a 
seminal figure in the history of the doctrine of atonement in two ways. (1) He supposedly 
crystallized and articulated a particular influential and archetypal theory of the atonement 
(namely the satisfaction theory), and (2) he was perhaps the first thinker to organize his 
theology of atonement in the form of a full-fledged, rigorously coherent and rational 
theory. On this widely accepted reading, Anselm appears as the archetypal single-theory 
atonement theologian. 
In challenging this view, I draw on an ongoing re-reading of Anselm’s work as a 
whole. This large-scale revision is expressed in many recent authors including David 
Bentley Hart, David Whidden, Eileen Sweeney, Nicholas Cohen, and others. This 
developing view emphasizes the crucial and often missed lines of continuity between 
Anselm and the patristic tradition. After sketching out the popular view, I contribute to 
this more recent interpretive trajectory, first by attending to relevant aspects of the 
theological background to CDH provided by Anselm’s earlier treatises. These earlier 
works reveal a greater degree of continuity between Anselm and the patristic tradition 
than is usually recognized, and moreover they provide a basis for doubting the way 
Anselm’s theology of atonement is usually presented.  
From there, I proceed to offer a reading of CDH itself. I will argue that, on 




alternative to other, previous theories. Instead, he is mainly engaged in an effort to 
understand together the elements he takes himself to receive from the tradition in a single 
comprehensive vision. I draw attention here to substantial elements which Anselm does 
not seem to think himself at liberty to discard in his own discussion of the saving nature 
of Christ’s work—and these elements are precisely those which are normally identified as 
alternative atonement theories. Therefore, I argue, Anselm is not arguing over what 
atonement is, but rather about how and why the atonement is what it is—why, given what 
it is, it is fitting and necessary. He thus presents a real alternative to the atonement theory 
paradigm. And, moreover, once he is reinterpreted this way, his position turns out to be 
more promising than the more typical way of interpreting him.  
In Chapter 4, I proceed with the Anselmian account of atonement developed in 
Chapter 3, and subject it to critique and development by comparison with the way 
Thomas Aquinas develops his theology of atonement in the Summa Theologiae. Some 
commentators note a difference between Anselm and Thomas on the question of whether 
the Incarnation and Cross were necessary, or instead extremely fitting but not necessary. 
Indeed, it has been suggested that Thomas’s refusal to say that they were necessary 
enables him to include a diverse array of effects alongside satisfaction in a more natural 
way than Anselm does. Picking up this dispute, I attempt to give Anselm a partial 
defense, while ultimately proposing what I take to be a mediating position. One central 
contribution of my reinterpretation of Anselm here is that, even if Anselm himself was 
incorrect on the question of necessity (and I take it that he was), his satisfaction account 




for our salvation. On the contrary, he provides an underlying logic according to which a 
variety of effects can be seen as extremely appropriate—the logic of satisfaction.  
Thomas’s more developed theology does indeed provide much material Anselm 
leaves out—though this is perhaps best explained by differences in the structure, volume, 
and purpose of Thomas’s writings from Anselm’s, rather than by Anselm’s search for 
necessity. Even so, I draw on Thomas’s thought to supplement Anselm, especially since 
Thomas’s writings contain the material for a more detailed account of how satisfaction 
relates to the Christian life, growth into holiness, and friendship with God. I also note 
Thomas’s mention of instances of literary or aesthetic fittingness in God’s chosen means 
of working our salvation in Christ. In these cases, the point of these examples is to note 
(by demonstration) the way that an Anselmian satisfaction account is susceptible to a 
great deal of elaboration and addition.  
With an account of atonement in view which is Anselmian, but nonetheless 
expanded and elaborated from what appears in CDH itself, I turn in Chapter 5 to consider 
a certain form of contemporary critique generally taken to apply to satisfaction accounts, 
and perhaps to render them untenable. Specifically, I engage the sort of critique generated 
by feminist and liberation-oriented theologians to the effect that satisfaction and similar 
accounts of atonement are, properly understood, ideologically supportive of the abuse of 
women and other forms of oppression. The idea is that by envisioning God as valuing 
Christ’s undergoing of abuse and oppression, such accounts of atonement cannot avoid 
implying that abuse and oppression are somehow valuable in and of themselves. 
Moreover, these accounts motivate imitation of Christ’s willingness to suffer, and calls to 




After sketching out this mode of critique and the inference that seems to be 
involved, I argue that on inspection it does not hold against the satisfaction account 
developed in the previous chapters. A satisfaction account does not imply that God values 
suffering per se, but rather the will towards a good end (indeed, towards justice) even in 
the face of suffering. To examine what a satisfaction account might actually entail in 
cases of injustice, I consider two cases: spousal abuse, and the call for reparations for 
slavery and its legacy in the U.S. What I hope to show is that a satisfaction account can 
indeed support calls for justice in such cases, precisely as a paradigm case where, instead 
of merely forbearing ongoing injustice and forgiving it, God opted to call the sinful party, 
humanity, to make things right (even as He provided them the means to do so). Attending 
to the details of how and why and under what conditions this was fitting put us in a 
position to see the way Christ’s work of atonement can illuminate what should happen in 
other cases of injustice. Among other things, this helps us to see that it is for the good of 
the wrongdoer that we might insist that he set things right before being accepted back, 
that the act of setting things right should be fitting to the particular wrong, and to the 
repair of the wrongdoer’s will. Moreover, this account ought to motivate us to work for 
justice, even if this leads us to suffering, because that is what Christ did. Overall, then, I 
argue that in cases of injustice, the natural way to apply the satisfaction account 
developed in this project would be to call for them to be set right through some concrete 
act, rather than to forgive them and leave it at that.  
The goal of all of this is to develop an Anselmian satisfaction account of 
atonement and render it as plausible and attractive as possible. It is an account which is 




which draws them together as parts of Christ’s work of satisfaction: setting right what 
was damaged and restoring humanity to the friendship to God for which it was intended. 
It is not that Christ makes satisfaction rather than defeating the devil, but that Christ 
defeats the devil precisely for the purpose of making satisfaction, offering to God the 
honor which Adam and Eve failed to offer Him when they were called to resist the devil. 
It is not that Christ makes satisfaction rather than providing a supremely effective moral 
example, but that Christ teaches us how to love God, above all, by making satisfaction. 
Indeed, everything Christ does is about bringing humanity to the state for which God 
intended it, the state where humanity ought to be but for the damage caused by sin. 
Developing this reading of Anselm, revising it and expanding on it through engagement 
with Thomas, and then illustrating how it can illuminate cases of injustice rather than 
supporting further injustice, hopefully displays the virtues and the promise of such an 
account as a way to understand what it is we believe, a way to guide us forward on the 
path from faith to sight.  











THE ATONEMENT THEORY PARADIGM 
 
 
For even the Fathers, because, ‘the days of men are short’, were not able to say all that 
they could have said if they had lived longer; and the logic of the truth is so copious and 
profound that it cannot be exhausted by mortals. 
   Saint Anselm of Canterbury, Cur Deus Homo, Commendatio 
 
 
 In his classic text, Cur Deus Homo (CDH), Anselm of Canterbury set out to 
understand the deep wisdom of the saving work of God in Christ. He did so, I will argue, 
by identifying an underlying logic according to which “all the things we believe about 
Christ”7 are intelligible together as profoundly fitting--even necessary--in light of the 
goodness of God and the reality of human sin. Anselm did not seek to develop a new 
doctrine of atonement, but to comprehend as precisely as possible the why of the doctrine 
already accepted and known in faith. He struck upon the concept of satisfaction as the 
conceptual fulcrum on which the whole thing turned. Satisfaction was not, for Anselm, an 
explanatory strategy opposed to saying Christ saved by defeating the devil or by his 
teaching and inspiring example of a life of love, but rather a lens through which those 
truths and more can be understood as exactly what was most fitting and even necessary—
why God saved this way instead of by another route. This reading of Anselm will be 
                                                 




unpacked and defended below (in Chapter 3), but with this very brief sketch of where we 
are going in mind, we turn instead to the scene of contemporary atonement theology. 
How has Anselm’s project fared?  
 In the modern period, theologians writing on the doctrine of atonement have not 
generally followed Anselm, either in his material claims or in his methodology—though 
here I will focus on the latter point. Anselm’s project has mostly been abandoned, in one 
way or another. This point is important to notice, because the most typical way of telling 
the history of atonement theology makes Anselm the paradigm example and even the 
originator of the dominant way of framing the task of atonement theology. We shall see 
that it simply is not so. In this chapter, I will unpack the dominant approach to the 
doctrine atonement today, so that the way it diverges from Anselm’s project can be seen 
clearly. I will also observe various problems that arise from the dominant approach, 
problems we can avoid by returning to Anselm’s fides quaerens intellectum in the fullest 
sense.  
 Today, atonement theology is done, by and large, under what I am calling the 
atonement theory paradigm. The basic task of atonement theology is to explain how it is 
that the events of the Incarnation, life, teachings, suffering, death, resurrection, and 
ascension of Jesus constitute our salvation and reconciliation with God. Under the 
atonement theory paradigm, an atonement theory provides such an explanation. Each 
atonement theory tells a different story about the problem between God and humanity 
how that problem has been solved in Jesus Christ. The explanatory task usually involves 
applying concepts from some other arena to the events of Christ’s life in a sort of 




those concepts and their interrelationships so that the intelligibility of the relevant 
concepts in their natural home helps to lend intelligibility to the events of Christ’s life, 
death, and resurrection, and specifically how those events constitute our salvation. 
Atonement theories are, under this paradigm, theories about what sort of act the 
atonement is.  
Not only is atonement theology often carried out this way today, but the history of 
the doctrine is now typically understood in these terms. The history of atonement 
theology is thus the history of atonement theories--theories about what the atonement is, 
or at least the inchoate beginnings of atonement theories. According to this way of 
thinking, the Christus Victor theory expressed or at least hinted at in the Fathers 
conceives of the atonement as a victory over oppressive forces. The ransom theory 
expressed in Gregory of Nyssa presents the atonement in terms of economic exchange 
(albeit one involving a bit of trickery): at the cross, Jesus offers himself to the devil in 
order to purchase our freedom, and the devil (foolishly) accepts. The moral exemplar 
theory of Peter Abelard presents atonement fundamentally as a matter of Christ’s 
example of love inspiring us to the same sort of love; the atonement is thus a kind of 
moral education. In each case, the concepts chosen render the story of atonement in 
Christ intelligible by presenting an account of what the atonement is, and each one is 
understood as discrete and distinct from the others. In the penal substitution theory, 
atonement involves Christ bearing our legal punishment, satisfying divine justice and 
therefore earning our acquittal--atonement is thus a legal exchange.  
By presenting different views of what the atonement is, atonement theories are 




atonement theology this way suggests, then, that either atonement is a victory over 
oppressive forces, or it is a payment rendered to the devil, or it is a legal judgment, etc., 
and the atonement theologian needs to show which is correct (or if none of these are 
correct, develop a new, correct theory). We will call this initial expression of the 
atonement theory paradigm the single-theory approach. By this label, we include any 
approach to the doctrine of atonement which selects a narrow slice of traditional teaching 
on atonement and rejects the rest. Alternatively, however, one might judge that what the 
atonement is not adequately captured by any of the alternatives on offer, though each one 
(or most of them, anyway) provide some window into the truth. According to this latter 
view, the project of atonement theology is not to pick out the theory we ought to believe, 
but instead to make use of an array theories in whatever way turns out to be appropriate 
for a given task.  
It seems, then, that the atonement theologian has two possible choices: either 
select a single theory as the only or the primary way of understanding the atonement, or 
decide that several theories do the job better than one. This latter option--which, 
following Joel Green’s term, we will call the kaleidoscopic approach--appears as a sort of 
postmodern reaction to inadequacies of the single theory approach, as we will see in more 
detail below. The point I want to emphasize here, however, is that the kaleidoscopic 
approach accepts the central assumption of the atonement theory paradigm, i.e., that the 
various elements of traditional teaching on the atonement which are identified as discrete 
atonement theories are, if taken literally, alternatives to one another. This is why, for the 
kaleidoscopic theorist, they cannot or should not be unified into a coherent story--the 




In the rest of this chapter, I will first consider two examples of the single-theory 
approach; I will then consider Mark Baker and Joel Green’s kaleidoscopic approach. I 
will observe the strengths and weaknesses of each approach, ultimately arguing that 
neither option can overcome its particular weaknesses. Indeed, I will argue that the only 
way to maintain the strengths and avoid the weaknesses of both alternatives is to reject 
the atonement theory paradigm altogether. I will conclude by examining Scot 
McKnight’s “golf bag” approach—this last option, I will argue, pushes beyond the 
atonement theory paradigm to something more like Anselm’s. These examples cannot by 
any means be exhaustive, but it is hoped they will be sufficiently illustrative with respect 
to the formal features of the atonement theory paradigm, its weaknesses, and the shape of 
an Anselmian alternative.8  
Single-Theory Approaches 
Gustaf Aulén’s Christus Victor 
We can start our consideration of single-theory approaches with Gustaf Aulén’s 
book, Christus Victor. Aulén divides the landscape of atonement theology into three 
options: the objective, the subjective, and what he calls the “classic” idea of the 
                                                 
8 I have selected these few examples to examine in some detail because doing so helps to bring out clearly 
the features of the atonement theory paradigm. There are, of course, examples of theologizing about the 
atonement that do not fall into the atonement theory paradigm, even though it remains the most common 
way of framing the doctrine of atonement. Just so, there will certainly be other possible ways of organizing 
the doctrine besides the satisfaction account I will develop in this project. One recent example, for instance, 
can be found in Jeremy R. Treat, The Crucified King: Atonement and Kingdom in Biblical and Systematic 
Theology (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 2014). Treat attempts to draw together penal substitution 
and Christus Victor through the Biblical theme of Christ’s kingship being established at the Cross, through 
an act of substitutionary sacrifice. What will differentiate my proposal from alternatives such as Treats, 
what will render it a stronger or weaker candidate than them, will be how successfully it illuminates and 
draws together the richness of the tradition, how much theological sense it makes, and how well it 
withstands objections compared to others. Due to limitations of time and space, however, after critiquing 
the atonement theory paradigm, I will mainly make a positive proposal and defend it from critiques, rather 





atonement; he treats these options as mutually exclusive even though he is aware that, 
often enough, a supposed exemplar of one view appears to express the other alternatives. 
As he admits, “points belonging properly to [the classical and the Latin views] often 
stand side by side without any apparent consciousness on the part of those who use them 
of their essential diversity.”9 
In any case, here is Aulén’s typology. On the classic view, God saves humanity 
from external forces, and the atonement is thus the work of God from start to finish. On 
the objective (“Latin”) view crystallized by Anselm, Christ saves humanity from God’s 
own justice; this view is modeled, Aulén recognizes, on the practice of penance.10 
Humanity has to give something to God, and thus, on Aulén’s analysis, there is a sort of 
break in God’s activity in the process of the atonement. It is “as man” that Jesus makes an 
offering to God in order to satisfy justice, and so the atonement is no longer the work of 
God from start to finish. Alternatively, on the subjective view, which arises as a critique 
of the objective view, the atonement is not really an act of God at all. The important 
activity takes place entirely on the human side via a change within the human persons 
who are inspired by Christ’s example of love. As he slices up the conceptual territory, 
then, we can see that these three options appear to be jointly exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive: either the atonement is completely a divine act, or it is partially a divine and 
partially a human act, or it is completely a human act.  
                                                 
9 Gustaf Aulén, Christus Victor: An Historical Study of the Three Main Types of the Idea of Atonement, 
trans. A. G. Herbert (Eugene, Ore.: Wipf & Stock Pub, 2003), 39. 
 





Arguably, however, this assumption of mutual incompatibility leads Aulén to 
mishandle his evidence. He denies, for example, that Augustine saw any “idea of an 
offering made to God from man’s side, from below.”11 But after a lengthy discourse on 
the nature of true sacrifice in The City of God, Augustine says that  
Thus the true sacrifice is offered in every act which is designed to unite us 
to God in a holy fellowship, . . . the whole redeemed community, that is to 
say, the congregation and fellowship of the saints, is offered to God as a 
universal sacrifice, through the great Priest who offered himself in his 
suffering for us – so that we might be the body of so great a head – under 
‘the form of a servant.’ For it was this form he offered, and in this form he 
was offered, because it is under this form that he is the Mediator, in this 
form he is the Priest, in this form he is the Sacrifice. . . . 
 
This is the sacrifice of Christians, who are ‘many, making up one body in 
Christ.’ This is the sacrifice which the Church continually celebrates in the 
sacrament of the altar, a sacrament well-known to the faithful where it is 
shown to the Church that she herself is offered in the offering which she 
presents to God.12 
Augustine plainly envisions Christ as offering himself to God as a perfect offering to God 
“from below,” an offering that enables and catches up into itself the offerings of the 
faithful. Likewise, Aulén recognizes that Athanasius talks about a “debt of honor” that 
Christ pays to God alongside the idea that Christ overcomes death for us, but Aulén 
insists that  
Athanasius is in no way forsaking the classic point of view; the payment of the 
debt is God’s own act, carried out by the Logos, while at the same time it is God 
who receives the payment. Least of all is it true to say that we have here anything 
like a rational theory of the Latin type, according to which satisfaction would be 
paid to God’s justice from man’s side, from below.13 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 46. 
 
12 Augustine of Hippo, City of God, X.6. This translation is taken from Augustine of Hippo, City of God, 
trans. Henry Bettenson (London ; New York: Penguin Classics, 2004), 379–80.  




In these texts where Augustine and Athansius explicitly affirm that God, through 
the self-offering of Christ’s human nature, offers something to God which sets things 
right, Aulén detects a “double-sidedness” and rightly so; they are grappling with the fact 
that what Christ is done by one who is both human and divine. Hence it is true both that 
in Christ a man offers something to God and that God is the one making the offering. But 
Aulén fails to recognize that this very same double-sidedness is what is stake in the Latin 
tradition, and thus where Anselm includes themes Aulén identifies as belonging to the 
classic view Aulén must dismiss these inclusions as merely vestigial.14 For Aulén, 
because the three options in his typology are mutually exclusive, where actual 
theologians appear to violate that exclusivity, they are simply paying lip-service or else 
they just were not thinking clearly enough to recognize the contradiction. We will see, 
however, that at least in Anselm’s case, we have an attempt at integrating elements Aulén 
identifies as properly belonging to the classic and subjective ideas which already pushes 
beyond the typology. This signals plainly enough that, for Anselm, the atonement 
consists of a liberating defeat of the devil and a perfect human offering to God and an 
inspiring and illuminating example. And, indeed, Christ brings each of these actions to a 
climax in one act, namely his Passion.  
                                                 
14 See, e.g., Ibid., 1–2: “By the theory of satisfaction developed in the Cur Deus homo? he repressed, even 
if he could not entirely overcome, the old mythological account of Christ’s work as a victory over the devil 
. . .” And later, Ibid., 89, he says, “. . . while it is true that he sometimes speaks of Christ’s work as a 
triumph over the devil, and connects this thought with the idea of satisfaction, this use of the old 
phraseology is purely accidental. It has no vital relation to the structure of his thought.” Aulén, however, 
provides little in the way of evidence that Anselm wished either to repress or to overcome the idea of 
Christ’s work as a victory over the devil, or that it plays no vital role in his thought. As we shall see in 
Chapter 3 attending to the logic of Anselm’s argument makes it more plausible to think that he intended 
understand the “old mythological account” of Christ’s work as a defeat of the devil and integrate it with 




What, then, of Aulén’s conceptual scheme? As we have noted, the supposed 
incompatibility between the types has to do with God’s involvement in the process. It is 
true, let us grant, that either the atonement is only a divine work, only a human work, or a 
mixture of both divine and human work. And, we can suppose that Aulén would reply 
that any view that includes a human offering and/or the inspiration of human love as a 
necessary step would amount to a mixed view, involving what he calls a “break” in God’s 
activity. So, merely to observe that Anselm actually did mean in all seriousness that God 
(in Christ) defeated the Devil and inspired us to love and righteousness, does not really 
refute that for Anselm the atonement is a mix of divine and human activity rather than 
being exclusively a divine act.15 Aulén’s analysis will not, however, withstand 
metaphysical scrutiny, at least not from within a Chalcedonian Christology. According to 
Chalcedon, the Word is one divine person who possesses two natures, and actions are 
attributed not to the natures, but to the one divine person. Thus God was born of a virgin 
and died on a cross, and thus Mary is the theotokos, and thus Jesus Christ is God without 
whom nothing has been made that has been made.  
It is true, of course, that creaturely actions such as birth and death are carried out 
by the Son in virtue of possessing a human nature, but this is equally true on either 
Aulén’s classic idea or the Latin idea. And, indeed, one of the chief tasks of patristic 
                                                 
15 C.f. Aulén’s discussion in Ibid., 88. There, he suggests that Anselm “throws out the idea that Christ even 
pays satisfaction to His own Divine nature, he is saying, as clearly as words can express, that he is thinking 
of that which Christ accomplishes as man, of an offering made to God from man’s side, from below.” 
Anselm does indeed affirm that the Christ’s honoring of God is an honoring of the whole Trinity in CDH 
II.18. He also, however, claims that he has preserved the truth of saying that this is an offering from the 
Son to the Father. He is not denying, therefore, that the self-offering of Jesus is a self-offering of the Divine 
Word—it is an offering of the Word in virtue of his human nature. Satisfaction is still, therefore, a divine 
act, and it is by no means clear that Anselm means to affirm a division between what Christ does “as man” 




theologians like Athanasius (and likewise Anselm) was to show exactly why God opted 
to defeat the devil through creaturely acts like being born and dying--in other words, why 
it was fitting for God to become incarnate. So, even if we take the view that Christ saves 
only by defeating the Devil and not by any human offering to God, it would seem that, 
equally for the patristic writers (representatives of the classic idea) as for Anselm later, 
God saves by what Aulén would have to call a mixture of divine and human activity. 
Happily, however, given Chalcedonian Christology, we can affirm that even what Christ 
does in virtue of his human nature is still a divine act--the act, precisely, of the the 
Incarnate Word. Therefore, insofar as we are committed to Chalcedon, we can say that at 
least the “classic” and the “objective” ideas of the atonement both affirm the atonement 
to be a divine act from start to finish, and that Aulén has not given us a good reason to 
see these two options as incompatible.  
Furthermore, we can see detrimental effects for the doctrine of atonement of using 
his approach. One observes that Aulén actually has a religious motivation for carving 
things up the way that he does, and that is his discomfort with the idea of penance. He 
recognizes (as other commentators often fail to do) that Anselm’s concept of satisfaction 
has its roots, not in feudal law, but in the practice of penance--a practice which he rejects 
as entirely legalistic.16 His rejection of anything much significant contributed to the 
atonement by Christ’s humanity aimed towards God appears closely tied to his rejection 
of any significant involvement in the human will in the process of appropriating the 
atonement. We can hold off for the moment on attending the specific way the human will 
(both Christ’s and the believer’s) is involved until we consider Anselm’s view in detail in 
                                                 




Chapter 3—there, I will argue that Anselm’s view does not amount to legalistic works 
righteousness. But for now, we can notice that Aulén (insofar as he can be read as 
advocating for what he calls the classic idea) essentially cuts off the doctrine of 
atonement from one important way that it might be seen to tie into a life of repentance 
and holiness. In pressing for us to see the atonement as a work of God on behalf of 
human activity to the exclusion of any significant role for Christ’s humanity, he is quite 
intentionally excluding any significant role for the human will of the believer in 
appropriating or participating in Christ’s work. God simply reconciles humanity to 
himself by removing an external impediment; there is no sense that humanity must, from 
its end, voluntarily relate to God in the appropriate way.  
The effect of Aulén’s single-theory approach, then, is to erase rich connections 
between the doctrine of atonement and other doctrinal loci. It becomes difficult to see 
how the doctrine of atonement connects to classical Christology (why does God need to 
become fully human in order to perform this act of reconciliation if Christ’s human will 
does not play a God-ward sort of role in the process?), to Biblical notions of sin as 
incurring a debt and of Christ’s death as an offering that cancels this debt (since Christ 
does not atone by an offering of his human life to God), or to our own participation in 
Christ’s sacrifice (why would we need to share in his sufferings, offer our own bodies as 
living sacrifices--indeed, why would need to be baptized into his death, and what bearing 
would that have on why we should no longer live in sin?). And, in general, I argue that 
single-theory approaches under the atonement theory paradigm will have this sort of 
effect--a detrimental one for systematic theology, for the intellectus fidei, and for the 




elements now called atonement theories will make it harder to see and therefore harder to 
express the “luminous interconnections”17 between atonement and other doctrines. But 
we can see this more clearly by turning to another example.  
Kathryn Tanner’s Incarnational Approach 
In Christ the Key, Kathryn Tanner argues for an account of the atonement focused 
on the Incarnation, in which Christ saves by being the one in whom God is united to 
human nature. Like Aulén, Tanner frames the doctrine of Atonement in a way that sets 
various models opposed to one another, although somewhat less rigidly:  
The disconcerting differences of opinion, and even outright conflict, among these 
models encourages efforts to construct typologies of their essential differences 
and establish criteria for their evaluation. The models differ, for example, on who 
is responsible for the crucifixion--the devil, human beings, God, or Jesus as the 
one consenting to his death and going willingly to it. They differ on who or what 
is changed via the cross: God (God’s wrath changed to mercy); human beings 
(our hate for God changed to love, our fear before God’s wrath changed to trust); 
or the whole situation (through the cross a new sort of relationship is set up 
between God and human beings). The models differ on the one effecting change: 
God brings it about or we do by following the way of obedience that Jesus models 
for us on the cross. Christ effects the change primarily through the powers of his 
humanity (for example, insofar as he is obedient), or through his divinity (in case 
God is battling the devil on the cross for the rights of jurisdiction over us). The 
models differ on whether the cross is an interruption of God’s relations with us or 
part of a continuous effort--for example, to win us back from the devil, or to 
express love for us in a way that will finally get through to us. And so on.18 
While Tanner implicitly seems to grant that not all of these options are exclusive 
(some, we can assume, she sees as mere “differences of opinion” and not “outright 
conflicts”), it is worth noting how few of these differences actually amount to 
                                                 
17 I borrow this felicitous phrase from Bruce D. Marshall, “Renewing Dogmatic Theology,” First Things 
223 (May 2012): 40.  
 
18 Kathryn Tanner, Christ the Key, Current Issues in Theology (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge 





contradictions—and where they do, they often do so by presenting an option that 
caricatures the view it is meant to represent. For example, surely many (perhaps even all) 
who affirm that God is in some sense responsible for the crucifixion would also affirm 
that (in different senses) the devil, human beings, and Jesus are responsible. Perhaps there 
are some who affirm that God’s attitude changes in response to the Cross, but, as Scot 
McKnight notes, most defenders of penal substitution (the best candidate, perhaps, for a 
view on which God’s attitude is changed by the crucifixion) would say no such thing.19 
And, as we shall see in Chapter 3, Anselm certainly would insist that God does not 
change, and that atonement by satisfaction is a consequence of the immutability of God’s 
good intentions. It is certainly possible to say that God brings about the relevant change 
and in a different sense we voluntarily participate in it via obedience. As we noted above 
related to Aulén, through the communication of idioms, it is possible to say that through 
Christ’s human will God overcomes the Devil and liberates us. And finally, it is plain that 
the Cross can be both part of a continuous effort (as indeed it must be if it is a divine 
action of an immutable God) and an interruption (e.g., perhaps it is the element of that 
continuous effort that finally succeeds in “getting through to us”).  
Now, certainly, Tanner is right that these opinions do represent differences when 
those who hold them affirm one and also deny another (as they often do), even if it is also 
possible to affirm both. To note mere compatibility is perhaps not saying much--it is a 
first step, however, in dislodging the assumption that selecting one of these “models” is 
simply what the atonement theologian must do. By and large, it seems they are not 
                                                 





mutually exclusive, at least not in the bare elements by which theologians identify them. 
That being so, to the degree that each one has substantial support for its main elements 
from scripture and tradition, to the degree that each is embedded in the Church’s 
liturgical life, and to the degree that each one has its own persuasive reasons supporting 
it, there is actually good reason, all else being equal, to prefer an approach that can 
include as many of these elements as possible. And at least in this particular way, we can 
say that any single-theory approach must be sub-optimal. What is sub-optimal all else 
being equal may, of course, be the best alternative when all else is not equal. Even so, the 
single-theory advocate thus has to meet a high standard. She cannot simply show that her 
favored theory should be accepted, but also that the others should be rejected rather than 
retained alongside hers. Tanner, it should be said, certainly provides such arguments; I 
will try to show that they are not decisive against the satisfaction account I will develop. 
But the central point for the moment is that, on the whole, it will be preferable to avoid 
the single-theory option if possible.  
Tanner’s positive proposal centers on the claim that “God wants to give us the 
fullness of God’s own life through the closest possible relationship with us as that comes 
to completion in Christ.”20 This central vision of incarnation thus serves as the “key” to 
understanding God’s intentions and actions in the world, including the atonement. 
Indeed, for Tanner,  
Incarnation becomes the primary mechanism of atonement. Such a mechanism 
replaces altogether vicarious satisfaction and penal substitution, with their 
obvious problems from both feminist and non-feminist points of view; and 
                                                 





provides a different underpinning than usual for the Christus Victor and happy 
exchange models [emphasis mine].”21 
Salvation is achieved, therefore, simply (not to say immediately) by the union of 
the Word to a human nature in Jesus Christ. Union with God is the goal—it is what 
constitutes salvation—and the union of the divine and human in Jesus is also the means 
to achieve the goal. In talking about salvation this way, Tanner draws rich support from 
patristic theology. The Fathers certainly did talk about the Incarnation itself as saving, as 
communicating the divine life to human nature generally through the hypostatic union of 
the Word to a particular human nature. And insofar as she is right in saying that the 
Incarnation “drops out of modern accounts of the atonement,”22 Tanner has brought back 
in a crucial theological theme to a doctrine that sorely needs it.  
On the other hand, one may question how much the atonement is actually 
explained by this model, and what other explanatory avenues it leaves out. Tanner 
distances her account from Platonic metaphysical assumptions (e.g., the existence of 
“humanity” as an ideal form) that might render salvation by incarnation more readily 
intelligible. She is right, of course, that in the Fathers “the saving efficacy of incarnation 
is not commonly explained by any technical philosophical means, but through the use of 
examples that are rather ‘homey’ and commonsensical even to modern ears.”23 But it 
seems plain enough that “homey examples” can themselves indicate or illuminate 
technical philosophical concepts. If we probe the meaning of the examples she cites, we 
may still be left puzzling over what mechanism is really at play if we opt not to appeal to 
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22 Ibid., 258. 
 




Platonic notions of a universal human nature. Her representative examples are the way 
light overcomes darkness and the way wood catches fire by being brought near a flame. 
But what do these examples (metaphors, really) actually mean? How or why does God’s 
intimate union with humanity work in the way fire does with wood? In a rich passage, 
Tanner explains:  
. . . in short; salvation is a form of temporal, historical process, involving struggle 
with the forces of sin and death, and the sort of changes that typify any human 
life, sinful or not. 
To understand this, one must see the humanity that the Word assumes as an 
historical humanity, one that alters and grows. . . . And one must see it as a 
humanity needing to be changed because of the forces of sin and death afflicting 
it. There is consequently in Jesus’ life a passover, a genuine way or passage, from 
corruption to incorruption, from a life of suffering from sin to one free from its 
effects. Each moment of Jesus’ life as it happens is being brought into connection 
with the life-giving powers of the Word, and the reworking of each of them takes 
time. Jesus is not saved from death, therefore, until he dies and not saved from the 
terrible consequences of his rejection in a sinful world until he suffers them, at 
which time those aspects of Jesus’ human life are taken up by the Word and 
subject to a process of reworking through the powers of the Word.24  
 On this model, then, atonement involves a change through time, a transformation 
of human life from one sort (suffering from sin and death) to another (no longer suffering 
from sin and death). Christ, as the union of God and humanity, embodies this shift 
through his own life, as he undergoes the suffering brought on by sin (including death) 
but ultimately overcomes it through the transformative power of the Word. Over the life 
of Christ, the distance between humanity and God is overcome, and the consequences of 
this for all of humanity are themselves worked out in time; it is also a “temporal and 
historical process.”  
                                                 





 How exactly does the temporal and historical process of salvation work? How, 
that is, does the change that the Word works over the life of Jesus effect the same change 
in the lives of other human persons? What is the mechanism by which this change 
spreads? To answer this question, we can attend to the way Tanner interprets Jesus’ death 
as sacrifice.25 On Tanner’s model, the cross does indeed play a climactic role in the 
process of atonement, even though she insists this role is an entirely negative one. Jesus’ 
death, in her terms, is an obstacle to his mission of atonement rather than its achievement, 
and it is overcome in the resurrection. Even so, Jesus’ death (as one event in his entire 
life, rather than precisely as his death) is sacrificial in that it establishes a new relation 
between God and humanity—and, unlike other sacrifices, it does so without maintaining 
any distance between God and humanity--at the cross, God takes on death and makes it 
his own, as a sort of culminating step in uniting himself to humanity. The cross tells us, 
then, that God is united to humanity even through death. The sacrifice of Jesus thus 
overcomes all need for sacrifices understood as human gifts to God for the maintenance 
of good relations, and instead reveals God as the one who gives gifts to us, especially the 
life of Jesus.  The result is that  
[p]utting those gifts to use for the good of themselves and others, human beings 
become living sacrifices. . . . [H]umans make a proper sacrifice in life-enhacing 
use, for the good of human life, of what God gives them in sacrifice—the life-
enhancing powers of the Word. The direction of these living human sacrifices 
becomes in this way the same as God’s: toward the satisfaction of human needs, 
the reversal of the effects of sin on human life. Service to the neighbor becomes 
the reality designated by ‘sacrifices to God.’26 
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 So, ultimately, it appears that the transformation in question is a moral and 
religious one following from an ontological reality. The life of Christ understood as the 
ultimate sacrifice teaches us something and inspires us to orient our lives in a certain 
way. That is, we learn that God has united humanity to himself and thus that we are 
already united to God (though this union has to work itself out in our lives over time) and 
we need no longer feel alienated or abandoned to death; we learn that we have no need to 
give anything at all to God to set things right, but instead that perfect humanity involves 
accepting and using the good gifts God has given in order to take care of ourselves and 
others. Indeed, for Tanner, “. . . God’s gifts are distributed to us—we are saved—just to 
the extent we are one with Christ in faith and love.”27 It seems, then, that Christ saves us 
by being the union of God and humanity and by revealing and inviting us into that union.  
 Tanner’s reflection here is commendable in redirecting atonement theology to its 
patristic roots in the Incarnation, as well as emphasizing the reality of union with God 
that Christ both is and reveals to and for the rest of humanity. Her account provides a 
deeply illuminating connection between classical Christology and the role of Christ as 
teacher and example. That is, the Incarnation was necessary both in order to enact and to 
reveal to us the fullness of intimacy and union that God intended between humanity and 
himself. This revelation unfolds over the whole of Jesus’ life, and it shows us not only 
that God intends this kind of union with humanity, but also what that unity consists of in 
a human life, and in this way it grounds—epistemically as well as ontologically—our 
own response of gratitude and our capacity to participate in that kind of life ourselves. 
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This, it seems to me, is one way to understand the underlying mechanic that make the 
atonement like a piece of wood catching fire by being brought near to a flame: the image 
of wood catching fire captures the way that Christ’s own nature communicates a new way 
of being and living to the rest of humanity—one completely in union with God. In this 
way, Tanner has beautifully drawn our attention to Christ’s entire life by the term 
incarnation, and thus to the significance of that entire life for atonement. Moreover, 
similar to Aulén, Tanner’s account captures very clearly the way that the atonement is not 
something that changes God’s mind but is rather the revelation and enactment of the utter 
consistency of God’s good intentions with respect to humanity.  
 On the other hand, the thesis I have been arguing is that any approach to 
atonement that cuts off major elements of the tradition (those elements ensconced in the 
theories or models to be rejected) will thereby be suboptimal. I have suggested that such 
approaches will leave something out that ought to be included, and thereby hinder our 
capacity to understand what we believe as fully as we could. Does this suggestion hold in 
Tanner’s case? I will argue that it does. Tanner rejects entirely any sense in which Christ 
achieves something vicariously for us—any sense that Christ does something instead of 
us—as well as any place for categories of law and of debt that often expound this sense 
of vicariousness. Along with this, she rejects any sense of the Passion itself as a positive 
achievement of Christ meriting a reward; it is simply an evil inflicted on him and 
overcome in the resurrection. As she says,  
an incarnational account of the cross severely undercuts legal or contractual 
interpretations of the saving mechanism of the cross . . . God’s saving act does not 




saving act follow Jesus’ self-sacrificial death in the way release from debtors’ 
prison follows the payment of a debt.28 
We shall delay until later offering a response to her characterization of these 
alternatives, as well as her reasons for rejecting those categories (though we can note for 
the moment that, surely, sophisticated defenders of penal substitution or satisfaction 
would agree that God’s saving act does not merely follow Jesus’ obedience since Jesus’ 
obedience is itself part of God’s saving act). For now, let us merely consider whether 
anything significant has been lost by giving them up (however necessary such a rejection 
might seem). What do we lose, religiously and theologically, if we do as Tanner suggests 
and reject any sense in which Christ’s death is vicarious, fulfills a debt, or satisfies the 
requirements of law?  
For one thing, the concept of sin as creating a debt to God is deeply and widely 
embedded in Christian scripture and tradition. This much can scarcely be contested.29 
One might argue even so that the idea of creatures owing a debt to God has to be rejected, 
perhaps because it conflicts with other aspects of the Bible’s teaching or because it has 
problematic moral implications. Grappling with these sorts of difficulties, however, is a 
core task of the Christian theologian. As Bruce Marshall has rightly observed, the way 
into this task is not simply to select the side of the apparent conflict one prefers, but to 
struggle to understand both as true.30 At any rate, for the Christian who is committed to 
the God revealed in the Bible, a theology that preserves this pervasive Biblical theme 
                                                 
28 Tanner, Christ the Key, 256. 
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will, all things being equal, be preferable to one that avoids the tension it might present 
with other important Biblical themes by simply rejecting it out of hand. A theology of the 
former variety will put us in a better position to appreciate the entire testimony of 
scripture about God as harmonious and beautiful, since we will not need to reject so 
much of it as inherently misleading. 
At a more substantive level, the notion of sin as incurring a debt is tied to other 
important theological themes. It has to do, for instance, with the doctrine of creation ex 
nihilo. If all that we have and are comes from God, then it follows that in a fundamental 
sense we owe God our very selves, and the proper response is gratitude and love. If we 
respond in a less fitting way, then we have not done with this gift as we ought. Indeed, 
that our response can be fitting or unfitting, proper or improper, is itself the basic idea of 
debt: that we should respond one way and not another. And to sin is simply to fail to do 
what we ought—to fail to pay this debt.  
The idea of a debt to God is also tied to the idea of God as goodness itself. On this 
view, the conformity of our wills to the divine will just is the content of our debt, since 
that is what it is for our wills to be good: to respond to the gift of creation in a way that 
appropriately mirrors the goodness of the gift and of the Giver. To say that we owe God a 
debt, then, is not to appeal to a financial metaphor; rather, it is to identify God as the 
ontological basis of all of our moral obligations, financial or otherwise. That we can owe 
monetary debts to each other turns out to be a species of the fundamental debt we owe to 
God, since the fact that we should deal honestly with each other and pay each other back 
is itself grounded in the fact that we owe God everything we have and are, and so to treat 




rights intrinsic to their God-given natures, etc.) is the only fitting response to that gift. It 
is only by being people who deal with each other truthfully and honestly, which includes 
paying our debts to one another, that our wills align with the divine will, and only in this 
way that our wills thus mirror the intent of God in creation.  
Seen this way, the notion of debt is basic to a Christian moral metaphysics; it is 
actually difficult to see how one can maintain the intended moral force behind 
recommending any way of living without it. When Tanner observes, for instance, that 
God’s gift of the life of Christ to and for humanity leads us to use God’s gifts for our 
good and the good of others, presumably the implication is that one ought to put God’s 
good gifts to good use rather than bad use—this is the use one owes in virtue of having 
received God’s gifts. The notion of debt in this sense simply specifies this very ought-
ness, and, therefore, denying that there is any debt to God undercuts the morally 
normative force attached to any such change, e.g., from using the gifts we have been 
given one way to using them another way. And in this way, for all that Tanner’s 
incarnational model does to illuminate descriptively the connection between incarnation, 
sacrifice, and changed human lives, by itself it cannot do much to account for the 
normative stance the Christian tradition attaches to this human response. It cannot 
account for the sense Christians have usually felt that they ought to respond in such and 
such way, and indeed that they always ought to have responded in this way, and that not 
acting in this way in the first place caused the problem which called forth God’s saving 
work in Jesus Christ in the specific form that it took.31  
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Closely related to the idea of a debt to God, as these last comments suggest, are a 
few of other ideas: that we have failed to pay this debt, that we nonetheless need to pay it, 
and that Christ is the one who ultimately pays it on our behalf. These claims go quite a bit 
further than what I have argued here. To grant that as creatures we owe a fundamental 
debt to God in the sense that we ought to behave one way rather than another is not 
obviously to agree that when we fail to do what we ought we incur something like a 
persistent negative balance, or that in his atoning work (on the cross or elsewhere) Christ 
achieves the equivalent of paying off that balance. I will explicate and defend these 
claims in Anselmian terms in Chapter 3; for the moment, suffice it to observe that these 
too are deeply biblical and traditional ideas, and they often appear right next to the ideas 
of sacrifice, of the Word’s healing and perfecting of human nature through the 
incarnation, and of the defeat of death and the devil. See Colossians 2:13-15, for 
example:  
And when you were dead in trespasses and the uncircumcision of your flesh, God 
made you alive together with him, when he forgave us all our trespasses, erasing 
the record that stood against us with its legal demands. He set this aside, nailing it 
to the cross. He disarmed the rulers and authorities and made a public example of 
them, triumphing over them in it. 
This text runs together several atonement themes—forgiveness, victory, debt-
cancellation—and ties them to the Cross; the debt is canceled because it is nailed to the 
cross; the powers are disarmed when Christ triumphs over them by the cross. And 
Athanasius tells us that,  
Whence, by offering unto death the body he himself had taken, as an offering and 
sacrifice free from any stain, straightway he put away death from all his peers by 




offering his own temple and corporeal instrument for the life of all satisfied the 
debt by his death.32 
Athanasius ties sacrifice to both the defeat of death and the payment of a debt—
and, indeed, an exchange of equivalent value. Many similar texts could be adduced. 
Anselm’s use of the concept of a debt of honor is often associated with his feudal context, 
but as a number of scholars have recently shown, there is an extensive biblical and 
patristic foundation for this idea (along with the related concept of satisfaction).33 Any 
model of atonement which is meant to stand alone, then, but also “severely undercuts 
legal or contractual interpretations of the saving mechanism of the cross” will thereby 
severely undercut much of the biblical and patristic tradition regarding the saving 
mechanism of the cross. Let us grant that if every possible “legal or contractual” account 
is as morally problematic as argued here, then such a route may be necessary, but a route 
that includes these biblical and traditional themes will otherwise be preferable.  
Assessing Single-Theory Approaches 
 These two examples are enough to see what the basic problem will be with any 
single theory view—any view, that is, that selects a particular element (or even a narrow 
subset of elements) from the Church’s teaching on the atonement and rejects the rest. 
Any such view will fall short of the richness of the biblical and traditional witness. As we 
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have seen, this will tend to obscure the interconnection between the atonement and other 
doctrinal loci, and cut off conceptual resources the Church might otherwise put to good 
use in its proclamation and teaching. Moreover, since there is strong support in scripture, 
tradition, and liturgy for each of these main elements, admitting that one or more of them 
must be cut off and rejected may well lead to basic problems of coherence in the 
Church’s basic materials. This might not seem obviously troubling, but we should notice 
that admitting this sort of incoherence requires us to give up the assumption that what the 
Church teaches us to believe and say (in prayer, confession, worship, and preaching, 
about God and about Christ and about ourselves) ultimately does fit together beautifully 
and harmoniously. What is the hope, in this case, for faith seeking understanding? What 
is the end of loving God with our whole intellect if God’s self-revelation is self-
contradictory, if only some parts of it are reliable guides to our speech and thought about 
God (which parts are reliable being left up to us to discern)?  
A more theologically promising strategy, in light of all of this, will be to work 
under the assumption that God’s self-revelation through the Church’s basic catechetical 
materials—scripture, tradition, and liturgy—is indeed coherent. And what follows from 
this assumption vis-à-vis the atonement is this: if a way of speaking about the atonement 
is deeply entrenched in the Church’s basic materials then there is a way to understand it 
as true, as teaching us something about the work of Christ which we ought to affirm. To 
go further, let us assume that each such element will offer something which will indeed 
be a blessing to us, which will shape our intellects in conformity to the mind of Christ if 




will be lacking. Reasons such as these have motivated some theologians to push beyond 
single-theory approaches; we can consider examples of these now.  
Beyond Single-Theory Approaches 
The Kaleidoscopic Approach 
The term “kaleidoscopic” comes from Joel Green and Mark Baker, who use it to 
describe the approach they advocate in their book, Recovering the Scandal of the Cross.34 
A kaleidoscopic approach is one which refuses to boil down Christ’s saving work to a 
single theory, but rather holds an array of theories loosely together. Green and Baker 
argue for this approach in two ways. On the one hand, they argue from the multifaceted 
nature of the biblical witness with regard to Christ’s work. Indeed, Green and Baker are 
especially insightful and productive as they trace out some of the diverse concepts 
through with the New Testament writers apply to the work of Christ. They put the 
argument this way:  
In the New Testament, the saving effect of Jesus’ death is represented primarily 
through five constellations of images . . .: the court of law (e.g., justification), the 
world of commerce (e.g., redemption), personal relationships (e.g., 
reconciliation), worship (sacrifice) and the battleground (e.g., triumph over evil). 
Within these categories are clusters of terms, leading us to the conclusion that the 
significance of Jesus’ death could not be represented without remainder by any 
one concept or theory of metaphor.35  
It is worth noting that Green and Baker share this basic premise with pre-modern 
approaches to understanding Christ’s work, including Anselm and Thomas Aquinas. 
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Anselm and Aquinas were each committed to affirming that whatever scripture tells us 
about how the Cross saves is true. The task of the theologian was then to try to 
understand how they are true. In the Summa Theologiae, this is part of Thomas’s 
procedure when it comes to the atonement: he considers the various concepts he takes to 
be given in scripture and tradition and then explains how it is each one can correctly be 
said to apply to what Christ does, including merit, satisfaction, sacrifice, redemption, 
liberation, payment of debt, and reconciliation.36 While Anselm does find satisfaction to 
explain the necessity of atonement through the specific means of the Incarnation and 
Cross, his aim by appealing to satisfaction is to show that “everything we say” about 
Christ is true—and this “everything” certainly seems to include many of the elements 
usually identified (under the atonement theory paradigm) as distinct atonement theories. 
As Anselm so nicely put it, “the logic of the truth is so copious and profound that it 
cannot be exhausted by mortals”37—this is his own justification for proceeding in his 
investigation even though the Fathers had already written so well on the matter.  
Anselm and Aquinas (and other pre-modern names could be added here) thus 
agree fundamentally with this observation of Green and Baker over and against the 
single-theory theologians we considered above: the witness of scripture and tradition 
provides us with multiple ways of talking about Christ’s saving work, and the task of the 
theologian is, above all, to find a way to preserve them together rather than to select one 
and reject the others. Through this line of argument, the kaleidoscopic theorists are 
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pointing to a truth about the doctrine of atonement that a good deal of modern atonement 
theology has obscured, but which can be seen readily by attending to pre-modern sources. 
This point allows them to attend to the Biblical witness in a richer way than a single-
theory approach can do, hearing the distinct voices and perspectives on the meaning of 
the death of Christ in remarkable ways.38  
In addition to this Biblical and traditional motivation for the kaleidoscopic view, 
however, Green and Baker have a set of pragmatic concerns which they argue are better 
addressed by a kaleidoscopic approach to atonement than by a single-theory approach. 
The argument here focuses on how a given model of atonement will function in some 
cultural or pastoral context. For Green and Baker, these models are fundamentally 
metaphors, and, “[m]etaphors work within cultures where a shared encyclopedia, or 
cultural narrative, can be assumed.”39 Indeed, they suggest, “our use of the tradition 
frequently falters because . . . we attempt to carry over into our own lives and 
pronouncements models and metaphors that belong to another age and that are dead to 
us.”40 So, by their lights, to be useful in some context, a model or metaphor of the 
atonement must be intelligible relative to the categories available in that context. They do 
want to insist on fidelity to scripture, and this means “embrac[ing] the ongoing relevance 
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of their message, including their metaphors.”41 Even so, they argue, “the models 
championed in the New Testament . . . may not (all) be suited to our day.”42 Even the 
models and metaphors of scripture, then, may need to be adapted so as to fit the cultural 
and pastoral context of the theologian.  
On the other hand, to communicate the Gospel effectively within a culture, a 
model must avoid simply confirming the cultural assumptions of that culture—the Gospel 
must be allowed to challenge and critique those assumptions where appropriate. For 
example, the view Green and Baker identify as the dominant one in contemporary 
American Christianity, which they call “penal satisfaction,” comes under heavy critique 
precisely for how well it fits with certain cultural assumptions of the modern West.43 
They articulate the tension they want to capture this way:  
All statements, and therefore all theological statements, relate to, speak to and 
make themselves relevant to their own social environment. If, on the one hand, 
they do not, then they are likely to be dismissed as hopelessly abstract, unrealistic, 
impertinent, meaningless, artificial. If, on the other hand, their relationship with 
their social environment is too intimate, they are likely to be regarded as 
parochial, time bound and irrelevant to a wider audience. Moreover, they will lack 
the capacity to speak over against their social environment. They will be impotent 
to challenge the status quo.44  
Together, these twin pragmatic concerns (intelligibility to a given cultural context 
and ability to challenge that context) provide Baker and Green a core motivation for the 
kaleidoscopic approach; they imply that different cultural contexts (and even different 
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individuals within a culture) will need different models of the atonement. And, since even 
those models found in scripture are relativized to context, fidelity to scripture cannot take 
the form of simply articulating and expositing the models found in scripture or tradition, 
let alone attempting to organize them systematically. Instead, for Baker and Green, 
fidelity takes the form of a generalized set of questions or “coordinates” derived by 
reflecting on what the New Testament authors were doing as they constructed the models 
they used for their own audiences. These include (1) sin as the human predicament, (2) 
God’s gracious action to save humanity from its predicament, (3) the human response of 
gratitude to this act, and (4) the universal significance of what God has done.45 These 
coordinates can then be applied for the development of new models and metaphors by the 
theologian who seeks to articulate the saving work of Christ in a new context: rather than 
simply expositing how the New Testament addresses these coordinates, the theologian 
should try to address them in ways that are like the way the New Testament authors did, 
but in models and metaphors which connect to her present context.  
Taken together, the criteria of intelligibility and capacity for challenge plus the 
“coordinates” serve for Baker and Green as criteria for evaluating various models of 
atonement, both with respect to the contexts out of which they arose and with respect to 
the specific context of contemporary American Christianity. That is, for an atonement 
model to be successful, it must address all four coordinates in a way that is intelligible in 
its original context and yet maintains a recognizable fidelity to authoritative Christian 
sources. The questions for every model, traditional or new, will be: (1) How intelligible is 
it in its/our context? (2) How theologically adequate is its attempts to address the 
                                                 




coordinates of sin/the human condition, God’s saving act in Christ, the human response 
to that saving act, and the universal significance of that act? To the extent that it receives 
positive answers to both questions, it should then be treated as a model to be used 
alongside others.46 To the extent that it receives a negative answer to either (1) or (2), 
Green and Baker seem to suggest, we have reason to set it aside.  
 This approach represents, it seems to me, a significant effort to follow out the 
implications of the contextual nature of theological discourse while still relying on the 
possibility of theological discourse to relate to a truth that transcends its context. The 
strategy we have traced above appears to be to tie the facts of historical context to a 
pragmatic aim—that of remaining a useful, intelligible model or metaphor in a given 
context—while letting epistemic criteria apply in a less contextually bound way. What 
we have here is in essence a pair of desiderata and a strategy of handling a conflict 
between them. That is, it seems that Green and Baker hold both of the following: 
Contextual Requirement: If an atonement model involves cultural assumptions 
that are no longer widely shared, then we have a good reason to dismiss it from 
use regardless of the truth status of those assumptions.  
Epistemic Requirement: If an atonement model involves claims that conflict with 
the teaching of Scripture47—or even if it fails to challenge culturally shared 
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assumptions that conflict with these claims—we have a good reason to dismiss it 
from use regardless of how widely or easily it gains acceptance within a culture.  
On examination, this arrangement is problematic. It is tempting to see the 
contextual requirement as simply about communicating effectively in a context. Maybe 
Baker and Green are simply saying that if a metaphor or model depends on concepts a 
person or culture does not know, then that person or culture will not understand the 
metaphor or model, and thus if we are trying to express some theological claim (a claim 
which in principle could be expressed one way or another), we need to find a way to 
express it in terms that the listener can understand. The requirement of contextual 
relevance then applies not to the truth or falsehood of substantial theological claims, but 
simply to their expression in certain terms. After all, Baker and Green cannot think that a 
lack of cultural currency makes an idea either false or incomprehensible; their own 
careful exegesis of scripture and their critique of contemporary views on the basis of it 
would then be impossible. They would thus surely grant that it is possible (if difficult) to 
come to understand an idea from outside of one’s own culture, and for such ideas to be 
true even when in conflict with widely accepted in one’s own culture. It simply takes 
some effort and training to work our way from things we do understand to things we do 
not—and since we cannot require everyone to become a historian or Biblical scholar to 
understand the Gospel, this means finding new modes of expression for ancient ideas.  
Perhaps some would reject such a neat distinction between the meaning of a 
model and the metaphorical terms in which it is expressed—in practice, it can be 
extremely difficult to distill the meaning of some model or metaphor to an essence that 
can be translated to other terms. Indeed, as Janet Soskice has argued, the cognitive use of 




adequately captured by translation to literal speech.48 If we grant, however, that it may 
often be practically impossible to boil down the content of a metaphor to a literal 
meaning that can be translated without remainder, we may still affirm that in principle it 
remains possible. That is, it may be practically impossible to translate a metaphor neatly 
because it suggests more connections than one can practically list, or perhaps because the 
metaphor itself leaves open to interpretation exactly which suggested connections are 
being asserted, but it may still in principle be possible (with unlimited time and attention) 
to list them all and discern which are really central and which are peripheral in a given 
use. And if this is true, then at a practical level it will often be possible to express the 
most central facets of some complex metaphor via translation into other terms, even if 
such expressions fall short of being perfectly exhaustive.  
On this interpretation, then, the contextual requirement really is distinct from any 
epistemic requirement; it is not fundamentally about the truth or falsehood of some claim, 
but rather the terms in which it is expressed. This means that for any given model or 
metaphor which expresses some theological claim, it is possible in principle to interpret 
what it means and then translate that meaning into another mode of expression. It is not 
clear to me whether Baker and Green would accept the interpretation I am proposing, but 
I would argue that something like this is necessary to maintain the coherence of their 
proposal. To see why, notice that for epistemic requirement to apply, there must be some 
claims from the teaching of scripture that are not themselves subject to the contextual 
requirement. Consider, for example, the objections offered by Green and Baker to what 
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they call the penal satisfaction account.49 According to them, penal satisfaction has 
achieved popular acceptance because it fits neatly with widely shared cultural 
assumptions (“individualism” and “obsession with mechanism”50). These assumptions, 
however, conflict with Biblical teaching. We therefore have a case where the epistemic 
requirement should apply and penal satisfaction should be rejected. But if this is true, 
then, ipso facto, the aspects of Biblical teaching which are in conflict with penal 
satisfaction (e.g., let us suppose, a more communal understanding of sin and salvation 
and an allowance for mystery) do not meet the contextual requirement as they conflict 
with widely shared cultural assumptions.  
How, then, can we explain this pair of criteria?  It does not seem to be the case 
that atonement models are in some sense especially contextual compared to other 
theological claims (such as the teaching of scripture) which are not subject to the 
contextual requirement. Baker and Green argue, as we have noted, that an array of 
atonement models are themselves a part of the teaching of scripture (though they also say 
that if these models no longer have cultural resonance, then they may need to be set aside 
to meet the contextual requirement). Moreover, as we noted above, they assert that all 
theological statements are bound to meet the contextual requirement or else be discarded 
as irrelevant. It might seem, therefore, that no theological claims have a high enough 
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epistemic status to serve as a basis for the epistemic requirement. But this cannot be right, 
since Baker and Green do in fact appeal to some theological claims as if they have a high 
enough epistemic status to warrant holding those claims even when they conflict with the 
assumptions of the surrounding culture.  
It must be, then, that there is a means of judging in any given case which 
requirement wins out. Conflict with widely shared assumptions gives a reason to set aside 
some theological claim as no longer helpful, but not always a decisive one; the more 
deeply embedded a teaching is in scripture, we might say, the more central it is to the 
Gospel, the more likely it may be that we should keep it in use despite conflict with 
widely shared cultural assumptions. This approach would leave us with some core of 
theological commitments which, for all intents and purposes, cannot be rejected even if 
they do not appear likely to communicate effectively within a culture. Presumably this is 
because we are confident enough of their truth and their status as constitutive elements of 
the Gospel that we simply cannot set them aside; we need to proclaim them whether or 
not they will be easily understood or accepted. It is on the basis of these claims that we 
would then decide that some cultural assumptions need to be challenged rather than 
accommodated in our theology of atonement. This proposal seems reasonable enough as 
far as it goes.   
But, we may well ask, why should we set aside any claim we have good reason to 
accept as true just because it conflicts with prevailing cultural assumptions? For instance, 
let us say that Anselm’s account of the atonement relies on the assumption (readily 
available to him) that we all live in relationships with authorities over us, and these 




era this view is assumption is no longer widely shared. If we are considering whether to 
accept Anselm’s account or not, should we not ask whether in fact we stand in such 
relationships and have such obligations, rather than whether most people believe that we 
do? Because, if we in fact do stand in such relations, then a model of atonement that 
communicates this fact arguably ought to be preserved, precisely so that the faithful will 
not lose sight of this truth in a situation where the wider culture no longer embodies it. 
On the other hand, if such relations are entirely a product of our social organization—if 
they, and the obligations they entail, are only there if we experience them as such—then, 
even in a society that arranges itself in such a way, it will not be the case that we actually 
stand in such a relation to God, and the model of atonement will be false if it presents the 
atonement in a way that implies or assumes that we do. In such a case, why would the 
fact that the wider culture would readily accept the model provide any justification for its 
use?     
It is at just this point that the distinction I have suggested between the meaning of 
a model and the terms in which it is expressed preserves Baker and Green’s proposal. If 
we can distinguish between what a model means and the terms in which it is expressed, 
we can say that whatever a model says that is true ought to be preserved even when 
changing contexts require a new expression. Their critique of Anselm then becomes a 
little more intelligible. We might imagine that what Baker and Green think is this: in 
Anselm’s world, certain a certain kind of social relationship existed between a lord and 
his subjects. This relationship had some features which are like the relation between God 
and humans, but other features which are not. In virtue of the former, appealing to this 




(truthfully) rendering the atonement intelligible; in virtue of the latter, it projects false 
cultural assumptions onto God. It then seems natural enough to reject the metaphor once 
those social relations no longer exist and those assumptions are no longer shared, since 
whatever truth was contained in it can be preserved in some other way.  
This interpretation of Green and Baker also has the benefit of making clear the 
specific way Green and Baker are thinking about atonement models, which turn out to be 
distinct from other kinds of theological claims. There must be such a distinction, because, 
after all, if there is some class of theological claims that have sufficiently high epistemic 
status to be a basis for challenging rather than accommodating to widely shared cultural 
assumptions, why not atonement theories? If it is simply true, for example, that Christ 
defeated the devil, then why should we not retain this theological claim even in a culture 
that is negatively disposed towards the idea of military combat? If we exist in a 
relationship of filial loyalty to God that requires us to honor him and to do our best to 
rectify the wrong that we do when we fail to give him due honor, then should we not 
retain an atonement model that expresses this truth, even in a culture that no longer is 
inclined to believe in such relationships of obligation? It does not seem that Green and 
Baker answer this question directly, but given the distinction we have articulated, we 
might imagine that they think of atonement models or metaphors as more like ways of 
expressing the truths of the Gospel than they are like substantial constitutive elements of 
the Gospel. This would explain why atonement models may be set aside when they 
cannot be received easily from within a culture: the truths contained in one model need 
not be lost if the model is given up. They can instead be expressed in another, more 




This solution is, unfortunately, too neat. In practice, things are more complicated. 
Different models of atonement do not simply express the same truths in different terms. 
For instance, as Baker and Green note by the second of their four coordinates, different 
models often emphasize distinct (not to say contradictory) ways of thinking about the 
problem to be overcome in the atonement. Insofar as sin and its effects are multifarious, it 
is appropriate that we have different ways of talking about Christ’s work so as to display 
the way these effects are undone by him. And, as far as context, it seems appropriate to 
observe that different contexts (social, cultural, historical, philosophical, etc.) provide 
conditions under which the human problem will be experienced and understood in ways 
that are distinctive to each context. So, then, it will be beneficial to articulate Christ’s 
saving work in a way that shows Christ to ameliorate the human problem as experienced 
in each context.  
On the other hand, to the extent that each different way of articulating the human 
problem is a true addition to our understanding of the effects of sin healed by Christ, just 
to that extent they will be true even in contexts that lack the concepts and experiences 
needed to see those effects clearly or easily. That is, if one of the effects of sin is that our 
intellects are darkened, then this will be true even for people and societies that consider 
themselves enlightened and are highly optimistic about the powers of the human intellect. 
If one of the effects of sin is that our wills are in bondage and need to be liberated, then 
this will be true even in societies that consider themselves to have achieved an idealized 
notion of freedom. If one of the effects of sin is that we inherit a debt to God that we 




debts could never be inherited.51 In general, it seems it will be especially important to 
preserve models of atonement that express truths that the larger context will tend to 
neglect—in this way, the Church can help those shaped by its teaching, preaching, and 
liturgy to interpret their own experience of the human problem and of salvation from it in 
ways that go beyond what they could do by drawing from the surrounding culture. Surely 
this is what Baker and Green have in mind when they envision atonement models being 
capable of challenging the cultural assumptions of the context. Putting things this way 
allows us to see very clearly that what we are calling atonement models cannot be 
reduced to mere window dressing that can be changed to suit current trends. They include 
elemental theological commitments that are deeply embedded in the Christian tradition, 
and that need to be preserved even when they are culturally inconvenient.  
It is worth noticing that a subtle elision happens when analyses of the doctrine of 
atonement shift from those elemental claims (think of the following: Christ saved by 
defeating the devil; Christ saves by his teaching and example; Christ saves by his offering 
of his life and death in faithfulness to God; Christ saves by canceling the debt of sin; 
Christ saves by bearing our punishment) to more sophisticated articulations and 
systematizations of them. It is plain enough that the latter can often be set aside and 
replaced with updated versions rather easily for reasons related to the contextual 
requirement (or even merely to justify the continued employment of theologians), but it is 
much less clear that a contextual argument can ever justify setting aside the former. Only 
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an epistemic argument can do that—that is to say, an argument about what is true, not 
what is relevant. To put this conclusion another way, if God really has revealed himself 
and the significance of his saving act in Jesus Christ through the Church’s testimony 
handed on in its scriptures and tradition, then it seems appropriate to envision the task of 
the theologian (and the preacher) as finding a way to receive and communicate that 
tradition as effectively as possible in a given context, rather than simply lopping off 
whichever elements appear especially difficult to communicate.  
Where does this leave us vis-à-vis Green and Baker’s proposal? I suggest that we 
should happily accept their argument that the tradition itself contains multiple metaphors 
and models for Christ’s atoning work, and thus that it will not do to select one and reject 
the rest. Furthermore, we ought to accept their suggestion that we ought to be open to 
creative attempts to understand and articulate the atonement in terms of new concepts 
generated by the distinctive perspectives of new cultures where the Gospel takes root. 
After all, we ought to remember with Anselm that “the Lord, whose promise is to be with 
the Church ‘until the end of the world,’ does not cease to bestow his gifts within it.”52 We 
have not, however, encountered a compelling contextual reason to reject a given element 
of traditional teaching on the atonement. The Church’s understanding of the faith will be 
richer and deeper if we can add to our understanding without taking away from it; 
perhaps in this way we may imagine that the Church is actually in progress from faith to 
understanding in the way Anselm envisioned.  
Nor have we found a strong reason to avoid any attempt to systematize these 
various elements. Admittedly, no such attempt here below shall ever be final. All such 
                                                 




attempts are subject to the limitations of finitude. The Church must discern the value of 
any such contribution over time, and surely this will continue to involve debate, critique, 
and extensive development of competing interpretative traditions—as well, from time to 
time, as reexamination and retrieval of ideas once thought to be without value. We 
remain, in this life, partway between faith and the understanding for which we hope. 
Even so, an understanding the diverse elements of the work of God in Christ as parts of a 
single unified act—the supremely intelligible and beautiful act of the one God—has its 
proper place as the aim of the Church’s intellectual task vis-à-vis the doctrine of 
atonement.  
This aim goes beyond what we can achieve. And yet, as an aim, it gives structure 
and form to our work. Among other things, it suggests that our task will include not only 
listing and elaborating the various pieces of what God has done in the atonement, but also 
organizing them into a coherent and systematic way so as to display their intrinsic unity 
as a single act—and, indeed, the intrinsic unity of this act with the rest of God’s actions 
towards creation. This, I suggest, is a way of understanding the task of atonement 
theology that does not fit either side of the atonement theory paradigm. And, I will argue 
in this next chapter, this is the most adequate way to develop that task of atonement 
theology exemplified by Anselm in CDH.  
Scot McKnight’s Golf Bag Approach 
At this point, we can consider another approach to atonement that attempts to 
embrace a diverse array of theories or models of atonement rather than selecting one, 
namely Scot McKnight’s “golf bag” approach. McKnight makes his own arguments 




provides some support for a kaleidoscopic approach. On the other hand, in using the 
metaphor of a golf bag, McKnight insists on providing a more substantial unity to the 
array of theories to be included—indeed, as we will see, he allows one traditional theory 
to function as the “bag” while the rest are included as clubs contained within the bag. 
Ultimately, this is a suggestive way to avoid both single-theory and kaleidoscopic 
approaches—that is, a way to avoid treating the various theological claims from scripture 
and tradition which we now call atonement theories as if they are alternatives that cannot 
be fit together coherently.  
McKnight begins with his golf club analogy, suggesting single-theory approaches 
to the doctrine of atonement are doing the equivalent of using only one club for the whole 
golf course. For McKnight, an account of the atonement articulates a vision of humanity, 
of the core problem for humanity (which goes under the label of “sin”), and of the 
corresponding solution to it in Jesus Christ. But, he observes, in different contexts people 
have much different experiences and ideas of what it is to be human and what the core 
problem with humanity is. And yet, he suggests, Christ provides a saving solution for 
people in all different contexts; we therefore need different ways of talking about 
atonement in order to account for how this is so—this argument is familiar enough from 
Baker and Green. 
He elaborates the point in a distinct way, however. With respect to the concept of 
sin, he observes, “. . . there are real differences in the big epochs in history when it comes 
to perception of sin . . . atonement is a challenge because of the mind-numbing 
complexity of sin.”53 Sin, the argument seems to be, is multifarious in its effects, and it 
                                                 




plays out differently in the lives of people living under different circumstances. If we 
understand sin in a way narrowly derived from a limited range of contexts experiences, 
we end up articulating the core problem of humanity (and the solution to that problem) in 
a way that excludes deeply harmful realities experienced by those whose voices are not 
included. As a result, our account of atonement will fail to make clear how Christ saves 
from those realities—the assumption being that he must do so if salvation is to be 
universal.  
One might ask whether in the atonement Jesus simply provides whatever one 
happens to think one needs, or whether in fact scripture and tradition tell us something 
about what everyone in fact needs, whether or not they realize it? Indeed, at times, 
McKnight seems to veer towards the idea that the task of atonement theology is to 
provide an interpretation of the Gospel that will effectively appeal to people within some 
context, presumably by framing atonement as providing the solution to a commonly felt 
problem. For example, with respect to postmodern people, he says, “. . . defining sin as 
offending God . . . does not strike home because not only is the premodern premoral, he 
and she are also adrift from others—make the notion of an offense against Someone or 
someone doubly difficult for them.”54 But if postmodern people have in fact committed 
offenses against God, then would it not important to retain such a concept of sin, so that 
they will not miss out on an important truth because it is difficult? Thankfully, however, 
McKnight does not appear to present this scenario as an argument for setting aside 
accounts of atonement in terms of repairing a relationship damaged by an offense in 






postmodern contexts. Instead, he seems to be arguing for retaining a wider set of concepts 
at the same time. Doing so will enable us to talk about atonement in ways that intelligible 
and compelling in a wide array of contexts, even if it also means retaining concepts that 
are less easily acceptable within any given context.  
Ultimately, what McKnight concludes is not that we should set aside metaphors 
that are difficult for some context, but rather that “[o]ur grasp of atonement is partial, and 
something still yearning for yet more.”55 Although this point appears in a chapter with the 
title, “An Exercise in Postmodern Humility,” it marks a move back to an Anselmian way 
of thinking of the task of atonement theology—as we have noted, it serves as a key 
element in Anselm’s justification for his own contribution to atonement theology. For 
Anselm, in this life we are always on the way from accepting by faith the revealed truth 
of the atonement to the understanding of the atonement which the Blessed receive in the 
Beatific Vision, and this is why, he says, he can have something to add even though he is 
not, by and large, rejecting the teaching of the Fathers as he understood it. McKnight’s 
approach thus represents a step away from the atonement theory paradigm and towards 
the Anselmian approach we will develop in later chapters.  
For McKnight, then, what the theologian must do is try to find a way to organize 
the diverse array of atonement models towards a coherent purpose. McKnight’s preferred 
metaphor of the golf bag signals a commitment to envisioning a unity to the diverse 
atonement metaphors he wants to include; this is an important difference between his 
approach and that described by Green and Baker. He sees his task as finding a bag which 
is capable of containing, ordering, and giving significance to each club:  
                                                 




It is easy to be faithful to one biblical metaphor for the atonement—say ransom or 
justification—and work hard at making everything fit into that image. The 
difficult art of bricolage, of taking all the biblical images and combining them into 
an expression that manages to keep all of them in play at the same time, is much 
more demanding. To return to our image, we are in search of a bag in which all 
the clubs can fit.56 
We need an organizing concept, then, which will gather and order our other 
atonement concepts towards a specific purpose, analogous to the way the game of golf, 
applied to a specific course, serves as the purpose for the clubs. It is worth noting how 
McKnight explains this purpose. One might think that the purpose towards which our 
language about atonement is put is that of developing as full an understanding as possible 
of what God has accomplished in Christ for our salvation. And, it is clear enough already 
that McKnight envisions the task of understanding as a part of the purpose that motivates 
our inclusion of multiple ‘clubs’; McKnight wants different metaphors for atonement to 
be available so that we are able to understand how in Christ God has provided for 
salvation sin and its effects, complex and multifarious as they are. This is at least part of 
what is expressed by one of McKnight’s central questions for any atonement theology—
does it show how atonement makes a difference?  
On the other hand, however, sometimes McKnight slides from asking whether an 
atonement theology shows how Christ’s atoning work makes a difference to asking 
whether a given atonement theology itself makes a difference. A passage at the beginning 
of the book reveals this shift:  
The challenge of the atonement is this: Does atonement work? Are Christians any 
better than anyone else in their relationship with God, self, others, and the world? 
Is there not a claim that atonement generates a multifaceted healing of the person 
                                                 




so that Christians ought to love God and love others, so that Christians ought to be 
different? . . .  
I teach a generation of students that believes the credibility of the Christian faith 
is determined by claiming a confident (if humble) “Yes!” to each of these 
questions. This generation is tired of an old-fashioned atonement theology that 
does not make a difference . . . They believe atonement ought to make a 
difference in the here and now [emphasis mine].57 
Or again, after developing a concept of systemic justice as a part of the aims of 
Christ’s saving work, McKnight says, “Any theory of atonement that does not have as its 
goal creating a society swimmingly happy in this kind of justice is not a biblical theory of 
atonement [emphasis mine].”58 Now, surely, McKnight is right to call for an atonement 
theology that illuminates our understanding of how Christ’s atoning work accomplishes 
what it does—how it makes a difference. But we should be clear about the distinction 
between atonement making a difference here and now and an atonement theology making 
the difference here and now, or between God’s saving work in Christ having as its goal a 
certain kind of justice and creaturely flourishing and our atonement theology having such 
justice as its goal. In the first case, Christ’s work, mediated through the means of grace 
available in through the Church, is what makes the difference, and the atonement 
theologian tries to understand how this is so. In the second, Christ’s work only makes the 
relevant difference if it is interpreted with the right kind of atonement theology.  
Of course, these things cannot be separated too strictly—a good theology of 
atonement hopefully will not only describe effects already achieved but contribute to the 
fulfillment of those effects to some degree in the way it opens them up for us to 
understand. Indeed, if Anselm is right to characterize gains in understanding of Christ’s 
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work as themselves gifts of Christ to the Church, then perhaps good atonement theology 
can itself be part of the effects of Christ’s work: God saves us through Christ, enabling us 
by the Holy Spirit to reflect fruitfully on that work, drawing out and deepening our 
response of worship and gratitude, which is itself constitutive of our new, reconciled 
relationship to God achieved by the atonement. Still, however, we do well to be careful 
about the distinction between understanding and the object to be understood: atonement 
theology is aimed at understanding, and the atonement, Christ’s saving work, is the object 
we are trying to understand. The atonement theologian as such does not produce 
atonement, but rather seeks to understand atonement. Let us agree that a good 
understanding of atonement is itself a fruit of the atonement and even enhances our 
participation in a reconciled, atoned relationship to God; let us further hope that a good 
understanding of atonement better enables us to think about the just and peaceful 
relations God desires between human beings as a part of his purposes in atonement. 
Nonetheless, the proximate goal of atonement theology is not to produce atonement but 
to understand the atonement which God has already produced and is producing; 
understanding, then, will be the purpose towards which we organize our atonement 
concepts.  
In any case, let us consider now the “bag” which McKnight argues can organize 
the array of “clubs” constituted by the various concepts applied to the atonement in 
scripture and tradition. McKnight identifies several concepts as needing to fit together: 
recapitulation, ransom, Christus Victor, satisfaction, substitution, and moral example; the 




puts it: “identification for incorporation.”59 He elaborates this phrase in a way that nicely 
displays how different traditional atonement concepts can be tied into a single narrative:  
Jesus identifies with humans: ‘he had to become like his brothers and sisters.’ 
Jesus incorporates humans in his destruction of death and the devil and liberates 
those held captive by being a faithful high priest for them (representing them 
before God as priests do). Jesus identifies and makes possible incorporation 
because he ‘shared flesh and blood’ and because he became a ‘sacrifice of 
atonement’ . . . for the sins of humans. Which means that Jesus died for them, 
with them, and instead of them: their death became his so that his life might 
become theirs. 
His act of atonement has a dual focus . . . identification in order to remove sins 
and victory in order to liberate those who are incorporated into him so that they 
can form the new community where God’s will is realized. . . . He identifies with 
us all the way down to death in order that we might be incorporated into him. To 
be incorporated ‘in Christ’ is not only a personal relationship with Jesus Christ 
but also a personal relationship with his people [emphasis in original].60  
 This is a fine summary of several aspects of what Christ accomplishes, tying 
atonement both to incarnation and ecclesiology and including concepts of liberation, 
sacrifice, reconciliation, forgiveness, and representation. As McKnight sees it, “Every 
theory of atonement emerges from this central, life-giving identification for 
incorporation,” and “identification for incorporation embraces all the models of 
atonement.”61 It embraces ransom and Christus Victor as elaborations on the cost Christ 
pays in his identification as well as part of the goal he achieves, setting us free from 
captivity to sin, death, and the devil; satisfaction because Jesus identifies “with our sinful, 
God-dishonoring condition . . . and this . . . is in some sense a satisfaction of what God 
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needs for God to be given proper glory”62; substitution because it allows that Christ 
accomplishes something for us which we could not do; example because it allows that 
inspiration by Christ’s example of love is part of what enables us to be moved to proper 
love of God and neighbor. 
 McKnight has nicely demonstrated the way that classic atonement theories are far 
from incompatible; they can form a fairly seamless unity. To be sure, doing so involves 
careful attention to the way they relate to one another and to other theological loci, but it 
is far from impossible. In addition, although he does not quite maintain clarity about what 
the goal of atonement theology ought to be, he nonetheless marks an important step 
beyond both the single-theory and kaleidoscopic approaches: he has attempted to affirm 
the diverse elements of teaching handed onto us by scripture and tradition about the 
meaning of the atonement, but also to understand them coherently together, as aspects of 
a single story.  
But, although his idea of “identification for incorporation” is a helpful as a way of 
describing what Christ does and towards what purpose (and in a way that can mesh with 
various classical atonement concepts) we may wonder whether we can go deeper in our 
quest for understanding. In Anselm’s terms, we may still wonder if we can understand 
not just that God accomplished these things through the atoning work of Christ, but why 
he carried them out in just the way he did. It is this latter task at which Anselm’s great 
treatise was aimed—it largely takes for granted that Christ saved through a process of 
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identification with humanity (i.e., incarnation), and that this identification is aimed at 
incorporating human beings into union with God and with God’s people. What Anselm 
seeks to answer via the logic of satisfaction is why God chose this process for that 
purpose.  
In the rest of this dissertation, my aim will be to explicate Anselm’s answer, 
develop an extension of Anselm’s answer by elaboration in terms provided by other 
thinkers, and defend the position I develop through this process from various critiques. 
This will not about to an objection to thinking of what Christ did in terms of 
recapitulation (or, if you like, identification for incorporation), though it will amount to a 
sustained argument that satisfaction provides a window into a deeper rationale that 
explains why this is what Christ did, and thus that satisfaction can function as an 
organizing principle in a deeper and more illuminating way—not in a way opposed to 
recapitulation, but in a way that explains the deep fittingness and necessity of 
recapitulation along with other specific acts Christ accomplished, such as defeating the 
devil, acting as an inspiring teacher and exemplar, offering a perfect sacrifice to God, 
offering himself as a ‘ransom,’ etc.  
Assessing the Atonement Theory Paradigm 
 We are now in a position to sum up some weaknesses of the atonement theory 
paradigm—weaknesses which, it seems, are inherent to the paradigm itself, and not just 
specific to any particular example of it. The paradigm identifies a set of elemental 
theological claims about how Christ accomplishes our salvation (that liberates us from 
the devil by defeating him, that he offers himself as a sacrifice on our behalf, that he 




he recapitulates God’s intentions for humanity through his life of faithfulness) as 
fundamentally a set of alternative theories about what the atonement is, despite the fact 
that all are deeply embedded in scripture and tradition. But since they are assumed to be 
alternatives, some theologians, as we see with Aulén and Tanner, select one or at least a 
rather narrow set of these claims and reject the others. In doing so, however, they will 
necessarily tend to be selective with biblical and patristic evidence, truncating the 
teaching handed on in scripture and tradition, and often closing off important connections 
between atonement and other doctrines. When faced with apparent tensions between 
some aspect of the atonement and another aspect, or with some other important doctrinal 
or moral truth, this approach resolves the tension by simply choosing one horn of the 
dilemma. But the intellectus fidei is better served by struggling faithfully with apparent 
tensions in the hopes of finding our way into a deeper understanding of what we believe.  
 Because of the testimony of scripture and tradition, and because of a recognition 
of the complex and multifaceted reality of the atonement, some contemporary theologians 
have rejected the single-theory approach. As we have seen with Baker and Green, some 
opt instead for a kaleidoscopic approach—one which accepts a diverse array of concepts 
as applying in some way to Christ’s atoning work, but without attempting to organize or 
order them systematically. This approach still accepts the fundamental assumption of the 
atonement theory paradigm, i.e. that these various concepts are essentially alternatives. 
Thus they can only be held together if they are accepted in a loose way, as something 
other than simply true. This approach has a difficulty, however, specifying why 
atonement theories in particular ought to be treated this way. It will be preferable, all 




complementary truths; striving for this sort of understanding is a much more promising 
way to plumb the depths of what we believe.  
Scot McKnight has suggested an approach that pushes beyond the atonement 
theory paradigm, attempting to understand the major traditional concepts attached to the 
atonement as ordered to a common purpose. When it comes to identifying that purpose, 
like Baker and Green, McKnight emphasizes the pragmatic benefits of having multiple 
ways of talking about atonement for the purpose of expressing the Gospel in ways that 
are relevant to people in diverse contexts. Baker and Green use contextual concerns as a 
way to reject views that seem difficult to convey effectively in this or that context. As I 
argued above, however, if theological claims are true, they generally ought to be 
preserved as part of Christian teaching even when they are out of step with prevailing 
cultural assumptions. McKnight, in contrast, emphasizes the positive benefit without 
arguing that any traditional atonement concepts ought to be set aside if they do not appear 
to be relevant, and thus his position improves on Baker and Green’s; indeed, in this, he 
appears to push beyond the assumption that traditional atonement theories are 
fundamentally alternatives. Instead, his approach insists they can be understood 
harmoniously and in an ordered way.  
Still, however, in insisting that atonement theology “make a difference,” he 
sometimes slips into the view that atonement theology is aimed at producing atonement. I 
have proposed instead that atonement theology be aimed at understanding atonement—
that is, the atoning work of Christ. The understanding we are aiming for is a kind of 
participation in the atonement (namely by the intellect), and nourishes our response of 




us to avoid confusing atonement theology for atonement, understanding for the object 
understood. Focusing on the goal of an atonement theology that makes a difference 
leaves McKnight at the level of organizing atonement concepts in order to say what Jesus 
does and how he does it (“identification for incorporation”). The goal of understanding, 
however, pushes us to the deeper question of why God chose to act in this specific way.  
With this analysis of the atonement theory paradigm in view, in Chapter 3 we will 
turn to a re-reading of Anselm’s treatise, Cur Deus Homo. I will argue that in Anselm we 
are faced with a genuine alternative to the atonement theory paradigm—one which does 
not treat the elements of tradition we now associate with atonement theories as 
alternatives, but rather as elements of teaching to be drawn together so that we can 
understand them in a coherent and beautiful way, as one supremely beautiful and fitting 
act of the one God. Wrestling with the tensions between them thus becomes the most 
central and productive task for the atonement theologian; simply discarding one or the 
other of these elements simply abdicates the theologian’s task, as does the kaleidoscopic 
option of refusing to pursue a coherent and systematic understanding of them. Like 
McKnight, Anselm’s theology of atonement organizes several elemental theological 
claims as contributing to a single purpose; what distinguishes Anselm, however, is the 
rigor with which he sought to understand, not just the what and how of the atonement, but 















. . . [I]t is demonstrated with . . . clear logic and truth . . . that it is from necessity that all 
the things which we believe about Christ have come to pass. 
   Saint Anselm of Canterbury, Cur Deus Homo, Preface 
 
 In CDH, Anselm is often thought of as fitting neatly into the atonement theory 
paradigm we examined in the previous chapter. That is, he thought to have developed 
(perhaps for the first time in the history of theology) a distinctive theory of atonement: 
the satisfaction theory. As we have seen, according to the paradigm, this theory must be 
set against other alternatives as fundamentally an alternative to them, such as the ransom 
theory attributed to Gregory of Nyssa, the closely related Christus Victor theory, 
Irenaeus’ recapitulation theory, and the moral exemplar theory attached to Peter Abelard. 
There is, of course, some warrant for this view. Closer attention to the details of 
Anselm’s thought, however, reveals a complex and multifaceted account—an account 
that ultimately does not fit into the atonement theory paradigm. We shall see that the 
example of Anselm actually suggests that the atonement theory paradigm is 
fundamentally misleading, both as a way of reading the pre-modern history of atonement 
theology, and as a normative way of understanding the systematic and dogmatic task of 




more felicitous way of thinking about the task of atonement theology, as well as a 
promising attempt to carry it out.  
CDH According to the Atonement Theory Paradigm 
 In CDH, Anselm sets out to defend the fittingness and necessity of the incarnation 
and death of Jesus for the salvation of human beings. He argues this in essentially two 
steps that correspond to the two books that comprise the work: (1) without Christ, the 
salvation of humanity would be impossible, and (2) salvation is indeed possible through 
an agent who is both human and divine. He sets out to make demonstrate these claims by 
“clear logic” without assuming anything scripture says about Christ.63 In support of his 
thesis, Anselm makes several arguments that appeal to concepts of debt and satisfaction, 
particularly in order to explain why God could not simply forgive without requiring any 
satisfaction. Forgiving without either satisfaction or punishment, Anselm argues, is 
unfitting for the ruler of the universe: doing so leaves something about the universe 
unregulated. It would mean treating sin the same as righteousness, which does not accord 
with justice, and even seems to make sin subject to no law.64 So, sin cannot be forgiven 
without some recompense, and this recompense needs to be in proportional to the weight 
of the wrong done—indeed, it must include a gift over and above the damage done.65 In 
order to see what would be satisfactory, Anselm says, we must understand the nature of 
the wrong done by sin. He thinks of sin as a failure to give God what is due Him—it is, at 
                                                 
63 Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, Preface. 
 
64 Ibid., I.12. 
 





least on the creaturely side, a violation of God’s honor.66 Anselm adds two further 
considerations: what we humans owe to God is everything we have and are—so we have 
nothing we do not already owe which we could offer as satisfaction. And, moreover, 
since the honor of God ought to be upheld over and against every other possible good, the 
weight of sin is greater than everything in the universe, or even an infinite number of 
universes.67  
 So far, Anselm has established that humans cannot possibly make satisfaction by 
our own means, for whatever is offered as satisfaction must be un-owed, of greater 
weight than the weight of sin, and it must be offered by humanity. Thus it turns out that 
the only possible means for human salvation is an agent who is divine in order to have 
something to offer that meets the first two criteria, and on the other hand is human in 
order to meet the third.68 Given such an agent, what is it that can to be offered in order to 
make sufficient satisfaction for sin? The answer is voluntary faithfulness unto death.69 As 
a human being, Jesus owes love and faithfulness to God, but since He is without sin (even 
original sin), he does not owe death. Jesus’ offering of his own life in faithfulness to is 
thus supererogatory. Indeed, it is an infinitely valuable gift that is greater than the weight 
of human sin. Therefore, in order for humanity to be saved, the Incarnation and Cross are 
necessary for salvation. Furthermore, it would be unfitting for God to create humanity 
with a certain purpose in mind and then allow that purpose to go unfulfilled. Combine 
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this with Anselm’s premise that we cannot attribute even the slightest unfittingness to 
God, and we have an argument that God necessarily will act to save humanity by such a 
means given the fact of human sin. At this point we have the basic elements of a 
satisfaction theory of atonement. All these elements are certainly present in CDH, and, 
moreover, he explicitly rejects another candidate atonement theory (albeit one apparently 
without a systematic exponent such as Anselm), namely the “ransom” theory in which 
Christ offers his life as payment to the devil in exchange for human beings. Given this as 
well as the tight logic by which Anselm proceeds, it is easy to conclude that he meant 
precisely to offer an innovative theory as an alternative to other existing theories.  
This reading makes Anselm easy to place within the history of atonement 
theology, and, not unimportantly, it also fits him neatly into a number of theological 
conflicts. Anselm becomes a paradigm case of rationalizing the doctrine of atonement, 
either excessively or appropriately. He is to blame for placing the doctrine of atonement 
primarily in an impersonal, juridical context, or he is given credit for shifting towards an 
objective and moral account and away from the dramatic and mythical language of the 
patristic era. He thus embodies the core sins or virtues of the Western theological 
tradition over against the East, or of medieval theology over against patristic theology. 
The common thread here is that Anselm is interpreted as a decisive break with the earlier 
tradition in content and method. Without attempting to be comprehensive, it is worth 
noting some examples of how Anselm’s distinctiveness in the history of atonement 
theology has been characterized and critiqued along these lines before we turn to a fresh 
reading of CDH. What I hope to show here is a particular array of common criticisms of 




criticisms which, it turns out, can be answered once we revise our understanding of 
Anselm’s relationship to the tradition he received.  
Content 
On this interpretive trajectory, Anselm’s chief contribution to the content of 
atonement theology is to envision atonement in terms of the payment of a debt of honor 
towards God in order to satisfy the demands of justice, where the patristic tradition had 
mainly thought of the atonement in terms of a military victory over oppressive spiritual 
forces, or healing of an internal corruption by a kind of contact or union with the divine, 
or a payment of an unjustly demanded ransom by the devil. While critical interpreters of 
Anselm have differed to some degree on the provenance of his central, load-bearing 
concepts, in general they have agreed that Anselm’s distinctive move is to develop a 
theory of atonement in terms of these concepts as opposed to other possible theories in 
terms of other concepts.  
How should we interpret Anselm’s central concepts? In contemporary theology, it 
has been common (bordering on universal) among theologians writing on the doctrine of 
atonement to interpret CDH as fundamentally dependent on a feudal legal system.70 
According to this system, a crime is understood primarily as an insult against the honor of 
one’s feudal lord, and satisfaction (which can be made by a third party instead of the one 
who committed the crime) must be made in order to avert the lord’s wrath. The 
conclusion which follows is usually that, whatever its merits might be (or might have 
been in his own day), Anselm’s theory is too intimately bound to a feudal context. By 
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itself, at least, it reduces God to a petulant ruler, and reduces the atonement to an 
impersonal transaction. It lacks any sense of a meaningful relationship between God and 
humanity, and thus it cannot adequately account for the human response of repentance.  
In his own work on the atonement, which organizes atonement theories around 
the need to deal with both subjective and objective dimensions of atonement, Paul Fiddes 
expresses this mode of evaluating Anselm neatly:  
The primary defect . . . is that both Calvin’s and Anselm’s theories are too 
‘objective’, at the expense of the ‘subjective’ dimension in atonement. 
They portray atonement as a transaction, or legal settlement, between God 
the Father and God the Son in which we are not involved, despite being 
the erring sinners concerned. To suggest that our debt to justice is paid . . . 
by a gift of honour (Anselm) . . . certainly expresses the once-for-allness 
of the cross of Jesus. But it does not integrate the human response to God, 
and the healing of human personality here and now, into the act of 
atonement. 
Of course theories of this kind add our response of repentance and trust as 
a second stage or appendix. . . . But it comes as a later appropriation of 
what has already been achieved, and misses the heart of atonement as the 
restoring of a relationship between persons, and as an event of 
reconciliation in which all estranged partners are involved. It is hard to see 
the relevance of human reaction to the atoning act if this is already 
complete.71 
For Fiddes, the “defect” of Anselm’s theory thus has directly to do with its basis on a 
feudal legal model in which “justice had become a matter of the rights of the great 
overlords, [so that] any crime at all was an infringing of their personal honour.”72 
Developing a theory of atonement along these lines reduces it to an impersonal 
transaction that does not meaningfully integrate human response and reconciliation to 
God.  
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Mark Baker and Joel Green provide another example. Like Fiddes, they see 
Anselm’s alleged feudalism as both a positive and a negative of atonement theology. As 
we saw in the last chapter, their own scheme for organizing and evaluating atonement 
theories includes the requirement that an atonement theory should, on the one hand, 
speak intelligibly within its cultural context, and, on the other, challenge that context in 
light of the Gospel. Anselm thus provides a positive example because Anselm “sought to 
interpret the cross with images easily intelligible to the people of his era.”73 On the other 
hand, he also provides a negative example, for “[h]e does more than just use images and 
experiences from daily life to illustrate the atonement; he allows his experience of 
medieval life—its logic and its conventional wisdom—to have an overwhelming 
influence in the shaping of his model of the atonement.”74 The conventional feudal 
wisdom which, on this reading, overwhelmingly shaped Anselm’s reading of the 
atonement has detrimental results—in particular, Anselm’s account leaves out the 
importance of a restored relationship to God and a subsequent life of holiness:   
Anselm’s focus on honor causes him to fall short of the relational 
understanding of sin . . . The emphasis on meeting the debt to the honor of 
the offended lord places little importance on the relationship itself and 
gives no attention to the impact a restored relationship with God will have 
on a person’s relationship to others.75 
The charge of feudalism is not necessary, however, to evaluate Anselm in this 
way. Thomas Noble, for example, finds similar flaws in Anselm’s theory, though he does 
not identify the origin of Anselm’s concepts as feudal. In fact, in his view, the distinctive 
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concepts Anselm applies are fundamentally Biblical.76 Even so, Noble interprets 
Anselm’s concepts of sin, honor, debt, and satisfaction as essentially legal and moral, as 
opposed to ontological, and in this way he too sees Anselm as representing a break with 
the Fathers. He comes to much the same conclusion as Fiddes, Baker, and Green:  
It is true that the Anselmic view . . . shows the seriousness of sin as an 
objective reality. It is not just our attitude to God that separates us from 
him. . . . [S]in is not simply attitude: it is act. And the fact of our sinful 
acts is an objective barrier between us and God. . . . All that is part of 
Anselm’s valuable insight.  
But where the Anselmic view is inadequate is that it fails to take account 
of an even deeper reality of sin, not just as acts or deeds, but as a condition 
of sinfulness. . . . The problem . . . as the Fathers saw . . . is ontological. 
Thus Anselm’s view of the atonement—while biblical, valuable, true, and 
necessary, as far as it goes—is not sufficient. It deals with the atonement 
entirely in external categories: the commercial model of debt and the legal 
model of acquittal. 
. . . It focuses on the legal and moral dimension of the atonement, but 
misses the ontological aspect. And it does not seem to have anything to 
say about sin as a reality internal to us. In short, it provides no basis for 
sanctification.77 
Earlier modern readers of Anselm tended to associate Anselm’s concepts with the 
medieval penitential system. Adolf von Harnack wrote that Anselm developed his theory 
“by making the principles of the practice of penance the fundamental scheme of religion 
in general.”78 Harnack levels a Protestant critique, insisting that Anselm’s account does 
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not guarantee salvation to any particular sinner, but only demonstrates the possibility of 
their salvation if they participate in and live under grace. Therefore, it offers “no comfort 
whatever to any distressed conscience.”79 On this view, Anselm’s satisfaction theory 
certainly provides a kind of motivation to repent (to wit, to avoid hell), but, as the critics 
cited earlier agree, it provides no ontological ground or basis for repentance, no account 
of how a sinful will becomes a righteous one in the first place. In his influential treatment 
of Anselm, George Foley read Anselm’s theory in a similar way as grounding “[t]he 
notion of supererogatory and transferable merit and the custom of indulgences.”80 On 
Foley’s reading of Anselm, merit is completely transferable, and so Anselm’s limitation 
of Christ’s merit to those who actually imitate Christ is simply arbitrary, and thus he 
opens the way for the Church to claim to dispense that merit however it chooses. Foley 
thus agrees that Anselm’s theory offers no substantive connection between the atonement 
and the subjective Christian response of repentance (the kind of connection which he 
finds in patristic teaching, e.g. on deification81). We can see, then, that an influential set 
of readers offer a common sort of critique, and that this critique involves the premise that 
Anselm’s theory of atonement is, in its content, essentially an alternative to the material 
found in the Fathers. Treated as an alternative, it is easy enough to locate relative 
weaknesses and strengths compared to the other possible choices.  
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When it comes to his theological method, Anselm was both highly innovative and 
highly influential for the tradition of theorizing about the atonement which followed after 
him. Indeed, it is typical to suggest that genuine theorizing about the atonement began 
with him.82 How did he innovate? In searching for a proof of the necessity of the 
incarnation and atonement, he certainly seemed to aim at a higher standard of proof than 
he believed had been met before. Moreover, he sought to do so without appeal to 
scripture or any other traditional authority. Notably, for this specific task, he found 
certain traditional ways of describing the fittingness of the incarnation to be insufficient, 
although he did not reject them as false or without value; perhaps it is best to say that he 
judged it possible and desirable to press for a deeper explanation than they could offer, 
even if they were fine as far as it goes. It seems, then, that Anselm inaugurated a 
distinctly philosophical and abstract method of reasoning about the work of God in 
Christ, where before there had been more comfort with pictorial and metaphorical 
expression.  
It is probably difficult to find anyone who has followed this aspect of Anselm’s 
method very closely; the later medieval scholastics certainly did not set aside appeals to 
scripture in their own treatments of atonement and satisfaction. And, as will observe in 
more detail in the next chapter, the tradition immediately following him almost uniformly 
rejected his notion that the particular way God acted for salvation was necessary, opting 
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instead to show that it is extremely fitting, though God could have chosen another way. 
Nonetheless, it is undeniable that the level of conceptual rigor he applied to his analysis 
was highly influential for the Western scholastic tradition. For his modern and 
contemporary critics, however, Anselm’s commitment to rendering the doctrine of 
atonement as rational by the most rigorous standards available to him mark an 
unfortunate departure from the more dramatic and ‘mythic’ style of the Fathers. As David 
Bentley Hart observes,  
For Harnack, as for Albrecht Ritschl before him, Anselm’s significance 
resided in precisely this perceived bare linearity of his thought; for both, 
Anselm was something genuinely new, a theologian who formulated a 
‘theory of atonement,’ as distinct from the simple ‘schemes of salvation’ 
characteristic of Greek patristic thought.83 
Indeed, Harnack saw Anselm’s method as something new and quite dangerous, 
profoundly arrogant, and even childish: 
In many passages, and these, too, the most important, Anselm proceeds 
according to a logic by which already everything can be proved. The 
gravest malpractices of Scholasticism already betray themselves in him; 
the self-restraint of the ancient thinkers, modest as was the expression 
given to it by the Fathers, is wanting to him. Everything is conceived of 
quite abstractly, very much in the way in which a clever child thinks and 
speaks of such things.84 
This is an important critique; in his search for logical necessity, Anselm truly does 
push for a level of understanding that perhaps we cannot rightly take ourselves to have in 
this life; perhaps he even unduly diminishes the scope of divine freedom as well as the 
gratuity of grace. We well take these latter two critiques up in the next chapter. Here, 
however, with a more comprehensive and charitable reading of Anselm in view, we will 
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be able to see that even if Anselm pushes too far in aiming for necessity, this goal 
nonetheless allows him to gain a great deal in terms of understanding—and more 
specifically, in understanding what is handed on in the patristic tradition. It enabled him 
to develop an account that draws together a great deal of that tradition into a coherent 
account. This, I will argue, is a result we can retain, even if we depart from Anselm in 
terms of certain aspects of the methodology that got him there.  
Towards an Alternative Reading of CDH 
This particular cluster of charges against both the content and method of 
Anselm’s theology of the atonement is intimately tied to the atonement theory paradigm. 
It is tied, that is, to the notion that Anselm offers us a theory of atonement that is at the 
most basic conceptual level an alternative to other items on the list of atonement theories, 
the most relevant alternatives being Christus Victor, recapitulation, and moral exemplar. 
Under this paradigm, the possible conclusions are that Anselm’s theory is true, that it is 
false, or that it is insufficient alone but to some degree or other warrants a place alongside 
others in the kaleidoscope. Fiddes finds it ultimately inadequate because it emphasizes 
the objective at the expense of the subjective element of atonement. Harnack thinks it a 
useful development in some respects but ultimately untenable, and Aulén thinks it 
inferior to what he identifies as the “classic” view—the one to which he seems to 
advocate as the genuinely Christian alternative. Green and Baker, taking the 
kaleidoscopic option, nonetheless see very little ongoing positive value in Anselm, 
whereas Noble thinks it insufficient on its own but nonetheless indispensable. All appear 




A fresh reading of CDH—one that attends to Anselm’s wider theological project 
and its deep and self-conscious continuity with the earlier tradition—will show that he 
does not put forth satisfaction as an alternative to other elements of the tradition. Instead, 
for Anselm, satisfaction will turn out to be a way of organizing all of these elements 
together conceptually so that their profound fittingness and necessity can be understood 
and appreciated. The continuity this reading uncovers will also undermine many of the 
charges leveled against Anselm above. Once we see what Anselm is up to vis-à-vis other 
elements of atonement theology from the tradition, we can leverage those other elements 
to address the weaknesses Anselm’s theory seems to have when interpreted as a single 
theory opposed to those other elements. With his continuity with the Fathers in view, it is 
easier to see that Anselm’s account is not (for example) juridical and legal instead of 
ontological or personal. In fact, read carefully, Anselm goes a great way towards a theory 
that is at illuminates these various pieces hang together, and, indeed, how they cannot be 
understood fully unless they are understood together.   
We can begin our move from presenting the common reading of Anselm to a 
fresh interpretation of Anselm himself by noticing that in order to present Anselm’s 
theology of atonement as fitting within the atonement theory paradigm—and as marking 
a fundamental break with the Fathers in both content and method—the elements that 
make it up have been extracted and set together in a certain way, “denuded of every 
nuance and ambiguity that enriches the text from which it is drawn.”85 While it has to be 
granted that those elements really are there in Anselm’s text, a great deal of what Anselm 
himself thought worth saying (most notably the lengthy discourses on the angels and the 
                                                 




divinely appointed number of the elect) has been neglected in this and many other 
summaries of CDH.  
To remedy this, I first offer a sketch of some relevant theological background 
from Anselm’s earlier writings. This is crucial for understanding CDH; as George 
Huntston Williams observed, “Precisely because the Cur Deus Homo is 
programmatically rationalist with allusions to Christian revelation reduced to a minimum 
. . . we must therefore also bring in the related writings of Anselm.”86 Then, with this 
context in view, I draw attention to several points in the CDH not adequately accounted 
for in the reading I have described above. In particular, I note the way Anselm 
understands his own project in relation to the Fathers, his inclusion of elements normally 
associated with other theories of atonement, and the larger metaphysical and teleological 
context within which Anselm sets his vision of salvation. Together, these suggest that 
Anselm has actually presented a much richer vision of the work of Christ that is usually 
appreciated, one that is deeply continuous with the patristic tradition. These pieces of 
evidence support the view that Anselm’s concepts are not best understood as originating 
in an imagined feudal context, but instead have a rich theological background. Once that 
background is in view, we will be in a position to offer a fresh evaluation of Anselm’s 
contribution to the doctrine of atonement.  
Theological Background to CDH 
 As we have seen in Chapter 2, many critics of satisfaction and related accounts of 
atonement find them to have problematic theological implications. For instance, some 
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find that satisfaction accounts imply that Christ’s self-offering changes God’s attitude 
towards humanity, implying a division in the divine will between God the Father and 
God the Son, or a division between God’s mercy and His justice (with His justice 
constraining His mercy). It is worth asking, then, about Anselm’s doctrine of God, and 
how he took it to conflict or cohere with what he wrote about the atonement. Before our 
direct consideration of CDH, we pause then to unpack some of the relevant theological 
background found in Anselm’s other writings. Attempting to read CDH as coherent with 
what we find here will be crucial for developing a better reading of CDH and answering 
various critiques of satisfaction accounts of atonement. We will briefly note some 
important features of Anselm’s understanding of the divine nature, his understanding of 
the Word (the Second Person of the Trinity), and his understanding of rational creatures.  
The Divine Nature 
 In the Monologion and the Proslogion, Anselm reflects in some detail on the 
nature of God; we shall see that although he is creative, he is committed to a deeply 
classical Trinitarian theism. The first of these two great treatises considers God as the 
supreme substance or nature, which he describes this way: “Of all the things that exist, 
there is one nature that is supreme. It alone is self-sufficient in its eternal happiness, yet 
through its all-powerful goodness it creates and gives all other things their very existence 
and their goodness.”87 Anselm then attempts to guide the reader through “a kind of model 
meditation” whereby one who has never heard of the supreme nature could come to know 
about it through reason.  
                                                 




Anselm reasons to the existence of the supreme nature from the fact that that 
things have goodness not through themselves but through some one thing through which 
they are all good. That through which they are good must be good through itself. “The 
one thing, therefore, that is good through itself is the one thing that is supremely good.”88 
In addition to goodness, Anselm argues, this one nature is that through which all things 
have existence, and it is the one thing that exists through itself; that it creates whatever 
else exists from nothing and not from existing material; that its existence is entirely 
unique; that it not only good and existent through itself but also is justice, wisdom, 
beauty, truth, and other similar terms (whatever it is unqualifiedly better to be than not to 
be); and yet it is simple rather than a composite; it is eternal and timeless, omnipresent, 
and free from constraint by anything it has made (which is to say anything at all outside 
of itself); it is immutable in its being; and that it is one individual substance best 
characterized as a spirit.89  
Though we have left a great deal of interesting detail aside, we have here enough 
to recognize that Anselm held (and reflected on with a great deal of rigor) a deeply 
classical understanding of God. Amid this welter of relatively familiar classical divine 
attributes and Anselm’s own distinctive analyses of them, two issues around the divine 
nature are of particular importance as background for CDH, and the both relate to the 
way Anselm understood divine simplicity: first, his attempts to reconcile the qualities of 
justice and mercy, and second, the way he connected truth and justice.     
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In the Proslogion, Anselm famously attempts to improve on the Monologion by 
demonstrating God’s existence and attributes without appeal to the evidence of created 
things; he does this through the concept of God as “that than which nothing greater can 
be conceived”—one notes the kernel of this notion already in the Monologion’s claim 
that since the supreme nature is supreme goodness, it must be whatever it is unqualifiedly 
better to be than not be. In essence, Anselm proceeds by considering each putative divine 
attribute (starting with real existence) and showing that if a being were thought of as 
lacking that attribute then it could be thought of as greater by adding that attribute. So, if 
one conceives of a being as not really existing, or as not just, or not eternal, and so on, 
one could conceive of a greater being by adding real existence, justice, eternality, and so 
on. Thus, the being conceived of is not that than which nothing greater can be conceived, 
and therefore it is not God. In this way, the argument leads to the conclusion that God 
exists and possesses these various attributes necessarily, as a result of the very concept of 
God.  
In this context, Anselm pauses to consider a potential difficulty. Justice and mercy 
are both qualities which, it seems, it is better to possess than not. But if justice is giving 
to each one his due, and mercy is precisely to refrain from giving to sinners their due 
punishment, how can God be both supremely just and supremely merciful? It would seem 
that even though it is good to be just and good to be merciful, God cannot be thought of 
as both. It is helpful to see how the force of this objection is intensified by Anselm’s 
formulation of divine simplicity from the Monologion. There, Anselm says, “Since the 
supreme nature is not composite at all, and yet really is all those good things, it is 




same thing as all of them (the same thing as all together and as each individually).”90 God 
is thus for Anselm the single and completely simple ground of what are to us different 
goods which sometimes even appear to be opposed. But if the dilemma holds, God could 
not be the one simple and supreme ground of all the various kinds of goodness. God 
would either be supremely just or supremely merciful. Absent such a commitment to 
simplicity, one might suppose that answering the problem only requires showing that 
justice and mercy do not directly conflict with one another. But, given simplicity, we can 
see why Anselm struggles to discover a deeper unity between mercy and justice:    
How then, O good God, good to the good and to the wicked, how do you save the 
wicked if this is not just and You do not do anything which is not just? Or, since 
your goodness is beyond comprehension, is this hidden in the inaccessible light in 
which You dwell? Truly in the deepest and most secret place of Your goodness is 
hidden the source whence the stream of Your mercy flows. For though You are 
all-just and supremely just You are, however—precisely because You are all-just 
and supremely just—also beneficent to the wicked. . . .  
For even if it be difficult to understand how Your mercy is not apart from Your 
justice, it is, however, necessary to believe that it is not in any way opposed to 
justice, for it derives from goodness which is naught apart from justice, which 
indeed really coincides with justice. Truly, if You are merciful because You are 
supremely good, and if You are supremely good only in so far as you are 
supremely just, truly then You are merciful precisely because You are supremely 
just.91  
Perhaps we cannot understand how justice and mercy are one, but it must be the 
case that in reality they are. A finally adequate understanding would show not just that 
God is merciful and just, but also that God is merciful because just. In the Proslogion, he 
goes some way towards this kind of understanding, and he does so through two steps. 
First, he observes that mercy is an effect seen from the point of view of creatures. When 
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God refrains from punishing, the effect is like when a human judge refrains from 
punishing out of a feeling of compassion, even though God’s choice not to punish is not 
brought on by any such emotion.92 Second, even though He is not moved by such an 
emotion, God refrains from giving (some of) the wicked what they deserve according to 
their merits—and He does so out if justice to Himself; it is God’s justice to Himself that 
motivates His mercy to human beings. But how is being merciful God’s justice to 
Himself? Along the lines of the central Proslogion argument, Anselm reasons that if God 
were “good only by way of retribution and not by way of forgiveness, and if [He] made 
to be good only those not yet good, and not also the wicked”93 then He would not be that 
than which a greater cannot be conceived. A being who cannot make bad people good is 
not as great as one who can do so. So, it befits God’s own goodness to be merciful, and 
thus,  
when You punish the wicked it is just, since it agrees with their merits; however, 
when You spare the wicked it is just, not because of their merits but because it is 
befitting to Your goodness. For in sparing the wicked You are just in relation to 
Yourself and not in relation to us, even as You are merciful in relation to us and 
not in relation to Yourself.94 
Anselm’s answer here is certainly not without its difficulties. He has given a 
motivation for God to overlook sins, namely the fact that it is good to be merciful, and 
thus it is just to God’s own supremely good nature that He might express His goodness 
both through punishing and forgiving. And, He argues that since God is justice itself, if 
God wills to forgive a person, it cannot be unjust for that person to be forgiven. Still, he 
has not yet given much insight into how it is that God is also just with respect to the 
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merits of sinners in His acts of mercy—this is a question that he is able to address when 
he ties it to the Incarnation and Cross of Christ in CDH. But the idea that God’s mercy 
can be understood as coming from His justice to himself will, I argue, remain consistent 
in the later treatise.  
There is an additional difficulty with the Proslogion answer: it appears to raise the 
question of whether God needs sinners to punish and forgive in order to do justice to His 
supreme goodness and power. For if, as Anselm argues, a being who punishes the wicked 
and rewards the righteous is better than one who only does the latter, and a being who 
makes sinners righteous as well as making righteous those who simply were not yet 
righteous is better than one who only does the latter, then it might seem to follow that 
God would not be the supreme being in a world without sinners. Perhaps the Proslogion 
argument can be rescued from this objection by adding the qualification: “Given that 
there are sinners, then a being who punishes the wicked and rewards the righteous is 
greater than one who only does the latter,” and “Given that there are sinners, then a being 
who makes sinners righteous is greater than one who does not.” Still, one might ask 
whether, given sinners, it cannot be open to God to save all of them? Quite apart from 
whether it is possible for God to insure that all are saved, Anselm’s reasoning in the 
Proslogion might imply that God’s goodness and justice would not be fully supreme if, 
given that there are sinners, He did not punish some of them. I will argue that in CDH 
Anselm provides an explanation of how God’s mercy is just to Himself that clearly does 
not entail that God needs there to be sinners, or that He needs some sinners to be finally 
punished in order to be the supremely good and just one. What we will retain, however, is 




if it is good to be merciful, then goodness and mercy and justice must ultimately cohere 
and even coincide in God’s action; and finally, God’s mercy towards sinners is in part a 
matter of God’s justice towards Himself.  
The Word 
We turn now to Anselm’s account of the relationship between supreme nature and 
its Word. Anselm’s Christology links the doctrines of creation and redemption in a way 
that is recognizably patristic, and provides crucial metaphysical and theological 
background music for his atonement theology in CDH; attending to it in some detail will 
motivate our attempt to interpret Anselm’s doctrine of atonement as deeply continuous 
with the patristic tradition, and even provide some basic language in which to do so.  
In the Monologion, the Second Person of the Trinity is discussed most extensively 
as the supreme nature’s locutio, its inner word or utterance. But this locutio appears first 
with reference to creatures. Anselm wants to clarify the sense in which creatures are and 
are not created from nothing: creatures came from nothing in the sense that before their 
creation they lacked real existence, but,  
before all things existed, the manner, features, and fact of their future existence 
already existed, in the reasoning of the supreme nature. On the one hand, then, 
before being made, what was made was . . . nothing . . . Yet on the other hand, it 
was not nothing as far as the reason [ratio] of the maker was concerned.95 
The way in which the forms of creatures are present in the divine ratio, Anselm says, is 
like a craftsman’s inner mental conception of what he is going to make. This inner 
conception Anselm thinks of as a kind of inward utterance or verbalization. This concept 
of inner verbalization is important for understanding how Anselm thinks of the Second 
                                                 




Person, and so his explanation of it is worth quoting and examining in detail. He clarifies 
by distinguishing three ways of referring to a man: 
First I can speak of a man, signifying him by the name ‘man.’ Secondly I can 
think of the name ‘man,’ but not say it aloud. Thirdly my mind can visualize the 
man himself. It can do so either by means of a bodily image (imagining, say, his 
perceptible shape), or by means of reason (thinking, say, of his universal 
essence—in this case ‘rational mortal animal’). . . . In the third case I am not 
using . . . signs . . . I am expressing the thing itself inwardly within my mind, 
either by imagination (in the case of bodily things) or by understanding (in the 
case of rational things). 
Each of these three kinds of utterance consists of its own kind of word. The words 
of the third and last kind (since they express things that are known) are natural 
and the same for all peoples. It is because these words exist that all other words 
have been invented. . . .  We can also say without absurdity that natural words are 
truer, insofar as they resemble and designate their objects more manifestly. . . . no 
other words appear so similar to and is so representative of its object, as this 
likeness by means of which the thing itself is represented to the thinking mind’s 
eye. It is therefore the natural word that is correctly said to be the most proper and 
principal word for its object.  
. . . Given this, it would seem possible that such a verbalization [i.e. by natural 
words] exists in the supreme substance, and that it existed before its objects, in 
order for things to be created through it, and which exists now, in order that 
through it things created may be known.96 
The inner utterance by which God understood the creatures He would make 
before He made them, then, is the truest sort of utterance: utterance by what he calls 
natural words. In the human mind, natural words are most basic, direct, and true way we 
have of thinking of a thing, thinking of the thing itself as we know it, and not just the 
series of sounds or letters by which we name it. “Similarly,” Anselm says, “the supreme 
substance first said within itself, as it were, everything that it was going to create, and 
then brought it about in accordance with, and through, that inner verbalization.”97 On the 
other hand, there is an important dissimilarity between human and divine inner 
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verbalizations: whereas a human craftsman has to draw on things he has seen before to 
construct his inner verbalization of what he will make, the Creator draws on no external 
source whatsoever. Unlike the inner verbalization of the human craftsman, that of the 
supreme substance “is neither taken from or given by anything external, and is the sole, 
sufficient and prime cause of its artificer’s complete work of production.”98 Now we can 
begin to see how Anselm arrives at the Second Person of the Trinity through this concept 
of inner verbalization. On the one hand, the supreme substance made everything that has 
been made through itself; on the other hand, the supreme substance has made everything 
that has been made through its inner verbalization. Therefore, Anselm reasons with his 
characteristic precision, the supreme substance’s Word, its inner verbalization, is the 
supreme substance.99 The Word, then, is the inner utterance through which God 
understands all things and through which God makes and sustains all things. The Word is 
not a creature, but nor is it another god. As the agent of creation, the Word is simply and 
truly God.  
There is a further dissimilarity worth noting between the Word by which God 
represents all things to himself and the natural words through which we humans represent 
things to ourselves. In our case, while mental representations of things are the truest kind 
of word, they are less real, less true than things themselves. Our mental representations 
are imitations of the things they represent. Not so in the case of the Word. Anselm says it 
this way:  
Truth, we usually say, is in the sitter while the likeness and image of that truth is 
in the portrait. What if we took it that likewise, the truth is in the Word, and the 
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imitation in created things? The essence of the Word exists supremely, so that, in 
some sense, it is the only thing that exists. Created things, by comparison, do not 
exist. Nevertheless they are created through and according to the Word. The truth 
of what exists is in the Word, and imitation of the supreme essence in created 
things. Thus it is not the Word . . . that suffers increase or decrease in accordance 
with the degree of similarity to creation, but the other way round. Necessarily, for 
every creature, the degree of greatness of its existence and the degree of 
comparative excellence of its existence is the degree of its similarity to that which 
exists supremely and is supremely great.100  
The true reality of created things is found in the Word, in the supreme substance’s 
own inner verbalization of those things. It is not the Word which needs to correspond to 
created things, but created things which need to correspond to their representation in the 
Word. We might gloss Anselm’s claim here this way: God’s knowledge of rocks is not 
true just because it happens to correspond to actually existing rocks. It is rather that actual 
rocks exist insofar as they correspond to the form of rocks eternally known and uttered to 
the Father in his Word. The Word, Anselm says, is the truth of what is. This has 
especially important implications for rational creatures, who are free, in a way that rocks 
are not, to reject God’s intentions in creating them, and so turn away from reality. They 
are free, that is, to fail in a voluntary way to conform to the truth of their natures as 
known in the Word. To sin is thus for Anselm to fail to exist fully and truly, to be, just 
insofar as one sins, false.101 This is a way of expressing the metaphysical principle that 
evil is a privation, a lack, but with a richly Trinitarian inflection.  
 Significantly, it is at the point of this observation about truth and imitation that 
Anselm turns from the Word’s relation to creatures to a further reflection on the Word’s 
relationship to the supreme substance itself. So far, he has shown that the Word is the 
                                                 
100 Ibid., XXXI. 
 




supreme substance, since through it all things are created. But, he asks, what exactly is 
the Word the word for? What does it express or represent? A word (in his sense of 
“natural” words, mental representations of things) depends on the thing for which it is the 
word. But the Word does not depend on the things it created, so it cannot be the word for 
those things which are made through it. Anselm’s reasons that, if nothing existed except 
the supreme substance, there would still be a natural word for the supreme substance. 
Indeed, through this word the supreme substance would understand itself. The Word, 
therefore, is the word for the supreme substance: in the Word God utters Himself. This 
self-utterance includes everything God eternally intends for creatures; Anselm says that 
“with one Word [the supreme substance] says both itself and what it has made.”102 God’s 
utterance of Himself, of course, is a completely perfect representation of Himself, so 
perfect that the Word is consubstantial with the supreme nature. The relation between the 
supreme substance and its Word is thus one of eternal begetting, and hence the Word can 
be named the Son and the one whose Word the Son is can be named the Father.103 
Anselm repeats this understanding of the nature of the Second Person of the Trinity 
(albeit much more briefly) in his subsequent treatise, the Proslogion. There, he identifies 
the divine nature in the same classical terms as the earlier treatise:   
And You are the being who exists in a strict and absolute sense because You have 
neither past nor future existence but only present existence . . . And You are life 
and light and wisdom and blessedness and eternity and many suchlike good 
things, and yet You are nothing save the one supreme good, You are completely 
sufficient unto Yourself, needing nothing, but rather He whom all things need in 
order that they may have being and well-being.  
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. . . You are this good, O God the Father; this is Your Word, that is to say, Your 
Son. For there cannot be any other than what You are, or any thing greater or 
lesser than You, in the Word by which You utter Yourself. For Your Word is as 
true as You are truthful and is therefore the very truth that You are and that is not 
other than You. And You are so simple that there cannot be born of You any other 
than what You are.104 
We do well to keep in mind Anselm’s detailed reflection on the nature of the 
Word and the relation of the Word to both the Father and to creatures as we interpret 
CDH. We will need to try to read the story Anselm tells there about the atonement, 
including any metaphors or analogies with creaturely realities it contains, in a way that 
fits with his detailed theology of the Word. I will argue that we can do so quite naturally: 
Christ’s atoning act will turn out to be nothing other than the perfect and satisfying 
utterance of God’s eternal intentions within an individual human nature, an utterance 
spoken into the history of a fallen humanity.  
Justice and Truth in Rational Creatures 
With Anselm’s understanding of justice and mercy in God in view, as well as his 
understanding of the Word, we need one more piece of background: his account of the 
way justice and truth exist in rational creatures. In the Monologion, Anselm turns to the 
topic of the rational mind after the lengthy discussions about the supreme essence, 
including its Trinitarian nature. It is at this point that he asks how it has been possible for 
him to say anything about the being he has been talking about, given that it is unlike 
everything else that exists. He grants that “one cannot get to see anything about the 
supreme nature by means of what is proper to it. Rather, one must work through 
                                                 




something other than it.”105 One approaches most closely to knowing the supreme nature 
through what is most similar to it, namely the rational mind.  
In Augustinian fashion, Anselm thinks of the mind as an image of the Trinity in 
its ability to be conscious, to understand itself, and to love itself.106 But the mind most 
fully reflects the image of the supreme nature not in its relation to itself, but rather in its 
relation to the supreme nature: its ability to be conscious of, to understand, and to love 
the supreme nature. The created mind is most like God in its ability to know and love 
God:  
. . . the mind is demonstrably an image of the supreme essence, in so far as it can 
be conscious of, understand, and love it. And the authenticity of the image 
discerned in the mind is in direct proportion to the greatness and the similarity of 
its mind to the supreme essence.  
The ability to be conscious of, to understand, and to love that which, of all things, 
is greatest and best—no other gift bestowed on rational creation is conceivably as 
excellent or as similar to the supreme wisdom. No other created trait so betrays 
the image of its Creator.107 
Recall that for Anselm the Word is the supreme nature’s understanding of itself, such a 
perfect understanding that indeed it is consubstantial with that of which it is the 
understanding. At the same time, the Word is also the supreme nature’s representation to 
itself of the things it will make. Creatures, therefore, are themselves reflections of the 
supreme nature who created them. Rational creatures, in particular, reflect the supreme 
nature by their capacity to understand the supreme nature, by being in this way like the 
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Word. For Anselm, this implies both that the mind’s attempt to understand itself points to 
God and that its attempt to understand God is the truest intimation of what it is itself. The 
more fully that the mind understands and loves the Creator—the more, that is to say, that 
the mind is like the Word—the more authentic an image the mind is of its Creator, and 
the more it is what it is created to be. Since this capacity to know and love God is the 
highest capacity of human nature, that which, above all, which we were created to 
exercise, Anselm reasons that it also marks out our most fundamental debt to our 
Creator.108 It is the best thing that we can do, and so it is most of all what we ought to 
want to do.  
Given that for Anselm God is identical with goodness itself, justice itself, and 
whatever it is unqualifiedly better to be than not, this debt is perhaps not best understand 
as a narrow injunction to study (and enjoy) theology. It would seem to include all of our 
efforts to know and to love what is good because it is good, what is just because it is just, 
what is true because it is true, what is beautiful because it is beautiful, and so forth. 
Properly understood, each of these are actually identical with the fundamental duty to 
strive to know and love God for God’s sake. To be sure, there is no doubt that the sort of 
knowledge of the divine nature Anselm himself pursues in his treatises and the response 
of love expressed in his prayers (sometimes, of course, prayer and treatise come together 
for Anselm) is an important part of what he has in mind. Even so, most especially 
through his identification of God as goodness itself, justice itself, truth itself, and so on, 
he goes some way towards tying the most basic exercise of rationality (which is always 
for Anselm a moral matter) into this fundamental duty of human nature. For it is this 
                                                 




connection that most clearly and comprehensively ties all human obligations together in 
the fundamental obligation (which Anselm already in the Monologion calls a debt) to 
understand and love God.  
Anselm developed the connection between truth and justice in God and creatures 
in more detail in his later treatise on truth, De Veritate. There, Anselm considers how the 
unity of truth is to be understood—if God is Truth, how exactly are other things said to be 
true? He approaches an answer by considering various kinds of things that can be true, 
and then arriving a definition of truth. Sentences are true in two ways: by correctly 
signifying what they are meant to signify, and by signifying that what is is (or that what is 
not is not). Opinions or thoughts are true when a person thinks as she ought, which is to 
say, when she thinks that what is, is. Likewise, for Anselm, the rational will can be called 
true when a person wills what he ought. Actions, too, can be true or false; Anselm argues 
that to do a thing is implicitly to affirm that one ought to do it. Indeed, Anselm sees this 
kind of signification as even more forceful than making an explicit assertion. In this way, 
for Anselm, actions speak louder than words. The actions of rational creatures can thus be 
false, by signifying that they ought to do what, in truth, they ought not to do. While the 
possibility of false actions is only open to creatures with a rational will, “natural” actions 
can also be called true insofar as these actions express the truth of the natures of things 
known in the divine wisdom, and the truth that they ought to be what they are and act as 
they naturally act: “If fire receives the ability to heat from the one that makes it exist, 
then when it heats, it does what it ought. So I do not see where the unfittingness would be 
in saying that fire exhibits truth and rectitude when it does what it ought.”109  
                                                 




Through this line of reasoning, especially by the repeated connection between 
truth and ought-ness, Anselm arrives at the idea of truth as rectitude—specifically, 
rectitude perceptible by the mind. Anselm offers here a systematic connection of God’s 
status as Creator and Sustainer of all things with His status as Truth itself. For God to be 
Truth seems to mean, for Anselm, that all other truths have their truth from God. The 
notion of rectitude, of being or doing what one ought, provides an explanation for how 
this is. Anything that exists has its being, its existence and its characteristic modes of 
action, from God; as a good and wise Creator, God gives to things the natures they ought 
to have, natures that correspond with God’s knowledge of them in the Word. The truth 
and reality of everything that exists, then, derives from this alignment with God’s 
knowledge and God’s will, from being what they ought to be and doing what they ought 
to do, or else what they are permitted to do according to the divine wisdom and goodness. 
In this way, we can see that the truth of all these different kinds of things (sentences, 
opinions, wills, the senses, natural actions, non-natural actions, and essences) is 
ultimately one, rooted in mind and will of God.   
For our purposes we need to pay special attention to truth in the wills and actions 
of rational creatures. As we have seen, for Anselm, to will or act truly is to will or act as 
one ought, which is just to say it is for one’s will and one’s action to conform to the 
divine will. This is the point at which Anselm draws a connection between truth and 
justice: justice is nothing other than rectitude of will. To will truly is to possess rectitude 
of will, which is to be just.110 More precisely, a just will is one which preserves rectitude 
for its own sake. Merely willing what is right is not enough unless it is willed because it 
                                                 




is right. In this way, we can begin to see how it is that God is true and just through 
Himself, while other things are true and just through Him, by conformity with His will 
and His wisdom; human obligations of all sorts are ultimately, in this theological scheme, 
specific instances of the general obligation to God.  
A rational will, we have already observed, is unique in that it can fail to stand in 
the truth. It can fail to be just. Given that all things are what they are through the divine 
wisdom, one might wonder how this can be. Anselm makes clear that this possibility is a 
result of divine permission rather than divine intent. It ought to be (and is) the case that 
angels and human beings possess the rational natures in virtue of which it is possible for 
them to will, even though in virtue of that nature they may (and often do) will what they 
ought not will. It is worth noticing that Anselm takes great pains to define free will in 
terms of its positive object rather than as the ability to sin; the ability to sin, he argues, is 
more precisely understood as lack of complete freedom, a weakness, rather than a power 
or capacity.111 Free will, he argues, is the capacity to maintain rectitude provided one 
currently possesses it. This formulation aims freedom at its proper end, namely loving 
God for God’s sake.  
Anselm also devotes some reflection the structure of the will in order to explain 
how it is possible for a rational creature to fall short of rectitude, and how it can be that 
creatures in beatitude can no longer lose rectitude. The essential structure of creaturely 
wills is such that they can will two things: justice, and happiness. To will justice is to will 
what God wills; to will happiness is to will what is pleasing or beneficial to oneself. One 
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of these must be given priority. To fall short of rectitude involves giving priority to 
happiness, willing justice only insofar as it accords with one’s own happiness. To be just, 
or to maintain rectitude, is to will happiness insofar as it accords with justice, which is to 
say, with God’s will.112 The ultimate result of a just will is the (just) reception of 
happiness from God; having received happiness in this fashion, there is now no more 
possibility of unjust desire, for the only possible source of temptation, as it were, is 
removed. As Anselm puts it in the Monologion, the supreme substance “requites its lover 
with itself,” and the nature of the happiness produced is such that the one who receives it 
will never will to lose it.113 The soul finds rest in God alone, but in God, it truly does find 
rest. For Anselm, God’s gracious gift of Himself is the end for which rational creatures 
were made; in keeping with our capacity of will, God intends this end as a reward for just 
will, which is to say a will that obeys God and assents to God’s own timetable for 
granting the reward of ultimate happiness. This is the only kind of will that loves God for 
God’s sake, rather than for the sake of its own happiness. Since God is goodness itself, 
this is in fact the only way that God is fit to be loved. Only this kind of love embodies a 
full and proper gratitude for the gift of existence, directing the rational nature to the one 
who is its source and their proper end, rather than at some lower end. Only this kind of 
love signifies the truth of human (or angelic) nature as known in the Word. So, therefore, 
the love which loves God for God’s own sake is the only kind of love which fittingly 
receives God as its reward, for it is the only love which truly desires God, rather than 
idolatrously desiring some lower good.  
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This vision of human nature is worth keeping in mind as we interpret CDH. It 
provides the metaphysical background that illuminates Anselm’s reflection on the 
atonement. As we shall see below, the vision of God and rational creatures at play here 
helps to make clear why for Anselm ‘mere’ forgiveness would be a form of untruth; why 
God’s justice to Himself calls forth mercy towards creatures in the specific form of the 
Incarnation and Cross of Christ; why God’s honor is not a matter of whether God feels 
insulted or adequately respected, but instead specifies the fundamental relationship 
between Creator and rational creature; and, finally, how Anselm understands the human 
will of Christ to conform perfectly to the will of the Father, rather than representing a 
separate will intent on changing the Father’s attitude or feelings towards humanity. 
A Better Reading of Cur Deus Homo 
Anselm’s Explicit Relationship to the Fathers in CDH 
With this background in view, we can turn to CDH. We first consider Anselm’s 
understanding of his own work in relation to the patristic tradition as he understood it. In 
particular, he articulates his project primarily as one of addition rather than rejection: 
For even the Fathers, because “the days of [human beings] are short,” 
were not able to say all that they could have said if they had lived longer; 
and the logic of the truth is so copious and profound that it cannot be 
exhausted by mortals. Moreover, the Lord, whose promise is to be with 
the Church “until the end of the world,” does not cease to bestow his gifts 
within it.114 
If we give Anselm the benefit of the doubt here, then we must presume he was not 
offering one theory that could only be set over and against others found in the Fathers. 
Instead, he seems to think he is adding a certain kind of reason to what is already there in 
                                                 




the tradition (even as he is rejecting other possible reasons). Indeed, he is trying to show 
that the truth that the tradition has conveyed about the work of Christ can be understood 
as fitting and necessary according to reason. This is not to say that Anselm’s agrees with 
everything all of the Fathers wrote at every point—Anselm clearly differs, for example, 
with Gregory of Nyssa and others over whether the devil has any legitimate right of 
ownership over humanity. But it is to say that he does not present himself as having set 
out a theory that is opposed to the tradition that preceded him. Instead, his intention is to 
add a certain kind of logical and explanatory support to what has already been unfolded. 
Of course, Anselm may have failed in this intention, or been insincere in expressing it; 
we cannot simply rule out those interpretive options based on what he claims to be doing. 
Nonetheless, if we can reasonably interpret him as being consistent with the aim he 
expresses here, then we probably ought to do so.  
The question, then, is how it can be that Anselm sees himself as mainly engaged 
in addition and support when he clearly also contradicts certain elements of what came 
before. More precisely, what is it that he sees himself as supporting, since he clearly is 
not supporting literally everything that the Fathers said? Before attempting to answer this 
question, we will need to consider carefully the relationship between Anselm’s 
soteriological vision and those that had come before. This is especially true given the 
long history of interpreters like those mentioned above, who have emphasized what 
Anselm’s innovations relative to the patristic tradition to such a degree that we see the 
differences much more easily than we see the connections.  
Ultimately, however, we will see that Anselm took a rather thick set of 




givens to be explained (or, more precisely, to be demonstrated as necessary from reason), 
including certainly the elemental claims that he saved by defeated the devil, that he 
provided saving teachings and a perfect and saving example of human faithfulness, that 
he gave himself as a perfect offering to the Father, and so forth. It is difficult to untangle 
and list every relevant proposition to which Anselm might have taken himself to be 
committed, but even this much will be enough to show the deeply traditional shape of 
Anselm’s doctrine of atonement, especially when read in light of his fundamentally 
classical Trinitarianism. We will see that, in fact, he does not fit into the atonement 
theory paradigm: rather than either selecting one from among these ideas or holding them 
in a loose configuration, Anselm attempts to understand them all together in a systematic 
fashion. But first, we need to unpack some of Anselm’s core concepts, such as 
satisfaction, debt, and honor. From there, we can observe the way that these concepts 
connect to other those which are usually thought of as belonging to other, alternative 
atonement theories. 
Satisfaction, Honor, and Debt 
For Anselm, satisfaction is one of two ways in which sin can be justly addressed, 
since it involves willingly repairing the damage that was caused by the wrongdoing. 
Satisfaction involves first of all restoring whatever was taken away by the wrongdoing, or 
providing something equally valuable to the injured party. But, Anselm says, it is not 
enough merely to restore the equivalent of what was taken away; satisfaction requires 
something more, “in proportion to the insult . . . inflicted.”115 If someone steals an item, 
satisfaction requires not just returning the item, but also making additional restitution to 
                                                 




the victim’s honor for the dishonor done by the act of theft. In the case where the 
wrongdoer cannot or will not make satisfaction, punishment is required. To some, this all 
makes it look as if concepts drawn from law and economic exchange, and social 
arrangements of a distinctly medieval sort are governing Anselm’s understanding of sin 
and its repair.  
If we look beneath the surface, however, we can see that theological commitments 
are controlling Anselm’s use of legal and moral concepts rather than the other way 
around. Anselm offers at least two arguments for why God ought not to forgive sin 
without satisfaction (where for Anselm to forgive is simply to refrain from punishment 
even without satisfaction). The first and more fundamental argument is that it would be 
unfitting for God to leave sin unregulated, to treat sin the same as righteousness.116 
Indeed, Anselm argues, if God allows the sinner to be in exactly the same position as the 
righteous person without any recompense, then the sinner appears to have greater 
freedom than the righteous person; the will and actions of the righteous will have been 
subject to law (the law which the righteous person obeys) whereas the will and actions of 
the sinner will have been subject to no law.  
Anselm discerns something fundamentally irrational and ugly about this. Recall 
that, for Anselm, to carry out an action is as if to signify that the action ought to be done; 
for a ruler to treat sin the same as righteousness thus seems to signify that they are in fact 
the same when in fact they are not. A judge or ruler who acts as if they are the same is 
irrational and corrupt; in an Anselm’s terms, such a judge would be acting falsely and 
unjustly. This is all manifestly contradictory to the nature of God, who is Truth and 
                                                 




Justice, and therefore cannot simply be indifferent to falsehood and injustice.117 Sin, if it 
were unregulated by God (if it were ‘merely’ forgiven), would create a rupture in the 
moral fabric of the universe, a contradiction given God’s nature. Satisfaction is the 
voluntary repair of that rupture, over against punishment, which is its involuntary repair. 
It is the only way, for Anselm, in which reconciliation is ultimately compatible with truth 
and reason. With satisfaction, whatever was damaged is voluntarily restored, and the act 
of doing the damage becomes, in a sense, the occasion for an equivalent supererogatory 
good beyond what would have been required before. In a genuinely satisfying act, the 
moral order of things is thus restored.  
What is the specific character of the rupture created by sin and of the healing that 
satisfaction provides? The initial and most fundamental locus of this rupture is between 
the will of the sinner and the divine will—which is also to say with Justice itself. It is 
most fundamentally the will which is either just or unjust, and actions follow, and from 
there follow consequences of unjust actions, often some form of material harm.118 In 
order to properly satisfy, things must be set right at all three levels. Recall that for 
Anselm what rational creatures owe to God is to love God for God’s sake, or, put 
differently, to align their will with God’s in all things—this is what it is to honor God 
properly. As we have observed above, for Anselm, this debt is given by the nature of 
human persons as creatures and by God’s ontological status as Creator and as the 
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supreme essence.119 God, as the supreme essence, is the highest end of the human 
capacities of knowing and willing—indeed, these capacities exist most fundamentally for 
the sake of knowing and loving the highest good, namely God. Sin is above all a break in 
that alignment of will, a misuse of the highest capacity of human nature, in which it is 
directed not at God but at a lower end, at the happiness of the creature in way that goes 
beyond justice. Repairing this rupture requires realigning the will, so that it now 
conforms to justice, which is to say, to the divine will. Given a just will, though, the 
rational creature must necessarily will the reverse of what it previously willed in sinning. 
It must will to set right whatever harmful consequences followed from the wrong actions 
it willed before, and, moreover, to restore proper honor to the one who was wronged, 
which, given the initial wrongdoing, means going beyond what would have been required 
before the wrongdoing.  
This way of understanding the relationship between sin and satisfaction is 
analogous to the way satisfaction provides for reconciliation between human persons, but 
it does not thereby reduce God to an insulted or vengeful human being. In the case of 
human beings, according to this way of thinking, wrongdoing starts with an unjust a 
will—a will, specifically, out of alignment with the (just) will of the person wronged. The 
victim wills to use his justly acquired money for some good purpose, while the thief wills 
simply to take it for himself. The thief then takes the money (an unjust act), with the 
result that the victim can no longer use the money for the good purpose he intended (a 
harmful consequence). If the thief sees the error of his ways and reforms his will, he now 
wills the opposite of what he willed before: he wants the victim to have the money that 
                                                 




was rightfully his money. Indeed, the thief wants never to have stolen at all, and 
recognizes that the dignity of his victim warrants something beyond simply returning to 
the previous state of affairs. He therefore returns the amount he stole and also honors the 
victim in some further way, perhaps by paying more than he initially stole, to make up for 
the dishonor he did to the victim’s intrinsic dignity by stealing from him. Likewise, a 
ruler or judge has to provide for justice by requiring satisfaction for victims of injustice 
as a matter of law; while the judge cannot control the wills of the involved parties (the 
first level of the breach), she can at least make satisfaction at the levels of action and 
consequence a requirement of restoring the wrongdoer to society (and likewise restrain 
the victim from vengeance). In this way she can at least provide for the possibility of 
genuinely just reconciliation—this is only possible if she requires something of the unjust 
that is not required of the just. If nothing else, the requirement to make satisfaction may 
guide the thief’s will back towards justice, since it instructs the thief accurately in what 
justice entails, in what he ought to will and ought to have willed all along in virtue of the 
dignity of the one he stole from.  
But we should also notice where God is not analogous to the wronged human 
person or the human ruler. While our intrinsic debts to one another as human beings are 
only partial, we owe God everything we have and are. And while the wronged person has 
an intrinsic dignity that ought to be respected by other rational beings, she has this dignity 
in virtue of being created by God, whereas God’s intrinsic dignity is rooted in nothing but 
His own essence. In this way, our debts to each other are grounded ontologically in our 
more fundamental debt to God. Properly honoring God’s creatures is part of what it is to 




mostly outward actions rather than minds and wills, God perfectly knows and judges 
based on the inner will of a person. And, while wronged creatures can respond in ways 
governed by sinful passions, desiring vengeance or apology out of a feeling of being 
insulted or taken advantage of, God’s justice is in no way rooted in such passions or in 
any injury creatures can do to Him—God’s requirement of satisfaction follows from the 
supreme goodness and justice of his will, which is to say, His divine nature. Indeed, it 
flows from His supremely good intentions for creatures, and His unwillingness to declare 
righteous something less than the fulfillment of those intentions.  
At this juncture we can now appreciate Anselm’s second argument that God 
cannot merely forgive without satisfaction. As we noted above, if a sinner were all of a 
sudden to possess a righteous will, then she would desire that satisfaction be made. That 
is, she would will that the damage she caused be repaired—the opposite of what she 
willed in sinning.120 If satisfaction has not been made, this desire would be unfulfilled, 
constituting a lack. Such a lack conflicts with the notion of beatitude, a state in which the 
Blessed lack no good they desire. In addition, Anselm argues, it is unfitting that souls in 
beatitude should be lacking in anything they desire, since the just soul wills only what is 
just. That is, this is the kind of desire which it is genuinely better to have fulfilled than 
not. To will to make satisfaction is to will that God’s intentions be fulfilled, and surely if 
God is Goodness itself then it is better that such a desire be fulfilled than not; what God 
wills simply ought to be the case. Final blessedness cannot involve that kind of desire 
going unfulfilled. God’s requirement of satisfaction, then, is fundamentally relational and 
restorative concept: it is about restoring the sinner and the one sinned against to a state of 
                                                 




rightly relating to one another, and bringing sinners to the full dignity and happiness for 
which they were created. And it does all this in a way that is fitted to what rational 
creatures are, as it involves the will and action of sinners to participate in the process of 
restoring justice. Satisfaction allows them to be a part of repairing the damage they 
caused, which is what they will want to do if they are just. If they are not just, then it also 
teaches them what they ought to want, requiring them to enact the true weight of the 
wrong and the true dignity of the one they wronged.  
We can now examine honor, another of Anselm’s central concepts, in a bit more 
detail. For Anselm, honor has to do with the ontological and moral state of right relations. 
In CDH, Anselm considers God’s honor from two angles: with respect to God, and with 
respect to rational creatures. In the first sense, God’s honor is intrinsic and cannot be 
affected by what creatures do; God is the supreme essence, the proper end of our 
capacities for knowing and willing, regardless of whether or not we treat Him as such. In 
the second sense, a rational creature can fail to conform to or reflect the truth about God’s 
intrinsic ontological status relative to them in the way appropriate for rational creatures—
that is, by willing what is just. So, honor here is not a subjective feeling of superiority or 
of being sufficiently respected. The way in which a creature can be said to “take away” 
from God’s honor is not by making God feel insulted or damaging Him in any way. 
Instead, as Nicolas Cohen helpfully puts it, “In Anselm’s view, all beings have an honor 
that reflects their essence. This honor is fundamental to the nature of a being . . .”121 
Moreover, “Honor also reflects the relationships between things. In any given 
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relationship, one party honors (or dishonors) the other based on the degree to which their 
actions are appropriate with respect to the other party’s being.”122 For Anselm, 
satisfaction is about the restoration of rational beings to a state in which their wills are 
once again united in truth and justice, insofar as it restores conformity between the will 
and actions of the wrongdoer and the honor or intrinsic dignity of the one wronged. This 
state of right relations is the only way for the sinner to be restored to happiness in the 
fullest sense, namely beatitude.  
Satisfaction is thus the way that a community maintains its moral integrity and 
beauty in the case that its members commit injustice. In the case of the wrong-doer, 
satisfaction involves a movement of will and action back into proper relationship to the 
honor of the one wronged. In the case of the one who was wronged, it enables a 
genuinely dignified reconciliation, where ‘mere’ forgiveness would do a kind of violence 
to the intrinsic dignity of the victim. The moral integrity of a community is not upheld 
when wronged parties simply consent to be wronged, for in so doing, they fail to act truly 
and justly towards their own intrinsic honor. This point underscores the meaning of 
saying that satisfaction reunites the wills of the two parties in truth and justice: they 
should be united in properly honoring the dignity of the one who as wronged, rather than 
united in accepting something less than proper honor. The importance of unity of wills 
also reveals the reason why Christ’s satisfaction could not apply to just anyone, 
regardless of his or her inner disposition towards God and other people. The application 
of Christ’s reward specifically to the faithful is not arbitrary. As Thomas Aquinas would 
later put it, one person can make satisfaction for another only given unity of wills in 
                                                 




charity; not coincidentally, this is for Thomas what the mystical unity between Christ and 
his Church is.123 Thomas’s rationale gives support to the fittingness Anselm discerns in 
the fact that Christ’s reward is supplied precisely to those who imitate him, who love 
what he loves.124  
Contemporary critics of Anselm often fail to see the relational focus of Anselm’s 
concept of satisfaction. They tend to reduce satisfaction to an impersonal transaction, an 
thus infer that it has no organic connection to the individual believer’s relationship to 
God or growth into holiness. In fact, satisfaction has deep relational significance. It 
begins with the assumption that all rational creatures stand in a web of relations of loyalty 
and love to other creatures, and ultimately to God in virtue of their natures and their 
concrete histories. Notice, for instance, that Anselm’s conception of Christ as satisfier on 
our behalf envisions Jesus’s supremely loving act on our behalf as generating a personal 
and familial bond of loyalty and friendship to Jesus himself, embodied in subsequent 
repentance and worship.125 It envisions gratitude to Christ for doing for us what we could 
not, for setting things right, as well as learning from Christ’s example and his teachings 
about how to respond properly. It likewise envisions the believer receiving grace 
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mediated through the sacraments Jesus instituted, and through this process joining herself 
to Christ’s perfectly satisfying offering of himself to God.126  
Other ‘Theories’ of Atonement in CDH 
i. Recapitulation and the Restoration of the Divine Image 
We are now in a position to notice how language and concepts normally 
associated with other theories of atonement not only appear in Anselm’s treatise, but play 
a crucial role in giving specific content to Anselm’s more formal concepts of debt, 
satisfaction, and honor we have just examined. We can see how this works by 
considering the concrete debt produced by human sin. The debt created by an act of 
wrongdoing will be, first of all, whatever is taken away by that act. In the case of human 
sin, Anselm says that what is taken away from God is, “whatever he planned to do with 
regard to the human species.”127 As we have seen, what God most fundamentally intends 
for human beings is that their minds and wills will relate appropriately to God, or in other 
words that they would know and love him for his own sake. Unpacking our debt of honor 
to God in these terms opens up a deep connection between satisfaction and what is 
normally identified as the distinct recapitulation theory, most famously associated with 
Irenaeus. Irenaeus’s account is fundamentally consonant with Anselm’s: 
. . . when [the Son] was enfleshed and became a human being, he summed 
up in himself the long history of the human race and so furnished us with 
salvation in a short and summary way, to the end that what we had lost in 
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Adam (namely, to be after the image and likeness of God) we might 
recover in Christ Jesus.  
It was impossible that the very humanity which had once been conquered 
and shattered by its disobedience should reconstitute itself and obtain the 
prize which belongs to victory.128 
Thus,  
We had to receive, through the Son’s agency, participation in him. The 
Word, having been made flesh, had to share himself with us. That is why 
he went through every stage of human life, restoring all of them to 
communion with God.129 
Like Irenaeus, Anselm holds that beatitude is a “prize which belongs to victory,” 
which is to say, a genuinely human victory. Moreover, Anselm shows that what the 
victory which is owed to God by humanity includes a human life lived fully in line with 
God’s original intentions. On Anselm’s view, humanity cannot be saved except if those 
intentions are fulfilled. Recapitulation is therefore bound up with Anselm’s vision of 
what is required of humanity and thus what Jesus Christ accomplishes. This connection 
shows that the faithful life of Jesus (and not just his death) is part of Anselm’s vision of 
satisfaction: the faithful human life is what was owed by nature, and voluntary 
faithfulness unto death of a sinless person is supererogatory because it goes beyond what 
was initially owed. The latter could not be supererogatory without the former. 
Conversely, Christ’s supererogatory self-offering makes it possible for the faithfulness of 
those who are united to him to be received by God as acceptable and pleasing; in virtue 
of this, God may then justly reward them with beatitude. Christ’s payment of humanity’s 
debt thus makes it possible for many other human persons to be restored to their intended 
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state, which is to say knowledge and love of God, in justice and without any lack or 
unfulfilled desire.    
Anselm’s account of atonement, therefore, does not involve a rejection of an 
alternative Irenaean “recapitulation” theory of atonement. Instead, Anselm underscores 
recapitulation as a matter of necessity, and as a display of God’s justice and mercy, 
rooted in the fulfillment of God’s immutable and profoundly good intentions for 
humanity. Even though it is true that Anselm has relatively little to say explicitly about 
the events of Christ’s life within the text of CDH, he nonetheless formally establishes 
human faithfulness (both of Christ, and of those for whom he atones) as a fitting and 
necessary element of the atonement.130  
Especially in the context of Anselm’s theology of the Word, we can see a deep 
harmony between satisfaction and recapitulation. Since the Word is both God’s utterance 
of himself and his utterance of creatures, it is profoundly fitting that the Word would be 
the one who would become incarnate, and that He would be the perfect expression of 
God’s intentions in creating human persons, God’s perfectly satisfying self-utterance in a 
particular human life. While Christ is infinitely greater than any other human being in 
virtue of his divinity, he nonetheless exemplifies and fulfills nothing but God’s original 
intentions, summed up perfectly in a single life, spoken into the history of a humanity 
that had rejected those intentions. The context of this sinful history gives a certain shape 
to the utterance, necessarily imposing the tragic element of death, which perhaps would 
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not be there in the context of a perfectly faithful humanity. Even so, as God’s perfect self-
utterance, Christ takes on death in such a way that by it he achieves our restoration and 
reconciliation to God.  
Nicolas Cohen has also drawn a parallel between the role God’s honor plays in 
Anselm and the role of God’s image in the soteriology of Athanasius. He points out 
several relevant features of Anselm’s use of honor, namely that (1) it is tied to God’s 
essence, (2) it is also inherently tied to the relationship between Creator and creature, and 
(3) it is eternally maintained via punishment or recompense.131 Cohen points out that each 
of these features is true of Athanasius’ use of the concept of God’s image in his own 
treatise on the incarnation, De Incarnatione Verbi, and, Athanasius puts them to the same 
use as Anselm, namely to demonstrate the necessity of the Incarnation for salvation. 
God’s image is tied to God’s essence, but it is also tied to the connection between Creator 
and creature. The marring of the image is what calls for punishment. As for Anselm and 
God’s honor, it can only be restored by the Incarnation—by the Word, the agent of 
creation, coming into humanity to restore and fulfill God’s intentions in creating. This is 
a striking and illuminating parallel, for the proper honor of God is, for Anselm, precisely 
how a rational creature bears the divine image. It is the participation of the human mind 
and will in God.132 Likewise, for Athanasius, to bear God’s image involves the same 
things as proper honor of God involves for Anselm, namely remaining in contemplation 
and love of God. Once the image is marred, the reflection of the human mind and will of 
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its Creator is broken. While God’s intrinsic honor remains intact, its reflection in the 
sinner is broken. For both Anselm and Athanasius, this is the affront which calls for 
punishment, and this punishment can only be averted or undone by a human person in 
whom the image/honor of God is not marred, but who, nonetheless, is a part of the human 
family descending from Adam and Eve. This can only be accomplished by the 
Incarnation of the Word, who is the true Image. Cohen spells out the “shared approach to 
the rationale for the Incarnation” between Anselm and Athanasius this way:  
For both [Anselm and Athanasius], the order of creation flows from the 
nature of God as Creator. Humans occupy a privileged place within that 
order in that they are given the gift of rationality. This rationality comes 
with the attendant responsibility to actively maintain a life of obedience to 
God. When this order of creation was violated by sin, it was God’s nature 
as perfect Creator and lover of creation that was the driving force behind 
the Incarnation as a means of restoring the order of the universe as it was 
originally created. Only God as creator could accomplish this act of 
restoration because it involved a re-creation on the magnitude of the 
original creation and only God is capable of this.133 
At this level, there certainly is a deep compatibility between Anselm’s account 
and the patristic tradition represented by Irenaeus and Athanasius. Like them, Anselm’s 
account presents the God-man as the one in whom God’s most fundamental intentions for 
human nature are fulfilled, and through whom those intentions can be restored in others. 
Anselm attempts to show that those intentions had to be met perfectly within a human 
being for human beings to reach beatitude, and that, given the Fall, they could not be met 
in any other way than by the Incarnation, in which God Himself in takes a human nature 
and recapitulates, embodies, exemplifies, and fulfills those intentions. Only God can 
restore the image of God, but it is humanity which needs the image restored. Only God 
                                                 




can perform an act of such magnitude that it can outweigh the damage wrought by sin, 
and yet a member of the human family needs to perform it, so as to fulfill God’s good 
intentions in creating human beings. This is the story that Anselm tells in terms of debt, 
honor, and satisfaction, and it is fundamentally compatible with patristic language of 
recapitulating and restoring the divine image in human nature. Indeed, if Anselm’s 
arguments hold, then the recapitulation and restoration of the image of God by the Word 
of God is necessary for the satisfaction of our debt, or in other words, for the fulfillment 
of God’s intentions for us. 
ii. Christus Victor  
Moving beyond the fundamental level of the mind and will, Anselm has more to 
say about what is “taken away” from God by sin, and how it is that Christ restores it. As 
we have seen, what human beings owe to God first is to love God above all things for 
God’s sake. What follows from this is that human beings should do whatever it is God 
calls them to do. So, secondly, what is taken away includes whatever concrete acts God 
had in mind for humans to do which they failed to do and, thirdly, whatever larger 
purpose God had in mind to which those acts were meant to contribute. We can consider 
the second level and third level in turn.  
At the level of concrete actions which humanity failed to carry out, Anselm 
identifies a particular intention for human beings in the biblical narrative of Adam and 
Eve. He suggests that God intended for humanity to overcome the devil: 
A. In the Garden, man was created without sin, as if he were placed there 
as God’s deputy, in a position between God and the devil, the intention 
being that he might overcome the devil by not consenting when the devil 




easily capable of doing this, he allowed himself to be conquered by 
persuasion alone, not under forcible compulsion.134  
Given the fall of the devil, that is, God placed human beings in a position to 
vindicate God’s righteousness by their free obedience in resistance to temptation.135 What 
humanity owed to God, therefore, was just such a victory over the devil. Because God 
intended that we do it, we simply ought to have done it. The failure of Adam and Eve to 
carry out God’s intent incurs a further debt. Now it is necessary not just to be victorious 
over the devil, but to do so in a way that goes beyond resisting mere verbal temptation. 
We ought to will to do what we were initially supposed to do, but also to go beyond it in 
order to make up for the fact of our failure. This, however, is something we cannot do in 
our sinful state. After the fall of Adam and Eve, Anselm argues, only a person who is 
both human and divine (one who inherits the debt of nature but not the stain of sin) can 
manage this defeat of the devil. The debt of a human victory of the devil seems to 
function on a familial or social level; it is not that every individual human being must 
overcome the devil, but rather that someone representing humanity must do so.136 It is in 
this sense that Christ, being a part of our human family, can share our debt and is in an 
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135 Because this intention depends on a contingent free act of sin by a creature (the devil), it seems that it 
must be subordinate, lower in priority within the divine will, both to God’s intentions for human nature viz. 
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up the number vacated by fallen angels, and so it seems reasonable to speculate that it is likewise in 
response to the angels’ fall that God gives humanity the specific vocation to vindicate His honor over 
against the devil by resisting him.  
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appropriate position to fulfill it. He is a part of the family God placed in Eden for this 
purpose, and thus he shares in that purpose.  
Specifying the debt owed by humanity in this way reveals consonance between 
Anselm’s view and what is supposed to be the alternative Christus Victor theory. 
Satisfaction on Anselm’s terms is most fittingly achieved through a human defeat of the 
devil, since this is what was taken away by Adam and Eve’s failure. Again, we can see 
that there is a way in which Anselm provides a different and (in his judgment) logically 
firmer set of reasons justifying essentially the same claims about what Christ 
accomplishes, rather than rejecting and replacing a patristic theory about what salvation 
in Christ is. For Anselm, just as for the patristic tradition, salvation consists in a victory 
over the devil by one who is both divine and human; Anselm’s rejection of the view (held 
by some but by no means all of the patristic writers) that Christ’s death frees us by being 
a ransom payment to justly purchase us from the devil amounts to a difference over why 
this victory should have taken place in just the way it did. 
As we saw in Chapter 2, Gustaf Aulén argued for a sharp distinction between 
Anselm’s “objective” view and Christus Victor, which he calls the “classic” view, and 
locates as the central Christian teaching about the atonement in the Patristic period. For 
Aulén, the most important difference between the Anselmian “objective” theory and the 
“classic” theory has to do with who performs atonement who receives it. On his reading, 
the classic view presents atonement as a divine act from start to finish: God reconciles 
humanity to Himself and is in no way reconciled by a human act. In response to sin, God 
authorizes a punishment in the form of bondage to the devil, but decides to liberate us 




reconciled. Anselm, on Aulén’s reading, creates a “break” in the divine act of atonement, 
since humanity has to make satisfaction in order to for God to forgive. On the classic 
view, God initiates and carries out our forgiveness from start to finish, while for Anselm 
God initiates the process, but at some point it becomes an act of Christ’s human nature 
towards God rather than an act of God towards humanity.137 
It is easy enough to see how one might read Anselm this way, but to do so 
involves significant errors. First, Aulén fails to see the deeply Chalcedonian shape of 
Anselm’s Christology. If we assign actions to persons rather than natures, then of course 
there is no possibility of imagining that some parts of Christ’s work are performed by 
God and others by humanity. But for Anselm (as for the Christological tradition 
descending from Chalcedon more generally), every act of the Incarnate Word is an act of 
a divine Person who possesses both a divine and a human nature. Some acts He carries 
out in virtue of the divine nature and others in virtue of the human, but they are all carried 
out by the same Person who is God. Granting this semantic/metaphysical rule is enough 
to show that everything Christ does in Anselm’s story is an act of God—even offering a 
faithful human life to God to satisfy for human sin. Anselm could not be clearer in 
following this rule, and also in insisting that the human acts performed by Christ only 
have their infinite value in virtue of the fact that the Person who performs them is God.138 
It is thus essential for Anselm that even in his death, the work of Christ is always the 
work of God.  
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Perhaps more importantly, we can now underline the fact that God is in no way 
changed by a human act of satisfaction; on the contrary, it is God’s very immutability that 
calls forth the Incarnation of God’s Word for the purpose of satisfying God’s 
(unchanging) intentions in making rational creatures. Satisfaction does not act upon 
God’s intrinsic honor, but restores the perfect reflection of that honor in human nature, 
just as the restoration of God’s image in human nature does nothing to alter God’s image. 
God does not demand satisfaction in order to change His attitude towards humanity, but 
rather provides for satisfaction in order to bring humanity into the state for which it was 
created. In just this way, we can see the coincidence of God’s justice and his mercy: the 
fact that we may receive mercy arises from the profound depths of God’s goodness, 
which intends for humanity not only a state of beatitude but also the dignity of meriting 
that state through an act of obedience in resistance to the devil. Indeed, though of course 
God had no need for such an act, Anselm suggests that God called humanity to play a 
voluntary role in carrying out His justice towards the fallen angels. It is a matter of God’s 
justice that this vocation should be fulfilled by the human family, and a matter of 
profound mercy to us that God in Christ brings it to fulfillment despite our sin. Thus, 
atonement involves a human act—not in order to influence God to be reconciled to us (as 
Aulén’s reading suggests), but precisely because our sin has failed to influence God to 
abandon His exceedingly generous intentions for us.  
iii. Moral Exemplar 
From here, we can move to the third level, namely whatever larger purpose God 
had in mind that is negatively affected by human failures of will and action. At this more 




articulates in detail his vision of God’s intentions for humanity in relation to the rest of 
creation. Specifically, God created human beings with the intention that some number139 
of them, having maintained their fundamental purpose of knowing and loving God and 
(therefore) discharged whatever specific vocation God placed on them, would participate 
in a harmonious heavenly community along with every other type of creature. The 
consequences of sin obstruct both of these aims: because all of humanity is affected by 
the sin of Adam and Eve, no human person can successfully defeat the devil, and, 
similarly, the weight of sin prevents any human being from entering beatitude unless 
satisfaction is made. To have human beings exist in beatitude as a part of this intended 
order is thus taken from God by human sin (or, rather, it would be if there were no means 
of satisfaction).  
So, in addition to recapitulating God’s intentions for human nature, and carrying 
out God’s intended mission for humanity in resisting the devil, we can add that Christ’s 
satisfying act needs to restore to God everything that was lost, so that “because of [the 
victorious human agent] as many humans would be brought out of sin into a state of 
righteousness as would make up that full number . . . for the completion of which 
mankind was created.”140 What is required is a defeat of the devil which would lead many 
out from captivity to sin, as many out as would fully restore the human component of the 
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perfect community which God originally had in mind. This suggests that Anselm’s vision 
of the atoning work of Christ extends forward in time, from the death and resurrection of 
Jesus through the spread of the church to the reception of the Gospel by every individual 
human person who receives it, and is thereby reconciled to God, most especially by being 
united to Christ’s atoning act through the sacraments.141 So, as long as that community is 
still lacking, it would seem that in one sense Christ’s atoning work is ongoing; he is still 
restoring to God that which was taken away. In every case in which someone is drawn 
into right relation to God by the life, teachings, miracles, death and resurrection of Jesus, 
his satisfying work continues on towards its completion. The human response of 
repentance and worship thus turns out to be essential by Anselm’s logic, and this 
provides for the fittingness of Christ’s role as teacher and example. For Anselm, God 
created human beings in order to be blessedly happy, specifically by understanding, 
loving, and rejoicing in the good, and above all God who is the highest good.142 Clearly, a 
holy life in which a person subjectively loves and rejoices in God is not a secondary add-
on to Anselm’s soteriology. The whole point of what God has done in Christ is to restore 
human persons to precisely that state.  
Notice again how Anselm argues that forgiveness without recompense cannot 
lead to blessed happiness for human beings:  
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[B]lessed happiness is sufficiency in which there is no want . . . so long as 
[a sinner] does not repay, he will either be wishing to repay, or not 
wishing to do so. But in the event that he has a desire to do what he is 
incapable of doing, he will be a person in want: in the event that he does 
not have the desire he will be a wrongdoer.143   
Anselm recognizes here exactly what some of his contemporary detractors think 
he ignores: that we must in some way be involved in the process of atonement and 
reconciliation. We cannot be mere spectators, or our reconciliation will not really be 
appropriate to rational beings who, insofar as they become righteous, will naturally desire 
to make restitution for the wrongs that they have done. This is why it is essential that 
atonement be made by a human agent, and in particular a human agent descended from 
Adam. If not, then the human family descended from Adam “will not be restored up to 
the dignity which it was to have had . . . Hence it will not be completely restored.”144 
Forgiveness without recompense would not lead to the full restoration of God’s good 
intentions for humanity. This is why forgiving without satisfaction would leave humanity 
in a state less than the beatitude for which God intended them. It would be unjust, that is, 
towards God Himself, who created humanity for beatitude, and who, above all, should 
have His intentions fulfilled. The justice which requires satisfaction, then, is not a 
requirement external to God forcing Him to make demands he would not otherwise 
make; it is, rather, God’s own immutable consistency with His own supremely good 
intentions.145  
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 At any rate, the divine intention that a community of human persons actually 
reach the beatified state leads Anselm to discern a great fittingness in the fact that the 
agent of satisfaction turns out not only to be related to us, but also “a sharer in our 
discomforts”146 who nonetheless teaches and exemplifies perfect faithfulness: 
For, who may explain how necessary and wise a thing it was for it to come 
about that he who was to redeem the human race and bring it back from 
the way of death and destruction to the way of life and eternal happiness, 
should live in the company of human beings and, while he was teaching 
them verbally how they ought to live, should, through his very behavior, 
present himself as an example? Furthermore, how was he to present 
himself to weak and mortal humans as an example of the fact that they 
should not depart from righteousness on account of injustices, insults, pain 
or death, if they were not aware that he himself had experience of all these 
things?147 
Anselm’s soteriology thus gives an important place to the supposedly alternative “moral 
exemplar” theory. Christ’s life and teachings are crucial to Anselm precisely because the 
“transaction” of atonement is aimed at a relational purpose: Christ needs to teach as a 
human being living and suffering faithfully among human beings so that he can best 
enable human beings to be restored to that blessed happiness in relation to God for which 
God himself had created them. It would be odd to suggest, therefore, that Anselm’s view 
is a rejection of the theory that Christ redeems us by being an inspiring teacher and an 
example.  
On this point, Katherine Sonderegger draws attention to a striking passage in 
which Boso is led to mirror Christ’s own self-giving love, a passage mirroring Anselm’s 
arguments for the infinite weight of sin with the infinite worth of the Redeemer:  
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A: If [the God-man] here before you, and you knew who he was, and 
someone were to say to you, ‘If you did not kill this man, the whole of the 
universe will perish, and whatever is not God,’, would you do it to 
preserve the whole of the rest of creation? 
B: I would not do it, even if an infinite number of universes were offered 
to me. 
A: What if someone were to follow this up by saying, “Either you will kill 
him or all the sins of the world will come upon you’?  
B. I would answer that I would rather take upon myself all other sins, not 
just all the sins of this universe—both those committed in the past and 
those to be committed in the future—but whatever sins can be conceived 
of as existing in addition to these. And I think I ought to make this answer 
not only with regard to the act of killing him, but with respect to any small 
injury whatsoever which would harm him.148 
As Sonderegger elegantly comments,  
The gravity of sin is now mirrored in the preciousness of the Restorer; the 
pride of saving worlds in Eden matched by the humble obedience and self-
offering of Christ and imitated by the self-giving love of the disciple. The 
‘objective atonement’ is realized, confessed and repeated in the ‘subjective 
love’ of the believer.149 
The text of CDH does, therefore, present Christ as a saving example, for he reveals the 
gravity of sin as well as the lengths we ought to go to avoid it or repair its effects, and, 
moreover, he inspires the love that of God that constitutes righteousness. So much, then, 
for the notion that Anselm does not account for the subjective side of the reconciliation of 
human beings to God, or that he includes it only as an ad hoc attachment. If Christ is to 
make proper satisfaction to God, given the nature of what was lost, it is extremely fitting 
that he should be an effective teacher and exemplar, inspiring human persons to love God 
and to live in faithful relationship to him. So much, too, for the idea that Anselm appeals 
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to an impersonal or abstract kind of justice that requires a merely forensic transaction in 
order for God to forgive. The justice at work in CDH is one that moves God to rescue us 
from the estrangement we had brought on ourselves by utter solidarity with us, and to 
restore in us by that solidarity the blessed life for which we were created.  
There are also intimations social and even ecological aspect to Anselm’s thought. 
He offers a richly aesthetic vision of an ordered universe, and of the place of rational 
creatures within it. This vision includes not only the way in which creatures relate to 
God, but also how they relate to each other. For Anselm, God’s intention is a world in 
which “every created thing would be happy, each in its own way joining in the eternal 
rejoicing in its Creator and in itself and in their mutual relation to one another.”150 Even if 
he does not develop the implications of what he suggests here in much detail, the 
intention Anselm attributes to God includes as an essential piece the notion of ordered 
and joyful community between human persons, and between human persons and the rest 
of creation. God envisions and intends not just individual righteous humans but a 
community whose perfection lies in the harmonious relations of its diverse constituent 
members,151 a community that includes not just human beings, but angels and creatures 
of all kinds. The consummation of this community is in Anselm’s view delayed until the 
full number of human beings has been redeemed. Hence, it seems one of the divine 
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intentions taken away by sin—and thus a needed element in satisfaction—is the 
establishment of this cosmic vision of harmonious relations between all things. Since the 
aim of satisfaction is to restore everything that was lost vis-à-vis God’s intentions, then 
what should finally result from the act of satisfaction is a community of truth, justice, 
peace, and love. The healing of human relationships broken by sin therefore has to be 
seen as a part of what is accomplished in Christ. So, too, does the healing of broken 
relations between humanity and creation.  
Conclusion 
To sum up the argument I have made in this chapter: in order to read Anselm as 
offering a new theory of atonement to be set in competition with other theories, one has 
to ignore his own explicit understanding of his intellectual task and his relationship to the 
Fathers. Not only so, but one has to ignore the fundamentally theological way Anselm 
himself fills out his apparently feudal or purely juridical concepts, as well as the 
metaphysical and theological background music presented in his earlier treatises. In doing 
so, one misses the significant conceptual connections his account of the atonement has 
with other so-called atonement theories. David Bentley Hart is right, therefore, in saying:  
Anselm is already situated in the Christian theological tradition, he already 
knows that Christ has recapitulated human nature in himself and 
conquered evil on our behalf; it is from this narrative that Anselm has 
undertaken a (by no means final or exclusive) reduction of the tale, in 
order better to grasp the inner necessity of its sacrificial logic.152 
To this we can add that Anselm also certainly knew that Christ frees us from sin by his 
teaching and example, and that this, too, he has attempted to connect to the logic by 
which the Incarnation is necessary and fitting.   
                                                 




The common reading of Anselm, namely that in CDH he is offering a discrete 
theory of atonement to be set in competition with other theories, is thus undermined by a 
careful reading of CDH. Instead, it appears that Anselm is offering support to a broader 
and richer vision of salvation that is quite explicitly compatible with other traditional 
explanations of Christ’s atoning work. Anselm attempts to provide a certain kind of 
logical grounding to a rich set of elemental theological claims which he takes more or 
less as given. Or, more precisely, in the context of CDH, he takes them as part of what he 
is supposed to demonstrate as necessary and fitting. The atonement theory paradigm has 
often led directly to the assumption that the conflict between atonement theories is over 
what sort of act Christ’s atoning work is. On the contrary, Anselm offers us a sustained 
engagement not with the question of what Christ’s atoning work is, but with the question 
of why that work is fitting, necessary, and true. The results of his efforts stand the test of 
time much better than some have recognized; at the very least, he provides a compelling 
basis for those who would try to move beyond the atonement theory paradigm today. 
It has often been suggested that the doctrine of atonement is unique in that the 
Church has largely avoided canonizing a particular understanding of it. Unlike the 
doctrine of the Trinity, for example, or the nature of Christ, which have been nailed down 
in great detail in the form of creedal and conciliar statements, atonement theology is open 
to a diverse array of theories, of which we may select one or perhaps some combination 
and remain within the bounds of orthodoxy. What we have observed in Anselm, however, 
suggests that there is a strikingly rich set of elemental claims at the core of atonement 
theology which Anselm did not see himself as within his theological rights to discard. He 




think he can discard the claim that Christ came to defeat the devil and rescue humanity 
from sin, or that Christ is our teacher and example, or that Christ came to recapitulate 
human life in a way completely faithful to God’s intentions for humankind, or that Christ 
gave himself as a perfect offering to the Father. These are the claims he struggles to hold 
together intelligibly, whose inner logic he strives to grasp. These are for him matters of 
faith about which he seeks understanding.  
In rejecting the claim that the devil had a legitimate right to hold human beings in 
bondage, a right which God could not justly override, Anselm rejects one traditional 
explanation of how God’s justice is on display at the Cross, but he does not question 
whether God’s justice is on display at the Cross. He argues that God’s justice is not on 
display in the form of fairness towards Satan, but instead in His integrity towards His 
own supremely good and beautiful intentions for Creation. But this is not a dispute about 
what Christ’s atonement is, whether it includes the liberation of humanity from the devil. 
It is a dispute about how and why salvation is what it is, why, and on what sort of basis 
viz. justice, it includes the liberation of humanity from the devil. In the same way, in the 
Monologion and Proslogion, Anselm does not innovate a new vision of who or what God 
is, or at least, if he did, this result is contrary to his aims. He maintains, of course, that 
God is omnipotent, omniscient, merciful, just, etc., and that He is Triune. Instead, he 
develops a new way to articulate the concept of God which displays His existence and 
possession of the divine attributes as implicit and necessary in the very concept itself. If 
one were to show Anselm that his proof did not lead to the God revealed in the Christian 
tradition but to something else, he surely would have faulted his own proof rather than 




same must be true when it comes to Anselm’s approach to atonement. He is still engaged 
in fides quaerens intellectum, and the fides in this case provides a thick set of claims just 
as it does in the case of the doctrine of God; intellectum consists not in the what of the 
fides, but in the why and how.  
Perhaps from this point of view we could come to see a rich and deep 
soteriological vision at the heart of the Christian faith—a vision to which Anselm and 
indeed many other pre-modern theologians of the atonement were all essentially 
committed, even as they elaborated and systematized it differently. In light of such a 
vision, contemporary reflection on the atonement in and for the church could gain a kind 
of unity which to this point has been lacking, precisely because we have imagined our 
task to be that of establishing what Christ’s atoning work is rather than why it is true, 
fitting, and beautiful. Reading Anselm this way, at any rate, turns out to undermine a 
great many criticisms which have been leveled against him, in particular by putting his 
theory in a position to draw on the insights of the prior tradition rather than having to 
compete with them. Anselm thus provides a rich and promising starting point for 
atonement theology beyond the atonement theory paradigm. 
Finally, let us briefly summarize the account of atonement we have discovered in 
Anselm, with a view to noticing the way it fits with his overall theology, and the way it 
provides a logical structure into which other classical ‘theories’ can be neatly fit. God 
creates human beings with specific intentions. Given in human nature is the end of 
knowing and loving God for God’s own sake; this end reflects the divine intention in 
creating human beings foreknown in the Word, the agent of creation. Human beings are 




this faithful use of their most distinctive capacities, they would participate in a beautiful, 
harmonious community with all the rest of Creation. Before the beginning of humanity, 
however, angels fell—the first creatures to reject God’s will. In light of their fall, God 
calls the first human beings to a concrete act of obedience, namely resisting the 
temptation offered by the devil. Humans are thus invited to play a voluntary and active 
role in the expression and establishment of God’s justice in the created order over and 
against the fallen angels. For this concrete act of obedience (perhaps along with other, 
subsequent acts), God intended to reward humanity with beatitude, the sharing of Himself 
with them in friendship, fulfilling and satisfying their will to know and love Him above 
all things, and, moreover, on Anselm’s telling, to allow many human beings to fill out the 
intended number of the community of the Blessed to make up the number of angels who 
fell.   
The first human beings gave into the devil’s temptation, however, and thus gave 
themselves over to his power and lost their original rectitude. God’s supremely good 
intentions for humanity is, however, immutable; it is unfitting, even unjust to God, that 
these intentions should be entirely unfulfilled. For the human family descended from 
Adam and Eve to be left to the power of the devil would mean that they were created for 
nothing. On the other hand, the immutability of God’s good intentions also rules out the 
possibility of ‘mere’ forgiveness. Giving humanity what was meant to be a reward for a 
proper exercise of their rational natures expressed in a concrete act of obedience absent 
that proper exercise, that act of obedience, would be to abandon God’s intentions for 




way would themselves long to know that the vocation God gave to the human family was 
fulfilled.  
In the Incarnation of Christ, therefore, God supplies what is needed to fulfill His 
good intentions, in spite of sin. In the life of the man Jesus, God’s intentions for human 
nature are recapitulated, uttered anew into the history fallen humanity. Christ perfectly 
embodies what it means for humanity to love God above all things. Through Christ’s 
willingness to resist the devil out of love and faithfulness even unto death, humanity 
fulfills the concrete debt of obedience Adam and Eve failed to render. Indeed, Christ’s 
self-offering goes infinitely beyond what Adam and Eve could have done, infinitely 
outweighing all of humanity’s sin. The merit due to Christ’s act is then shared at his 
behest with all of those who join their wills to his, and who are thereby able to offer his 
faithfulness on their behalf. These redeemed persons are now brought into a bond of 
loyalty and friendship to Christ, and therefore also to his Father and to everyone else who 
is joined to him. Through Christ’s teaching and example, the faithful also learn how they 
ought to love God above all things. Likewise, they are enabled to enter beatitude and take 
their place in the harmonious community God intended in creating. Thus, Christ is God’s 
perfectly satisfying self-utterance, God’s expression of His will in and for human flesh in 
such a way that His intentions are fully satisfied, every debt discharged.  
In Christ’s work of satisfaction, God’s justice and mercy are brought together. In 
his life, his resistance to the devil, and his willingness to offer his own life on behalf of 
humanity, Christ fulfills God’s just vocation for humanity, and sets right the damage 
wrought by human sin; he is humanity’s perfect offering to God. At the same, he is God’s 




to draw us up to God’s supremely good intentions for us. In this, God gives us a gift 
beyond what we could ever deserve or merit; God’s justice to Himself is profound mercy 
to us, motivated by His unchanging will for us to fulfill the vocation set out for us in the 
divine will from eternity.  
In Chapter 4, we will move forward from this account, developed through a 
careful re-reading of Anselm, and develop it further in light of helpful elaborations and 
critiques to Anselm’s atonement theology presented in the thought of Thomas Aquinas 
and John Duns Scotus. At this point, I will shift from re-reading Anselm to offering my 
own solutions to ambiguities and critiques of Anselm in order to develop my own 
constructive proposal. I will not carry over every aspect of Anselm’s thought that has 
been unpacked here; what will result is a vision of the atonement that is (hopefully) 
Anselmian but goes beyond Anselm’s own work. In Chapter 5, I will then argue that the 
theology of atonement I have developed can offer successful responses to important 
















In [liberating humanity through Christ’s Passion], God manifested greater mercy than if 
he had forgiven sins without requiring satisfaction. 
   Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IIIa q.46 a.2 ad.3.153 
 
 In the scholastic period immediately following Anselm’s work, his thought on 
satisfaction was influential, though it was not accepted wholesale. The critiques and 
elaborations offered by the scholastics are quite different from the ones that have 
concerned modern and contemporary readers of Anselm, but they turn out to be 
instructive and illuminating for the purpose of developing a workable satisfaction account 
of the atonement. Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of the doctrine of atonement thus provides 
a helpful counterpoint in various ways; at some points, he offers a needed corrective, 
while at others he provides a helpful clarification or elaboration. At still others, analysis 
of a dispute between Thomas and Anselm helps to show where a satisfaction account 
may admit of multiple possible ways forward.  
We will first consider the similarities and differences between Thomas and 
Anselm with respect to the appropriate methodology for reflection on the atonement, 
especially around the difficult question of necessity and fittingness. Some recent thinkers 
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hold that Thomas’s position is more conducive to an appreciation of the full diversity of 
concepts that can illuminate the atonement, as well as more adequately allowing for 
divine freedom; here we shall attempt to give Anselm’s position a full hearing, which 
will allow us to see more clearly the way satisfaction functions for Anselm as the basic 
logic underneath the entire array of atonement concepts, rather than a single step that 
crowds out the importance of others. On the other hand, Thomas nonetheless provides an 
important contrast to Anselm, especially when it comes to confidence about the capacity 
of human judgment to conceive of and evaluate the relative fittingness of range of 
possibilities potentially open to God in light of His omnipotence and freedom. Attention 
to this disagreement can also help us to distinguish the Anselmian account of atonement 
we are developing in this project from a straightforward reproduction of every aspect of 
Anselm’s thought on the matter.  
From there, we move on to consider two aspects of Christ’s work that Thomas 
draws out in more detail than Anselm: the role that various aesthetic and almost literary 
connections can play in opening up the beauty and fittingness of the way God has worked 
our salvation in Christ, and the intimate connection between satisfaction and friendship 
with God. Having navigated these elaborations and disputes, we will be in a position to 
articulate a revised satisfaction account, one which allows for a more breadth on than we 
could get from reading Anselm alone. In Chapter 5, we can then proceed to the question 







I. Thomas’s Approach to Atonement in the Summa Theologiae 
In questions 46-50 of the Tertia Pars of Summa Theologiae, Thomas develops his 
interpretation of Christ’s saving work at the Cross. As Adam Johnson has recently 
argued, Thomas’s account of atonement is fundamentally synthetic: he incorporates to 
some extent elements now associated with different theories of atonement.154 These 
questions come in the midst of a section of the work of Christ; Thomas’ synthetic and 
systematic tendencies are displayed in the fact that he moves from Christ’s birth, to his 
teachings and miracles, on to the Passion, through his death, burial, and resurrection, 
finding saving significance all the way through. When Aquinas proceeds to consider the 
modes through which the Passion in particular is effective for salvation, he develops 
meticulously a synthetic account of atonement, including concepts of merit, atonement, 
sacrifice, and redemption, and provides an argument that Christ’s passion is 
instrumentally efficient in bringing about the salvation of humanity.155 Thus, in addition 
to merit and satisfaction, and the teaching and example provided by them (about which 
we will say more below), Thomas adds that the Passion is effective through the modes of 
sacrifice and redemption. In the Passion, Christ offers a sacrifice insofar as he offers a 
voluntary act of charity oriented towards unity with God. Indeed, Christ’s offering can be 
seen as the sacrifice of which the prior sacrificial system was the prefiguring. Following 
Augustine, Aquinas identifies the crucial elements of a sacrifice to be the one who offers 
it, the thing offered, the one to whom it is offered, and the one for whom it is offered; the 
                                                 
154 Adam Johnson, “A Fuller Account: The Role of ‘Fittingness’ in Thomas Aquinas’ Development of the 
Doctrine of the Atonement,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 12, no. 3 (July 2010): 302–18. 
 




concept of sacrifice reveals the perfection of Christ’s mediatory role in that he is perfectly 
united to the one to whom the sacrifice is offered and to the ones for whom it is offered, 
and that he both is the one who offers and is himself the sacrifice that is offered. In 
Christ, what are separate aspects of prior sacrifices are embodied all together in one 
person.156 
It is appropriate to say that Christ’s passion effects salvation through redemption 
insofar as God justly allowed humanity to be in bondage to Satan (even though Satan had 
no just claim on humanity), and insofar as Christ’s passion represents an exceedingly 
costly price (albeit, one that is not paid to Satan, but it is nonetheless paid in order to free 
us from Satan).157 Thomas also takes the opportunity at this point to articulate how it is 
that it is proper to attribute the efficient cause of our salvation through the passion to 
Christ in particular, as well as to the Trinity as a whole, again showing that an account of 
atonement involving satisfaction involves no “break” in the divine act of salvation, no 
point at which we cannot attribute Christ’s saving work to God. As Thomas makes clear, 
it was through the instrumental efficient cause of Christ’s flesh, proper to him as a human 
person, that the Triune God acts as the principal efficient agent to bring about salvation. 
In sum, Thomas’s account of the atoning effects of Christ’s Passion is captured thus:  
When Christ’s passion is viewed in relation to his divinity, it can be seen 
to act in an efficient way; in relation to the will which is rooted in Christ’s 
[human] soul, by way of merit; in relation to the very flesh of Christ, by 
way of satisfaction, since we are freed by it from the guilt of punishment; 
by way of redemption, inasmuch as we are thereby freed from the slavery 
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of sin; and finally, by way of sacrifice, thanks to which we are reconciled 
to God . . . 158 
In his synthetic approach, Thomas is plainly aimed at preserving as much he can 
of the language about Christ’s saving work that was present in the tradition he received as 
authoritative. Perhaps it is because he does not so much generate a new controlling 
concept of his own that he is not given a primary place in the history of the doctrine of 
atonement. But, arguably, the way he elaborates and systematizes so much of what came 
before him makes him a compelling challenge to the atonement theory paradigm, as well 
as an example for those who would take a different route. A comprehensive synthesis can 
allow the atonement theologian to retrieve modes of discourse about Christ’s saving work 
that perhaps do not bear in an obvious way on contemporary controversies, but 
nonetheless open up the beauty and wisdom God’s saving acts to the faithful. If theology 
is faith seeking understanding, it is crucial not to give up what understanding has been 
achieved by prior generations. When it comes to the doctrine of atonement, synthesis, as 
(I argue) both Thomas and Anselm show, would seem to be more likely than selection or 
replacement to succeed in receiving and preserving what understanding has been 
achieved in the past, and thereby offer to the Church the fullest possible understanding of 
the faith. By devoting some attention here to the account he offers in the Summa, I hope 
to provide a small corrective to the tendency among theologians writing about the 
doctrine of atonement to leave Thomas out; attending to Thomas with some care in 
conversation with Anselm will serve to further some ongoing debates about how best to 
appreciate the full wisdom, goodness, justice, and mercy displayed in Christ’s atoning 
                                                 




work—in particular, whether Anselm’s concept of necessity, or his use of satisfaction as 
an undergirding principle, prevent a full appreciation of aspects of Christ’s work 
expressed in other concepts.  
In the last chapter, I argued that Anselm’s approach to the doctrine of atonement 
is also a synthesis of the tradition he received, rather than a new, alternative theory. As 
we can see, Thomas’s synthesis in the Summa Theologiae takes a markedly different 
shape. Johnson argues that the reasons for these differences lie around Thomas’s 
developments on Anselm’s concept of fittingness159 and his rejection of Anselm’s goal 
(and conclusion) of discovering a necessary reason behind the Incarnation. It is Thomas’s 
focus on fittingness (along with his explicit use of biblical and creedal material, rejecting 
Anselm’s remoto Christi approach), Johnson argues, that “cultivates sensitivity to the 
multiplicity of effects accomplished by Christ’s death,” while “the concept of necessity 
tends by nature to collapse into the search for a single explanatory concept . . . resulting 
in an atrophied witness.”160  
In light of our reinterpretation of Anselm, however, we can contest some aspects 
of Johnson’s analysis. For one thing, we can note that Anselm’s aim of necessity does not 
actually leave him any less able than Thomas to take on board a diverse array of 
atonement concepts handed onto him by earlier tradition. As we saw in the last chapter, 
Anselm includes in an explicit (if abbreviated) way the elements of Christus Victor and 
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moral exemplar, and that the overall structure of his account is striking in its similarity to 
patristic accounts like Irenaeus’s concept of recapitulation and Athanasius’s concept of 
restoring the imago Dei. The question of whether these elements are best appreciated 
through an Anselmian sort of synthesis or a Thomistic one is worth asking, but in any 
case it is important to appreciate that Anselm’s theory does in fact incorporate these 
themes, and it does so in a way that is plainly open to elaboration, even if Anselm’s own 
purposes precluded him from doing so in the text of CDH.    
Even so, Thomas does approach the question in a more systematic and 
comprehensive way than Anselm, and this allows him to make the diversity of effects of 
Christ’s work more visible. In this, Thomas provides a more natural example to 
contemporary theologians, methodologically speaking, than Anselm’s remoto Christi 
approach—though the latter has its own distinctive virtues as well. In any case, we will 
begin by examining the question of necessity and fittingness and how we should interpret 
and evaluate the differences between Thomas and Anselm on it. This will lead us into 
another point of dispute, namely how to interpret the concept of satisfaction within 
Christ’s work of atonement. Is it merely a step on the way to atonement and salvation, as 
Thomas treats it? Or, as I will suggest, can we discern in Anselm’s concept of satisfaction 
a sort of underlying logic that provides an explanation for all of the diverse effects of 
Christ’s work? From there, we will be in a position to attempt an epistemic qualification 
of Anselm’s position in light of Thomas. We can then observe several points at which 






II. Thomas and Anselm on Necessity and Fittingness 
Thomas moves his reflection on the Passion according to a characteristically tight 
logical progression: he begins with the necessity and fittingness of the Passion, moves to 
the efficient cause, and then to the modes by which the Passion operates. We can briefly 
consider what he says about each of these in turn, beginning with the question of 
necessity and fittingness. For Aquinas, the Passion is known to be necessary only in light 
of God’s will and foreknowledge indicated in revelation, and then can only be called 
‘necessary’ as a fitting means to the particular end of salvation.161 While Anselm likewise 
insists that the necessity he attributes to satisfaction is not a matter of compulsion, he 
nonetheless does affirm that there was no other more fitting way for God to save, and 
therefore, in virtue of God’s own perfect nature, salvation by satisfaction is necessary. 
Thomas agrees that Christ’s Passion is in fact a maximally fitting means to the end of 
human salvation. Citing Augustine, he argues that saving by the particular means God 
chose is supremely fitting because the diverse means that come into play in it are all 
helpful towards the end of delivering humanity from sin. Here, Thomas defines the 
concept of fittingness more precisely than Anselm: “A means is the more appropriate 
[convenientior] for an end, as it brings together more assets towards the end.”162 For the 
means of Christ’s Passion to be supremely fitting as a means of salvation, then, would 
mean for it to bring together a maximal array of assets towards the end of salvation. Even 
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so, Thomas’s concern to preserve divine freedom and omnipotence prevents him from 
following Anselm’s inference from the supreme fittingness to necessity.163  
This raises difficult questions. For Aquinas, it is certainly not within the realm of 
possibility that God could do that which is, in fact, less than supremely fitting (and, 
indeed, Thomas insists that there was not a better way for God to work our salvation164). 
In Johnson’s terms, it cannot be possible that God does what fails to “best express God’s 
delight in His being” or what does not “bring about the fullest array of resources towards 
accomplishing our salvation”165 Given God’s supreme goodness, wisdom, and justice, it 
still seems that, necessarily, He does what is most fitting. Let us grant that, as Bruce 
Marshall suggests in his interpretation of Aquinas on this point, God “is free to look out 
for his own interests as he sees fit,”166 a claim with which Anselm would surely agree. 
The question then is what, after all, would God see fit to do viz. His own interests? So 
long as we deny that could God could see fit to follow a course of action which is 
actually less fitting than another, we are left with the conclusion that, necessarily, God 
does only what is maximally fitting. If anything, as Johnson suggests, Thomas’s method 
appears to take it as a given that if God is revealed to have done something, then there 
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can be nothing more fitting for God to have done.167 What can make such an inference 
valid except the premise that, necessarily, God does what is most fitting, what best 
expresses His delight in His own being, what brings the fullest array of resources towards 
accomplishing our salvation?  
Given the premise that God does only what is most fitting, we can ask a further 
question. If satisfaction is included in the fullest possible array of resources, and, 
therefore, and if salvation including satisfaction is, therefore, more fitting than salvation 
without it, does it not follow that, necessarily, God saves via satisfaction? Granting that 
to save via satisfaction is truly more fitting than to have saved without satisfaction, as 
Johnson indeed seems to do, what could it mean to say that God could possibly have 
done the latter, except that it is open to God to do what is less than the most fitting, to do 
what less than fully expresses His delight in His own being? No, it would seem that if for 
Thomas these two premises hold, namely that, necessarily, God does what is most fitting, 
and, it was more fitting for God to save through an act of satisfaction than to save by 
mere forgiveness, then Anselm’s conclusion follows that, necessarily, God would save 
through an act of satisfaction, precisely because, necessarily, God chooses the most 
fitting means to His ends, and not less fitting ones.  
The way to preserve space to coherently reject that the necessity that God does 
only what is most fitting can be applied to a particular maximally fitting course of action 
would be to imagine that there are (or at least may be) many maximally fitting 
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possibilities open to God rather than just one. This seems a good way to make sense of 
Thomas’s rejection of necessity in the sense Anselm affirms it. For Thomas, as William 
Courtenay suggests, “God’s wisdom, goodness, and justice could have found expression 
in some other preordained system. The present order is . . . a product of the divine will; it 
is not the necessary and only product of divine wisdom.”168 The requirement that God 
does what is best would not, then, necessitate any individual course of action, but it 
would still necessitate one course of action from the set of maximally fitting ones. In this 
case, Thomas is right to say that God does not carry out the specific course of action He 
does by necessity. On the other hand, even if the divine wisdom might well be displayed 
in many possible maximally fitting acts, it still seems that any course of action that is less 
than maximally fitting could not be the product of the divine wisdom. It follows from this 
that any reason for the fittingness of what God has done of the sort that involves the 
implication that some other course of action would have been less fitting is, at the same 
time, a reason why God would not do the less fitting one. So, again, if salvation via 
satisfaction (for instance) is genuinely more fitting, all else being equal, than saving 
without satisfaction, then it still would seem to follow that God will save via satisfaction 
rather than not. Every means of salvation genuinely open to God, that is, would include 
satisfaction. The same logic would apply to the Incarnation if it is indeed more fitting for 
salvation to come through it than not, and so on, for every detail.  
To identify multiple possibilities equally open to God, then, given that God only 
does what is maximally fitting, one would have to grant that some facets of God’s action 
                                                 
168 William J. Courtenay, “The Dialectic of Omnipotence in the High and Late Middle Ages,” in Divine 
Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy: Islamic, Jewish and Christian Perspectives, ed. 




to save are genuinely indifferent viz. fittingness rather than adding to it substantially, or 
that there are facets which are mutually exclusive with other, equally fitting possibilities. 
It would seem odd to say that the Incarnation itself fits in this category; it is hard to 
imagine that there are other possibilities which are mutually exclusive with the 
Incarnation which are also equally fitting with it.169 But likewise, it would also seem 
surprising if this were true of salvation by satisfaction. On Anselm’s analysis, of course, 
there is either satisfaction, or there is mere forgiveness, or there is no salvation at all. 
Granting Anselm’s premise that a sinner made just would desire to make satisfaction, 
then satisfaction would be necessary because it is actually constitutive of salvation for 
sinners. Anselm rejects mere forgiveness as, properly understood, not a route to beatitude 
at all.  
Although he does not follow Anselm’s reasoning on this, Thomas, too, gives 
arguments that seem to weigh against the notion that salvation by mere forgiveness 
would be just as fitting as salvation including satisfaction: Thomas argues that “greater 
mercy is manifested [by saving through satisfaction] than if [God] had forgiven sins 
without requiring satisfaction.”170 Here we face the same implication: either God could 
do what manifests less mercy, or it would follow that God would not do something other 
than save through an act of satisfaction. Granted that, perhaps, one might argue that God 
need not manifest as much mercy as He has in fact done, and, indeed, that He could have 
manifested even more mercy than He did, had He chosen to do so. Still, if the level of 
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mercy displayed in God’s actions is truly no more fitting than any other level of mercy 
He might have displayed, then Thomas’s argument seems to lose its relevance. The 
objection Thomas is responding to is to the effect that the Passion is in no way necessary 
because it neither displays God’s mercy as fully as it could, and nor is it required by 
God’s justice (more on which below); if in fact the extent of mercy God displays is 
irrelevant to the fittingness or necessity of God’s actions (if, that is, any level of mercy 
God chose would have been equally fitting), Thomas would have needed to attach that 
qualification. “Satisfaction is indeed more merciful,” he could perhaps have said, “but 
this fact does not render mere forgiveness a less fitting alternative for God compared to 
the satisfaction Christ offered in the Passion.” But if that is true, then it would follow that 
the Passion was not necessary over and against mere forgiveness, even in the sense 
Thomas specifies, i.e., as a more fitting means to the end of salvation. It would simply be 
an option God could choose, with no increased fittingness contingent on choosing it such 
that not choosing it would be less fitting.  
Perhaps, though, beyond the Incarnation itself and the question of satisfaction, 
there are many particular details of God’s saving work in Christ that could be replaced 
with other equally fitting alternatives. The various fitting parallels that appear in scripture 
as a result of how God chose to save, mentioned by Anselm at the beginning of CDH, 
could be candidates for this category.171 It seems likely that Anselm would have thought 
that these fitting connections really are constitutive elements of the single maximally 
                                                 





fitting course of action,172 but that they cannot be known or demonstrated to have been so 
without directly appeal to the fact that God in fact acted in such a way as to produce 
them, whereas, he takes his other arguments to demonstrate the necessity of the 
Incarnation without direct appeal to the fact that God enacted it.173 There is in Anselm, 
then, at least a hint of an epistemic distinction here: some elements of Christ’s work can 
be known to be necessarily present within any maximally fitting means of salvation, 
while others can only be known to be maximally fitting after the fact of God’s having 
carried them out.  
God’s freedom is, of course, a fundamental concern for Thomas on this issue, as 
is the related theme of the absolute gratuity of grace; these interrelated concerns seem to 
motivate Thomas’s insistence on stopping short of Anselmian necessity viz. the 
Incarnation. So it is worthwhile to consider whether Anselm’s inference to necessity 
really does constrain divine freedom, or detract from grace’s gratuity. Anselm engages 
this question explicitly in CDH. Boso raises an objection to Anselm’s argument that God 
will necessarily save some human beings (because it would be unfitting for God’s 
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purposes in creating humanity to utterly fail); here the objection focuses on the gratuity of 
grace:  
But if this is so [that God of necessity that God will bring to completion 
what he began in creating humanity], God seems, as it were, to be forced 
to bring about the salvation of mankind by the necessity of avoiding 
unfittingness. How can it be denied, therefore, that he is taking this action 
for his own sake rather than ours? Again, if this is the case, what gratitude 
[gratia] do we owe him for this thing which he is doing for his own sake? 
Furthermore, how is it that we are to attribute our salvation to his grace 
[gratia], if it is of necessity that he saves us?174 
Anselm’s reply is to distinguish the sort of necessity that reduces the gratitude 
merited by an act from another kind of necessity which, on his analysis, actually 
increases the gratitude merited. Necessity provided by external compulsion is of the 
former kind, but what exactly does Anselm have in mind in the latter case? He describes 
it as necessity to which one freely becomes subject, and to which one freely adheres. He 
provides two examples: making a promise to give a gift in the future, and taking a vow of 
holy living. In these cases, he says, one accepts a kind of necessity which was not there 
before: now, if one does not carry out what was promised, one will be a liar. To avoid 
being a liar, it is now necessary to give the gift, or to adhere to one’s vows. But in these 
cases, we should not conclude that the gratitude merited by the relevant actions is 
reduced, so long as the person carrying them out still does so willingly. Quite the 
opposite. Anselm observes that in the case of such promises one gives up more than one 
would simply by giving the gift or carrying out a monastic life: one has taken these things 
on as a matter of obligation, and therefore given up not just the actual fact of doing 
                                                 




otherwise, but also permission to do so. Even so, whatever one does in fulfillment of such 
a promise continues to be as gratuitous as the initial promise.  
It is striking that both of the examples Anselm chooses involve entering 
voluntarily into a kind of relationship to another. One could easily add the example of 
marriage vows and it would not be out of place. The idea seems to be, then, that God 
enters into a kind of relationship by creating. He does so freely, but by doing so, 
voluntarily puts Himself into a position He would not otherwise be in, since He will act 
towards Creation in a way that comports with His nature. The purposes built into created 
natures now form a kind of obligation on God’s part, but an obligation that is first of all 
to Himself, because it is, after all, His intentions for creatures that He is obligated to 
bring to fulfillment. At the same time, for Anselm, God’s intentions in creating cannot be 
otherwise than those ends which are intrinsically good and appropriate for created 
natures, because He is Goodness itself, and thus the natural orientation of creatures 
towards good and appropriate ends is an orientation towards Himself.  
Ultimately, on Anselm’s telling, there can be no real distinction between the fact 
of the goodness of God’s intentions (in virtue of which He is obligated, so to speak, to 
carry them out) and the fact of their being genuinely good for creation itself, although, 
metaphysically, the former has to be understood as more fundamental. God’s goodwill 
towards His creatures, this is to say, is rooted metaphysically in His own immutable 
goodness—His commitment, as it were, to do what is in conformity with His own nature 
for the sake of that nature. This commitment on God’s part can be said to be obligatory 
only in relation to Himself, not to creatures. In conformity to God’s nature, however, the 




achieve, generally speaking, the ends which are implicit in created natures, and that they 
should play the (necessarily good) part which He intended them to play within creation. It 
is to this good will, according to Anselm, that we owe gratitude for every good thing. All 
that is to say that if God is so perfectly good that His very goodness will not leave open 
the possibility that He would allow His creation to fail utterly to reach the good end for 
which He created it, then, as Anselm says, we ought to be even more grateful than if His 
goodness were somewhat less, so that He might well have seen fit not to provide a means 
to beatitude, the end for which He created human beings. This is what Anselm argues in a 
striking passage, where he concludes that in fact God is even more to be thanked because 
He saves by an internal, voluntarily accepted necessity:  
Consequently, despite the fact that it is not fitting for God to fail to bring 
to completion a good beginning, we ought all the more to attribute it 
entirely to his grace if he completes the act of beneficence towards 
mankind which he has begun, seeing that he has begun it for our sake, not 
for his own, being himself in need of nothing. For it was no secret to God 
what man was going to do, when he created him, and yet, by his own 
goodness in creating him, he put himself under an obligation to bring his 
good beginning to fulfillment. . . . And when we say that God is 
performing some action as if out of a necessary obligation to avoid what is 
dishonourable—something of which he certainly has no fear—what we 
should understand, rather, is that he is acting thus out of a necessary 
obligation to uphold what is honourable. The necessity to which I am 
referring is plainly nothing other than the unchangeability [immutabilitas] 
of God’s honour, which he possesses of himself, and from no one apart 
from himself. For this reason, ‘necessity’ is a misnomer. Let us say, 
nevertheless, that it is a necessity that the goodness of God should bring to 
completion what it has begun with respect to mankind, because of his 
unchangeability, although the whole of what he does is grace.175 






  This is all consonant with Anselm’s developed account of freedom.176 As we saw 
in the previous chapter, Anselm provides a way of thinking about freedom that is oriented 
towards its proper use, rather than the possibility of misuse: freedom is the capacity to 
preserve rectitude for its own sake. For creatures, Anselm insists, moral responsibility—
praiseworthiness or blame—requires genuinely open options at some point, though 
freedom does not require this. Without this situation of genuinely open options (viz. to 
will justice or to will happiness), the creature’s right (or wrong) will would come entirely 
from God. The requirement of open options thus has to do with the creature’s overall 
ontological dependence on God; if God does not give the creature two potentially 
conflicting affections, from which the creature actually can choose one or the other to act 
upon in a non-determined way, then whatever the creature does follows simply and 
necessarily from God’s action. Given this relationship of dependence, the real possibility 
of misuse of freedom has to be open to the creature, and when it occurs, it must come 
from the creature, and not simply from the circumstance of causally determining desires, 
in order for it to merit praise or blame.  
God, however, has no such dependence; God is what He is entirely through 
Himself. If God’s perfect Goodness determines that He will never sin, this is likewise a 
feature that comes entirely and exclusively from Himself. There is no need for God to be 
given options in order for the choice among options to come from God; the perfect 
Goodness which determines that God does the most fitting thing was not imposed on God 
by any external source, but comes entirely from His own being, and therefore the 
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gratitude we owe is directly to Him and not to another,177 even though God does not face 
conflicting affections and therefore there was no real possibility of Him doing 
otherwise.178 All of this makes it plain enough that Anselm is concerned to insist on 
God’s freedom, and on the genuine gratuity of grace in salvation, just as Thomas is. 
Anselm’s approach to defending himself on these matters is, at points, quite similar to 
Thomas; like Thomas, he wants to preserve the rich intelligibility of God’s choice (as it 
were) to carry out this particular means of salvation rather than another, and rather than 
none at all. Like Thomas, he sees the value of identifying a variety of effects distinct to 
this particular means of saving for the purpose of grasping the fittingness of God’s action. 
And, like Thomas, he is careful to clarify the type of necessity he means to attribute to 
these acts, and in particular to deny that it is a necessity of compulsion. On the other 
hand, it appears that Anselm is willing to defend necessity in a sense that Thomas is not; 
the facts that not saving at all, and on top of that, not saving by satisfaction, would be less 
than maximally fitting, entail for Anselm that failing to do these things was not really 
open to God. Nonetheless, Anselm insists, He does them freely, and as a matter of grace 
and not obligation.  
 
 
                                                 
177 See CDH, II.10, where Anselm develops this point explicitly: “The reason why angels are to be praised 
for their righteousness is not that they were in the past capable of sinning, but because in some way they 
possess—independently [a se]—an inability to sin; in this respect they somewhat resemble God, who 
possesses whatever he possesses independently. . . . God possesses to a perfect degree what he possesses 
independently, [therefore] he most of all is worthy to be praised for the good things which he possesses and 
keeps in his possession, doing this not out of any inevitable necessity, but as I have said earlier, out of an 
unchangeability which is his peculiar property and lasts for ever. Thus the man we have in mind, who is 
also to be God, will be righteous independently and therefore worthy of praise, since he will possess 
independently every good thing which he will possess, not out of necessity but in freedom.”    
 




Satisfaction and Divine Justice 
Before we can begin to adjudicate this disagreement, we must consider another 
important and intimately related objection raised by Thomas against Anselm’s arguments 
for necessity, this one having to do with the requirements of justice. Even if Anselm were 
right about the unfittingness of mere forgiveness, it might be that Anselm has 
mischaracterized the relevant requirement as a matter of God’s justice, rather than, say, 
His supreme wisdom and goodness. Indeed, Anselm argues that, in the absence of 
satisfaction, to forgive sin rather than punish it is to tolerate that than which “there is 
nothing . . . more unjust to tolerate . . . in the universal order.” In such a scenario, Anselm 
concludes, God will have been unjust to Himself.179 God will have done less than was 
possible to bring about His own will. Thomas argues that, on the contrary, justice does 
not entail that God must require satisfaction or else punish. He considers the opposite 
position as an objection when he addresses the question whether other means of salvation 
were open to God; there, he insists that, 
Even this justice depends upon the divine will which requires satisfaction 
for sin from the human race. For if God had wanted to free man from sin 
without any satisfaction at all, he would not have been acting against 
justice. Justice cannot be safeguarded by the judge whose duty is to punish 
crimes committed against others, . . . or the government, or the head of 
government, should he dismiss a crime without punishment. But God has 
no one above him, for he is himself the supreme and common good of the 
entire universe. If then he forgives sin, . . . he violates no one’s rights. The 
man who waives satisfaction and forgives an offence done to himself acts 
mercifully, and not unjustly.180   
                                                 
179 Anselm, CDH, I.13.  
 




Anselm and Thomas agree in assigning God the position of the highest Good, and 
in saying that God is accountable to no external standard or authority. Yet Anselm infers 
from this that a sin against God must require either satisfaction or punishment, while 
Thomas infers that there is no authority which could impose such a necessity. For 
Anselm, God must require satisfaction out of justice to Himself; for Thomas, the fact that 
it is a matter of justice to Himself means it is open to His will to either require 
satisfaction or not.  
There are at play in this disagreement two possible ways of interpreting the 
concept of satisfaction, which we have so far tended to conflate. On the one hand, we can 
think of satisfaction as a single discrete aspect of Christ’s atoning work: a moment in 
which something of sufficient value is offered to God to outweigh the debt produced by 
sin. On the other, we can think of satisfaction as the underlying rationale that ties together 
all of the actions which comprise the atonement: satisfaction as the rendering to God the 
very same which He justly demanded of humanity to begin with, to which is added a 
further gift to make up the fact of the initial failure. Thomas plainly treats satisfaction 
mainly in the former sense. In Anselm, there is admittedly a basis for this view as well: 
the whole schema of the infinite value of Christ’s life outweighing the debt of sin is 
suggestive of this, since it would seem to obviate the need for anything else to be done to 
set things right. One might think, then, that so long as Christ offers himself on behalf of 
humanity, all is well, regardless of whether anyone ever becomes united to Christ by 
receiving the benefit of his merits. The debt has been paid; whether sinners receive 




But there are compelling reasons to interpret Anselm in the latter sense. Recall 
that in specifying what has been “taken away” by sin and therefore needs to be restored in 
order to make satisfaction, Anselm says it is “whatever [God] planned to do with regard 
to the human species.” Here, Anselm shifts from the notion of an exchange of equivalent 
value to the conceptually prior one of rendering that which was always owed, and which 
was taken away. It makes sense that the former idea follows from the latter, i.e., that the 
ideal way of making satisfaction is to begin by repairing the precise damage that was 
done, restoring exactly what was taken away, and since in many cases this is not possible, 
we settle for an offering of similar value. But in the case of the atonement, Anselm 
actually presses the idea of restoring exactly what was taken away into service for the 
task of identifying exactly what Christ must accomplish. If satisfaction is merely the 
offering of sufficient value to remove a debt, one might think that the infinite value of 
Christ’s self-offering would obviate the need for humanity to give God anything else, but 
for Anselm, this is not so. Notice what follows from this:  
Man, therefore, neither ought nor can receive from God what God planned 
to give him, unless man returns to God all that he has taken away from 
him. In this way, just as God incurred loss through man, similarly, through 
man’s agency, God would recover what he had lost. The only way in 
which this can be put into effect is as follows. Because of the man who 
was conquered, the whole of humanity is rotten and, as it were, in a 
ferment with sin—and God raises up no one with sin to fill up the 
complement of the renowned heavenly city. Correspondingly, suppose a 
man were victorious, because of him as many humans would be brought 
out of sin into a state of righteousness as would make up that full number . 
. . for the completion of which mankind was created. 181  
This passage strongly suggests the satisfaction called for by human sin is not 
merely the removal of a debt which impeded forgiveness, setting the balance sheet clean. 
                                                 




It is, rather, a matter of bringing to fulfillment of God’s original intentions for humanity 
as a whole, over and against humanity’s sinful rejection of those intentions. Indeed, the 
whole point of satisfaction in CDH is not simply to pay a certain amount of value to God, 
but to provide for the fulfillment of what God originally called humanity to be, namely (a 
certain number of) rational souls participating in beatitude in harmonious community 
with the rest of the creatures God intended to be there. Christ offers himself to God, in a 
sense, so that he can also offer to God the Church, holy and blameless; until this latter 
takes place, that which was “taken away” has not been restored, and satisfaction has not 
been achieved.  
On the broader view of satisfaction, then, we can see more clearly why God’s 
immutability would seem to Anselm to entail satisfaction over against mere forgiveness 
(and, likewise, why it would rule out the possibility of allowing humanity to be entirely 
condemned): God created humanity with intentions implicit in human nature; further, 
God justly intended to give humanity a specific task in the economy of his justice 
towards the devil and the other fallen angels. God’s immutability means that His 
intentions for humanity do not change. God foreknows sin and yet still intends the 
fulfillment of human nature. Satisfaction names God’s work in Christ to bring it about 
that humanity fulfills God’s intentions, both the intention implicit in human nature (that 
is, to know and love God for God’s sake), and the specific task of victory of the devil. It 
is important that Anselm tends to tie the divine will to justice quite tightly, in a nearly 
tautological way: since God willed this act of obedience from humanity, and God’s own 




to say the immutable consistency of His own will, means that He will provide for 
satisfaction, which is just to say, the fulfillment of His will in spite of humanity’s sin.  
This broader interpretation of the concept of satisfaction has the salutary effect of 
unifying the diverse effects of Christ’s atoning work under single intelligible rationale. 
Far from reducing the importance of Christ’s defeat of the devil, his saving teaching and 
example, and so forth, it actually illuminates the importance of each of these effects while 
rendering them intelligible as a single, beautiful, supremely fitting act. If satisfaction is 
merely about the abstract value of Christ’s offering overcoming the abstract weight of 
sin, then establishing the necessity of satisfaction could indeed seem to crowd out the 
significance of other concepts; other effects would be interesting flourishes, perhaps, but 
the real reason for the Incarnation of Christ would have been simply to offer something 
of infinite value to God. But if satisfaction is not simply about fulfilling God’s concrete 
intentions for humanity, intentions which would go unfulfilled absent the Incarnation, 
then satisfaction does not actually crowd out the significance of the other effects of 
Christ’s work. On the contrary, it draws them all together.  
Indeed, all of the beautiful and fitting effects of Christ’s work must ultimately be 
seen as bound up with the infinite value of his self-offering, just as the infinite weight of 
sin is bound up with supreme goodness of the concrete will of the God whose will sin 
rejects. God cannot be the one against whom a sin carries infinite weight unless He is one 
whose acts towards His creatures would display an infinite goodness and wisdom. 
Beatitude is a profound good. To receive beatitude as a fitting reward for obedience is a 
profound good. The heavenly community God intends is a profound good. These things 




an infinite value (such that one should not turn aside from acting towards them no matter 
what other good could be accomplished thereby) because among whatever good 
possibilities there could be for God, these are the things He actually willed for us. Sin has 
infinite weight in that it threatens to prevent these things. Likewise, Christ cannot be an 
infinitely valuable offering to God except if he is such a one whose every act and effect 
would display (to the eye of faith) the infinite goodness and wisdom of God. Christ’s life 
is supremely valuable because Christ is God, the Word. But because of this identity, it 
follows that Christ would do the sorts of good, beautiful, and fitting things that he did to 
fulfill God’s intentions for humanity, such as resist the devil and provide a saving 
teaching and example. Christ’s life is infinitely valuable, this is to say, because of the 
same, self-consistent, infinite goodness that suffuses everything about him, and 
everything he accomplished.  
If we recognize this relationship between Anselm’s seemingly abstract valuation 
of sin and of Christ’s self-offering as infinite (though not to say equal), on the one hand, 
and, on the other, the infinite goodness and wisdom of the concrete ends God intended 
(which sin “takes away” and satisfaction restores), then the relationship between 
satisfaction and other atonement concepts comes more clearly into view as something 
like that of a whole to its constituent parts. We cannot finally separate the infinite value 
of Christ’s life from the things which Christ does with his life, nor the infinite value of 
God’s commands from the goodness at which those commands are necessarily aimed. 
Likewise, we cannot finally separate the satisfactory value of Christ’s self-offering from 
the diverse array of effects it brought together towards the accomplishment of God’s 




provides a teaching and saving example for human beings in order to satisfy God’s 
intentions; and so forth. Understood this way, satisfaction does not obviate the need for 
the theologian to attend to the diverse array of fitting effects accomplished by Christ’s 
work. On the contrary, a satisfaction account is inherently amenable to continuous 
addition; as Anselm suggested himself, there is no need to suppose that the full depth and 
richness of Christ’s satisfying offering to God will ever be fully plumbed by human 
minds. In this life, we hope and believe that through God’s guidance the Church will 
search out ever more deeply the ways in which Christ’s work brings about God’s 
intentions for and in us in spite of sin—which is to say, the ways in which Christ makes 
satisfaction.  
An Epistemic Qualification on the Question of Necessity 
It is important to notice at this point that the broad view of satisfaction can be true 
whether or not Anselm is ultimately correct on the questions of necessity and justice. I 
have tried to give Anselm a fair hearing on these issues, because doing so allows us to see 
important features of the meaning of satisfaction more clearly. This is the account of 
satisfaction I mean to defend; nonetheless, I suggest that we can hold to it in conjunction 
with a different view of divine freedom and justice. To see how, we can start with an 
important epistemic qualification to make in light of Thomas even if Anselm is 
substantially correct about necessity and about God’s justice to Himself. Let us grant for 
the moment that Anselm is right about the following: (1) necessarily, God does what is 
most fitting, and, (2) given the conjunction of God’s intentions for humanity and human 
sin, satisfaction by the Incarnate Word is the most fitting means of salvation, and, 




so, it may be that Thomas’s epistemic procedure is more sound. That is, it may be that 
Anselm overestimates the possibility that human reason can know (2) with sufficient 
confidence absent divine revelation. Perhaps, that is, we simply cannot know the range of 
possibilities open to divine power and compatible with the divine nature, including the 
range of possible intentions God could have had for humanity, and thus cannot say with 
certainty whether there is one most fitting course of action for God viz. sinful humanity 
or many maximally fitting possibilities. Likewise, perhaps we cannot know for certain 
that every maximally fitting possibility includes satisfaction; perhaps God could have 
fittingly arranged the fulfillment of some different set of maximally fitting intentions in 
some other way than having them be fulfilled by the Incarnate Word. In that case, even if 
(1)-(3) are all actually true, it would still be the case that we could not know (2) and (3) to 
be true, even given that God carried out salvation this way. Perhaps, we might say, 
satisfaction was metaphysically necessary as a matter of God’s justice to Himself given 
creation and the facts of angelic and human sin, and grant Anselm’s arguments that this 
would not militate against divine freedom, but humanity cannot know it to be so, even 
after the fact.  
With this qualification in mind, we can see why Thomas’s is perhaps a better as a 
normative example of theological method viz. the doctrine of atonement. Since proving it 
strictly necessary depends on too great a level of knowledge about the possibilities open 
to the divine nature, when it comes to the doctrine of atonement, theologians attempting 
to think with and in service to the Church generally ought to plumb the tradition for an 
array of concepts which illuminate a diversity of effects that flow from the particular 




various elements from the tradition in turn, and then work out how to understand and 
affirm each as much as possible in explicit and direct conversation with scripture and 
tradition. Thomas’s method does indeed allow him to display the diversity of effects of 
Christ’s Passion (which Anselm in fact affirms and underscores in his own way182) in a 
more readily accessible way than Anselm does.  
This recommendation probably should not be pushed too hard; Anselm’s method 
also has distinctive virtues as a speculative exercise. Asking why this means of atonement 
is necessary rather than merely recognizable as fitting after the fact puts Anselm in a 
position to probe the ratio of the Incarnation in a unique way, a way he could not do as 
readily if he did not attempt to find some hinge of necessity. I should also be said that 
Anselm was plainly responding to questions that arose in conversations within his own 
community; theologians arguably should not neglect questions posed from the 
perspective of nonbelief just because their preferred method is not convenient for doing 
so (though on this front, Thomas likewise considers objections that come from a 
perspective of unbelief). Indeed, in the very fecundity of his work, Anselm shows us how 
the more directly apologetic practice of arguing without assuming all of the premises 
which might be available within the faith can produce distinctive intellectual goods for 
the faithful, over and above any persuasive value it may happen to have for non-
believers. But by and large, perhaps, what is needed more regularly is the careful and 
systematic attention Thomas exemplifies to the diverse array of concepts and modes of 
                                                 
182 Recall that in his Commendation of the text of CDH to Pope Urban, Anselm insists that he is adding to 
what the Fathers unfolded about the fittingness of the Incarnation, and that “the logic of the truth is so 
copious and profound that it cannot be exhausted by mere mortals.” And likewise, as we noted in Chapter 
3, Anselm includes victory of the devil, and moral example within his account. Though these mentions are 




reflecting on the work of God in Christ handed down in the tradition, in such a way as to 
show as much as possible of its profound and multifaceted fittingness.   
 So what shall we say about the question of necessity? When we understand the 
dispute, such as it is, there appear to be dangers on both sides. Thomas’s approach can 
tend to drain any real force out of the points of fittingness he identifies: if it truly is more 
fitting to do X rather than Y under circumstances C, but still it could be equally open to 
God to do Y under circumstances C, then fittingness does not seem to amount to much. 
Anselm’s approach, on the other hand, risks overestimating the human capacity to rightly 
discern and evaluate what might or might not be open to the divine will: perhaps, even 
though X is more fitting than Y under circumstances C, Y could be carried out with equal 
fittingness under circumstances D. Perhaps a principled agnosticism about the set of 
circumstances in principle open to God can allow us to avoid both dangers on both sides. 
Let us grant with Anselm that God cannot do what is unfitting, and infer from that what 
he does: if in fact we could know that, given circumstances C, X is the most fitting 
option, then this is as much as knowing that under circumstances C, X is what God freely 
would do, and if this is true of salvation by the satisfying offering of a God-man, then it 
follows necessarily that this is what God will freely and graciously do. But let us attach 
the epistemic qualification that God’s power and wisdom are such that we cannot 
properly evaluate the range of options that could be open to Him so as to evaluate the 
relative fittingness of each.183  
                                                 
183 There is some justification for this sort of caution in Anselm’s thought. In his treatment of the fall of the 
devil, Anselm suggests that, before their fall, the angels reasoned that God would have to forgive them: 
“the angel was certain that the number that were created to enjoy God had been established with so much 
wisdom as to have nothing superfluous and to be unable to be lessened without leaving something 
incomplete, and that God’s wonderful work could not remain partially incomplete . . . he could in no way 




If this is correct, we can thus conclude, going some distance with Thomas, that we 
are not ever in an epistemic position to safely conclude that we have arrived at necessity 
when it comes to God’s actions. This allows us to say that, to whatever degree we discern 
that it really is the case that saving by satisfaction is, in an absolute sense, more fitting 
than saving without it, we really are discerning why God would save by satisfaction and 
would not save without it, even if, at the end of the day, we confess that our finitude 
means that we cannot confidently assert necessity, since we do not know whether another 
means of salvation could have been equally fitting, equally expressive of the divine 
wisdom and goodness. We can even leave room here for comparisons within a narrowed 
space of possibilities. For instance, we might reasonably ask whether, holding all else 
about God’s actual work in the world equal, it was more fitting or less fitting that Christ 
save by making a satisfactory offering to God rather than without such an offering (for 
instance, if Christ simply taught rather suffered the Passion). If we judge positively, then 
we have a very narrow and relative sense of necessity. This idea provides an 
interpretation that allows many of Thomas’s arguments from fittingness to carry some 
weight and provide a real intelligibility to God’s actions even if they do not show 
necessity of the type Anselm thought he had achieved; if in this narrow sort of 
comparison, God’s mercy would be displayed less without satisfaction, then we have a 
good reason for why God saved by satisfaction rather than not given all the other facts 
about the world and God’s chosen means of salvation, without being able to conclude 
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certainly have reason to withhold conclusions of necessity from their own speculations about what God 




that God’s mercy could not have been displayed equally well in a radically different order 
that nonetheless did not include satisfaction.184  
III. Aesthetic and Literary Fittingness in the Doctrine of Atonement 
One of the aspects of pre-modern atonement theology that is almost never 
included in contemporary atonement theology is displayed by the way Thomas’s 
arguments for the fittingness of the Passion extend to various features of the Passion, 
such as the location, the time, the fact that Christ suffered, and the fact that he was 
executed next to criminals. He considers objections having to do with the way in which 
these features seem not to cohere with Old Testament prefiguring: if Christ’s passion is 
prefigured by Old Testament sacrifice, why is he tortured on a cross rather than simply 
killed and burned? Why is Christ not killed precisely at the time when the Passover lamb 
would be sacrificed? And why does he die outside of Jerusalem rather than in the 
Temple? Why is it fitting that Gentiles have a hand in killing Christ? It is at this point and 
in the same manner that Aquinas considers various objections to the moral fittingness of 
the Passion as a means to salvation, such as why it is appropriate that Christ should an act 
of violence should be a part of bringing about salvation.   
Thomas often answers these objections by highlighting some pedagogical, 
soteriological benefit to each particular feature of the passion. Christ’s suffering on the 
Cross teaches and inspires us not to fear a painful death. He dies in Jerusalem because 
Jerusalem is God’s ordained place for sacrifices, while he dies outside of the Temple to 
better communicate that his death is efficacious for the Gentiles and not just for the Jews. 
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He dies in a violent and visible way rather than dying of natural causes or due to sickness 
so that no one would have reason to think that death was natural and proper to Christ, and 
so that no one would have reason to doubt that he really did die before being resurrected. 
Christ dies with his body remaining whole so as to avoid giving a justification to those 
who would divide the Body of Christ. 
 There is another, overlapping class of explanations of fittingness that are not quite 
pedagogical or soteriological in this fashion. Instead, in these cases Thomas identifies 
something much more like an aesthetic, even literary connection, typically between 
God’s actions in the Old Testament and the Passion in support of the fittingness of the 
passion. For example, Christ’s death on a tree is fitting because Adam and Eve fell by 
taking fruit from a tree. Christ dies lifted up to show that he sanctifies the air and opens 
the way for our ascent to heaven. Drawing on Augustine, Thomas asserts that the 
physical shape of the cross which Christ occupied signifies the breadth, and height, and 
length, and depth of the love of God. Indeed, providence is seen to lie behind the great 
variety of resonances with Old Testament symbols that the cross allows: 
Seventh, this kind of death corresponds to many figures. As Augustine 
says, a wooden ark saved the human race from perishing in the Flood. 
When God’s people were leaving Egypt, Moses divided the sea with his 
wooden rod, forced Pharaoh to yield, and saved the people of God. The 
same Moses cast a piece of wood into the water, changing its bitterness to 
sweet, and by his wooden rod caused a salutary spring to issue from the 
spiritual rock. To overcome Amalec, Moses stretched forth hands clasping 
his wooden rod. God’s law was consigned to the Ark of the Covenant, 
which was of wood. Thus, as by so many steps, we come to the wood of 
the Cross.185 
                                                 




 This sort of typological connection is by no means unique to Aquinas, but it is 
helpful to consider them in the context of the doctrine of atonement, and what the task of 
the theologian is when it comes to this doctrine. In this, Thomas provides a helpful 
corrective to the impression we might get from emulating Anselm alone. While Anselm 
does mention these kinds of explanation of fittingness (and indeed he does not actually 
reject them), he moves on from them as a matter of methodology in order to uncover a 
rationality that is responsive to a deeper kind of doubt, the doubt of one who does not 
already accept the testimony of scripture. Even though this is a feature that follows from 
Anselm’s rhetorical purpose in CDH (that is, to answer questions from the perspective of 
unbelievers, rather than to unpack the meaning of Christ’s work systematically and 
comprehensively) rather than from any substantive theological commitment on his part, 
Anselm’s more provocative proposals seem to have had the effect (in the long run, at 
least) of crowding out space for this sort of reflection in the domain of atonement 
theology. Such a shift does not actually follow from Anselm’s method; Thomas shows 
beautifully how discernments of aesthetic fittingness in what we might call God’s 
authorial Providence can fit next to detailed analysis of how and why Christ’s offering 
satisfies for sin, how and why he overcame the devil, and so on. The theologian serving 
the Church has the task, when it comes to the atoning work of Christ, of meditating 
deeply on every aspect of it in order to discern God’s character in those acts. This 
includes beauty just as surely as it does justice, truth, and mercy.  
 Contemporary approaches to atonement tend to focus on questions around issues 
such as the mechanism and meaning of atonement according to various models; on moral 




or innocent suffering; the appropriateness of this or that theory for this or that cultural 
context; whether this or that model is supportive of oppression or resistance to 
oppression; on the biblical and historical antecedents for this or that model; on the correct 
interpretation  and placement of this or that author with this or that ‘type’ of  atonement 
theory. Although these questions are not raised with the same formally apologetic 
concern as Anselm’s, it is notable that none of these questions are really answered by the 
kinds of appeals to pedagogical or aesthetic appropriateness relative to the particular 
historical and physical circumstances of Christ’s Passion, just as Anselm’s question of 
necessity was not answered by them. That Thomas (or Anselm)186 might suggest that the 
fittingness of Christ dying by being lifted up on a piece of wood because Adam and Eve 
sinned by taking a fruit from a tree, and because Noah and his family were saved on a 
wooden boat, does not appear to fit anywhere into contemporary atonement debates.  
 The fact that this particular explanatory and justificatory strategy with respect to 
certain divine actions seems to be treated more like an artifact of antiquity than a serious 
form of argument is worthy of careful consideration. It might be explained any number of 
ways. Perhaps it has to do with the sense that explaining resonances of this sort within 
scripture, or indeed within history itself, in terms of divine authorship is not a legitimate 
historical or exegetical move. Perhaps it has to do with the fact that, as we have observed, 
other issues have dominated the attentions of academic theologians. In any case, the trend 
itself is an unfortunate one. In the case of Christians who do affirm a strong doctrine of 
divine providence (of the sort that seems to follow from classical Christian claims about 
the nature of God), it is hard to see why they should not use such a doctrine as a premise 
                                                 




when they interpret scripture or the events of history; there is nothing unreasonable in 
this, even if, naturally, the conclusions they draw from such a premise will not be 
immediately compelling to people who deny it. This sort of interpretation is still worth 
doing, if for no other reason than that it can contribute to the understanding of those who 
do accept the relevant premise. If we operate, that is to say, with a strong doctrine of 
divine providence, and we recognize that such a doctrine may constitute a genuinely 
rational presupposition in our approach to history or to the texts of scripture, then we 
have good reason to think of God as an Author. To put it another way, if we have crossed 
the threshold of divine revelation,187 we may then look back at God’s actions revealed in 
scripture and in history and discover a whole new range of explanations and justifications 
has become available to us. Now that we have accepted the reality of an Author and have 
come to understand something about his character, we are in a position to consider all of 
reality to be in principle open to explanation with reference to the revelatory intentions 
and creative capacities of that Author. 
Given the trend of neglecting this kind of reflection, we ought to consider what it 
might add to our understanding, and what is lost if we leave it out. Arguably, it is a 
benefit to the understanding of the faithful to unfold the wisdom and beauty of what God 
has done, both in the events of Christ’s Passion, and in the way it is recorded in scripture, 
in every possible way. Arguably, this strategy, which views events in salvation history 
and in the text of scripture as potentially intelligible in the same way as decisions made 
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by an author or creator in producing such objects as stories, poems, songs, and other 
works of art. With respect to the agency of an author, explanations in terms of fittingness, 
beauty, foreshadowing, prefiguring, resonance, repetition, symbolism, pedagogical or 
revelatory efficacy, and so forth, are naturally taken to explain the significance of a 
particular authorial choice, and thus the meaning of a particular feature of the work in 
question.  
Discerning this kind of literary beauty is, therefore, one way we recognize 
intentionality and wisdom behind a story, and identifying connections across a text is 
likewise a way of coming to understand the text to have a genuine unity. Making these 
connections visible with all the exegetical and analytical skill theologians can bring to 
bear, then, is an important and valid task if they want to recognize and understand God as 
the Author, both of salvation history and of the scriptures which relay that history to us—
and the latter not necessarily in the sense of dictation to the human authors, but certainly 
in providentially guiding them, perhaps so as to leave signs beyond what the human 
authors could have intended. Such signs can serve both to teach us, concretizing and 
reinforcing truths we may know from elsewhere in an abstract way, and to elicit our sheer 
joy at recognizing them. Recovering this mode of reflection within the doctrine of 
atonement, then, can serve to increase our understanding of the events that constitute our 








IV. Satisfaction, Holiness, and Friendship 
There is one further theme to explore in the vein of Thomas’s elaboration of 
Anselmian satisfaction, and that is Thomas’s emphasis on the concept of friendship.188 
Aquinas provides a distinct advance on Anselm’s account in the way he shows the end of 
satisfaction to be the renewal of friendship. The theme of friendship as a kind of concord 
of wills (along with that of friendship with God as the proper end of humanity) is a rich 
one in Thomas’s thought, and it provides an important context within which to 
understand the role of satisfaction in leading to the proper end of human life, rather than 
functioning as an arbitrary legal prerequisite for the achievement of that end. To be sure, 
we have already leveraged aspects of Anselm’s thought towards this point, especially in 
unpacking the proper honor of God for Anselm as love of God for His own sake, as well 
as Anselm’s identification of the connection that enables sinners to benefit from Christ’s 
satisfaction as one of familial love. Thomas, however, provides a greater level of clarity 
about what kind of unity of wills is involved in our proper honoring of God, how this 
unity makes for friendship, and how satisfaction restores friendship when it is broken by 
injustice. In the remainder of this chapter, we shall briefly introduce Thomas’s concept of 
friendship, and then move to the question of friendship with God, and satisfaction as 
aimed at the repair of that friendship. We will interpret Thomas’s account of merit, grace, 
and satisfaction viz. Christ’s Passion in light of this vision of friendship with God. This 
will show how satisfaction can be integrated naturally into an account of the Christian 
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life, membership in the Church, and growth in holiness through repentance and 
participation in the sacraments. In Chapter 5, when we consider some critiques of 
satisfaction accounts of atonement that have to do with its implications about 
relationships between human beings, we will return again to the human side of Thomas’s 
account of friendship in order to see what our satisfaction account actually entails in the 
sphere of injustices between human persons.  
The capacities of knowing and willing make human beings capable of friendship, 
which Aquinas (following Aristotle) identifies as a certain kind of concord of wills. It 
constitutes a kind of unity between persons, and, in particular, a unity based on the 
orientation of the will towards ends (rather than unity of opinion). It is because we can 
grasp ends, find them worthy of love, and direct our actions towards them, that we can 
form friendships. In a friend, one recognizes another who loves what one loves, and 
therefore comes to love the friend for the goodness of her will. One thus desires to imitate 
the will of one’s friend, and likewise wills that she receive those things which constitute 
her genuine good. Friends may sometimes differ in their judgment of what means will 
best materialize the ends they share, but they will share at least a concord in willing the 
end. Moreover, when there are multiple acceptable means that might actualize the shared 
end, the love of friendship provides a motive to choose the same means as one’s friend 
whenever possible, and in this way it moves friends towards union of wills; friendship 
motivates cooperation.189 Friendship is thus the sort of shared habit of will that enables 
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and supports participation in common projects, and a common life. This common life 
makes us each better able to work towards our ends, to live virtuous lives, both because 
friends are beneficent towards one another, and because friends delight in, encourage, 
and join in each other’s virtuous activity. In this way, through a shared will, “friends are 
united to ourselves in such a way that their actions are, in some ways, also ours.”190 This 
point will be important for thinking about how it can be possible for a person to make 
satisfaction on behalf of a friend.  
With this picture of friendship in mind, we can turn towards the question of 
friendship with God. For Aquinas, friendship names the relationship towards God that 
constitutes the proper end of human beings:  
[F]riendship provides, for Aquinas, the paradigm through which the 
theological virtue of charity can be best conceptualized. Friendship 
captures the many disparate elements that different authoritative sources, 
both biblical and patristic, assign to charity. Charity is a friendship 
involving love towards God and all rational beings capable of loving 
Him.191 
Now, given the radical ontological difference between creaturely wills and the divine will 
presents some difficulties for applying the concept of friendship neatly to the relationship 
between human beings and God. Human beings can never will what God does in the way 
that God wills it, since our understanding of the connection between any given material 
good and the end for which God wills it (namely His own goodness) is vastly inferior to 
God’s. God certainly seems to will things we cannot understand as connected to the Good 
at all. On Schwartz’s reading, however, Aquinas’s view is that friendship with God 
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means willing the things God wills just to the extent that we do grasp the connection 
between those things and the Good; this is always a rather limited extent, but it is more 
than nothing. On this reading, Aquinas even allows that in the cases where we cannot 
understand what God wills as aimed at the Good, friendship with God does not require us 
to will what He does—it simply requires that we be subject to His will in spite of our not 
being able to will with Him. We can only actually will with Him materially in the manner 
that constitutes friendship in the case that the thing God wills impresses our own rational 
will as good, as connected to the end for which God wills it. In these case, we are invited 
beyond servanthood (in which we merely recognize God’s authority) into friendship (in 
which we actually, however partially, grasp the connection between what God wills and 
the end for which He wills it, and thus will it alongside Him). In friendship with God, we 
come to love God for God’s sake, as our will is directed through God’s means towards 
God’s end, namely His own Goodness.192 Friendship thus specifies a state in which our 
hearts and minds are drawn ever more deeply into concord with God, which is possible 
through God’s gracious sharing of His own wisdom and love with us. It follows naturally 
that, in addition to specifying the sort of relation to God that beatitude involves for 
human beings, friendship also characterizes the unity of the Church. Those who are 
friends with God are also, therefore, friends with one another, sharing a concord of wills 
leading to habitual shared action towards an end—the highest and most ultimate end 
there is for human beings. The members of Christ’s Church, that is, share God as the 
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formal end of their wills, and the Church’s sacraments and teachings as the means to 
materialize that end; the bond that makes the Church one is thus a bond of friendship.   
This account of friendship can illuminate the appropriateness of the satisfaction 
offered by Christ as a means of bringing sinful human persons into friendship with God, 
and in at least two ways: one has to do with the way satisfaction is appropriate as a means 
to restore friendship (or perhaps establish it in the first place), and the other has to do 
with the way satisfaction is something a friend can help us to perform, or even perform in 
our stead. First, then, we can note that the same capacities which make us capable of 
friendship make satisfaction a fitting way of setting things right between friends when the 
relationship has been damaged by injustice committed by one party. An unjust act against 
one’s friend signals and acts upon this break in the concord that is necessary for 
friendship. In Thomas’ terms, it produces an inequality that is contrary to friendship.193 
Since friendship is a concord of wills, it follows that the inequality created by unjust acts 
properly speaking (that is, unjust acts done willingly) involves at root an inequality of 
wills, a disparity between what the honor and dignity of the wronged person calls for and 
what the wrongdoer actually wills and does.194 Satisfaction is the means to repair this 
disparity and the restoration of friendship, since it directs will and act back into alignment 
with the good of the one wronged.  
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Some might argue that recourse to satisfaction is not appropriate between friends; 
friends should simply forgive. As Schwartz notes, however, Thomas rejects this view and 
defends recourse to justice between friends as at times permissible or even obligatory. 
This was an important practical question for conflicts Aquinas faced in his own day, 
when he would have understood most people in his society to be joined by charity insofar 
as they were members of the Church, but nonetheless there were important and difficult 
conflicts, some of which involved injustice. When secular masters at the universities 
sought to remove the rights and privileges of Mendicants, they also advanced the 
argument that Mendicants should not turn to authorities to have their rights and privileges 
protected; the Mendicants should rather preserve peace by accepting even unjust forms of 
harm to themselves. Thomas’s response was to argue that under certain conditions it is 
licit to pursue justice even against a friend.195 When the injustice in question threatens the 
good of the community, Thomas insists that pursuing justice can even be an obligation of 
love rather than merely permitted. While it is true, Thomas concedes, that one ought to be 
willing to accept personal inconvenience to maintain genuine peace, the peace that is 
upheld by ignoring serious injustice is actually a false peace, and not worthy of being 
upheld.196 Likewise, we might speculate, an injustice can be a rupture in the concord of 
wills that makes a friendship, so that ignoring it cannot really preserve the friendship 
anyway. Friendship here has to be based on something substantial, and it can be damaged 
or even undone. Satisfaction can mend such damage, since it represents a movement of 
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the wills back into concord. On the other hand, for Aquinas it seems that friends can 
differ in opinion about what justice requires to the degree that one opposes the other in 
court without losing the unity of wills that constitutes friendship; they both will to do 
what is just toward the other, but simply cannot agree about what justice entails. In such 
cases pursuing a judgment from a higher authority (perhaps enjoining an act of 
satisfaction on one party) might take place within a friendship, rather than being needed 
in order to restore it.197 In this case, it might be better to say that satisfaction preserves 
friendship rather than restores it, but friendship remains its end.  
Lest we think that satisfaction between friends is overly exacting and unmerciful, 
we should note that for Aquinas, satisfaction between friends is actually more about 
union of wills than quantitative equality with the harm done. Sometimes it is impossible 
to set right exactly what was broken or provide something of equivalent value; on 
Aquinas’s analysis, satisfaction between friends requires only that one do what one 
can.198 While this may seem at odds with Anselm’s more rigid insistence on equivalence, 
there is some space for Anselm to accommodate this possibility. Anselm says, after all, 
that satisfaction requires the offender to offer something that is of the appropriate value in 
the eyes of the one wronged. It may be that in many cases, in light of a history of 
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friendship, one can value a sincere apology expressive of a real desire to set things right 
as of sufficient value to achieve satisfaction.  
In any case, we can see that recourse to satisfaction need not be motivated by a 
lack of mercy, or a vindictive desire to mete out punishment, or self-interest; the pursuit 
of justice against a friend may perhaps be motivated by a genuine concern for the good of 
the friend, which includes that he be just. Or, it may be motivated by the specific end 
which one has in common with the friend, while differing about the means to it. Such 
cases need not entail a failure to value the friendship enough, but rather a recognition that 
there is a sense in which friendship really does need to be merited by a genuine concord 
of wills, and when this is gone, forbearance would simply hide the truth, or constitute a 
failure to will an end shared in common firmly enough. If two friends share a common 
project, but the actions of one of them threaten to endanger that project (however 
unintentionally), then surely the erring friend would want the other to use whatever 
legitimate means are available to end his errant actions, and bring him back into proper 
alignment with their shared end. If friendship is oriented towards a common end, then it 
is no friendly act to value the friendship itself more highly than the end towards which 
both friends are working, and towards which their love is more fundamentally directed.    
Turning towards the repair of a break in friendship with God, we can recall, as we 
have observed already, the most fundamental level at which sin causes a break between 
the sinner and God is in the will; to sin is to will in a way that one ought not to will, in 
short, to violate the concord of wills that is required for friendship with God. To restore 
the will to friendship with God, we need a means that appropriately embodies the right 




In connection with the requirement of satisfaction towards God, Schwartz captures this 
dynamic nicely:  
Aquinas’s theory of satisfaction is explained by a theology that considers 
God not to be a self-concerned being, but one who aims to bring His 
creatures, and especially rational creatures, into a particular bond with 
Him—one that is or resembles friendship. God is not content simply to be 
redressed for the injustices committed against Him. His aims look beyond 
redress to the establishment of a relationship. Rational beings have to 
make themselves deserving partners of such friendship through the 
reformation of their attitudes and habits and the performance of certain 
acts. Conformity with the demands of corrective justice as effected by 
satisfaction brings about some of these changes.199   
Charity is thus required for an act to count as satisfactory with respect to God, 
since charity is the kind of conformity between human will and divine will that makes it 
possible for a person to be friends with God. It seems natural, then, that satisfaction 
would play a role in preventing future wrongs, in addition to repairing a wrong done in 
the past, since it is an act of the sort that comes from the habit of the will that is in the 
opposite direction of sin. Though the habit of charity is infused rather than acquired, the 
appropriate exercise of the habit plays a role in strengthening it, disposing one to receive 
further grace.200 Although, as we saw in Chapter 2 and 3, critics of satisfaction accounts 
of atonement tend to think that it has nothing to do with future holiness or proper 
relationship to God, Thomas’s way of thinking about friendship shows that the 
connection is quite natural: satisfying for sin is an exercise of the habit of will that makes 
for friendship with God, and, specifically, an exercise of will aimed at repairing the 
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wrong, which helps one both to learn the true nature and extent of the wrong and to 
strengthen one’s will against committing further wrongs.  
We find these features of satisfaction and the role it plays in bringing about 
friendship between sinners and God on display when Thomas lists the ways in which the 
Passion is fitting means towards the salvation of human persons: 
Now because man was set free through Christ’s passion, many things 
having to do with man’s salvation over and above liberation from sin also 
converged . . . First, man could thus see how much God loves him, and so 
would be aroused to love him . . . Second, he gave us an example of 
obedience, humility, constancy, justice, and of other virtues which his 
passion revealed and which are necessary for man’s salvation. . . . Third, 
by his passion, Christ not only freed man from sin, but merited for him the 
grace of justification, and the glory of beatitude . . . Fourth, man thus feels 
a greater obligation to refrain from sin . . . Fifth, in this way a greater 
dignity accrues to man. Man had been overcome and deceived by the 
devil. But it is a man who overcomes the devil. Man has merited death; a 
man by dying would conquer death.201  
Thomas understands Christ’s passion to merit grace insofar as it is an act of virtue 
performed by a person in a state of grace. The grace merited by Christ then overflows to 
the members of Christ’s body, who are united with him through charity, which means 
friendship with God. Eleonore Stump unpacks the logic of this process nicely: 
The source of Christ’s merit that provides grace for humans is his will. For 
someone to merit something is for him to bring it about that some good 
thing should in justice be given him. In the last analysis, however, good 
things for humans are those which contribute to obtaining eternal life. 
Now an action meriting eternal life must be an action done out of charity. 
And in fact charity is the root of all merit because it is the love of God, 
who is goodness personified, and the love of other persons and things for 
the sake of goodness. . . . But Christ in his passion suffered out of the 
deepest charity, for he voluntarily accepted great suffering and death out 
of love for all humans. . . . So because of the intensity of his love for 
                                                 




human beings Christ merits grace leading to eternal life; and as the head of 
all humans (at least potentially), he merits this grace for all people.202 
The grace bestowed in virtue of Christ’s merit is the internal habit which enables 
and inclines a person to love God for God’s own sake; it is the infused virtue of charity, 
which makes one a friend of God. It is essential for Thomas that this grace does not 
override human freedom. It is rather that the will cooperates with and is empowered by 
grace. Though there are many puzzles here around the relationship between grace and 
freedom, the key point for our purposes is that we can see the way a satisfaction account 
of atonement can very organically connect with a detailed vision of the Christian life. For 
Aquinas, it leads to and continually supports gradual growth into perfect union with 
Christ through a consistent life of faith and especially through participation in the 
sacraments.203 Through this process, the merit of Christ’s satisfying work on the Cross is 
active over and over as the soul receives grace through the sacraments, is empowered to 
grow in charity, to repent of sins, and ultimately to become holy, to be a saint in the 
fullest sense. This makes it clearer than is apparent in CDH, perhaps, that satisfaction is 
an event that changes the recipient, drawing them ever more deeply into friendship to 
God. Thomas thus unpacks the way that the need (such as it is) for satisfaction comes 
from the particular predicament of the sinner, who needs to make satisfaction, rather than 
from anything in God (except, perhaps, His wisdom and goodness towards us) requiring 
Him to demand it.  
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What Anselm suggests quite briefly as a supplementary argument is thus drawn 
out more explicitly in Aquinas: it is appropriate to penitents to desire to set right what 
was broken. Sin is a problem not just of wrong action but of a will that is not 
appropriately aligned with God’s, a will that does not love God properly, or love the 
things that God loves. Making satisfaction is a part of bringing the will back into 
alignment. As Stump observes, “On Aquinas’ view, the will moves away from sin by 
moving in a direction opposed to those movements which inclined it to sin. Doing so 
requires being sorry for past sin in such a way that the past sin comes to be against one’s 
present will.”204 
As Aquinas suggests, and as we have already noted, an act of satisfaction can also 
teach a wrongdoer the truth about the wrongdoing by showing them what it is they ought 
to will. This makes sense in the case of an act assigned to the wrongdoer, but also in the 
case that the act is carried by someone else. In the latter case, the will of the wrongdoer is 
drawn first of all to love the satisfier, but thereby to love what the satisfier loves, namely 
what is just, including the full and proper dignity of the one who was wronged. When 
sinners fail to realize the full gravity of their sin, or how they truly ought to love God, the 
Cross teaches them the truth, enacting both how much God loves them, and what true 
faithfulness looks like. Sinners can learn by meditating on the Cross how far they ought 
to go in resisting sin. Our loyalty and gratitude to Christ is loyalty and gratitude to God, 
both because Christ is God, and because Christ’s human will, which we love in loving 
him, loves God. In friendship to Christ, we are drawn to imitate his will. Over time, by 
grace we may align our wills more and more fully with Christ’s self-offering, and thereby 
                                                 




come to offer to God the honor we have always owed to Him. We can see in all of this 
that satisfaction itself is a pedagogical tool. When God is the one who assigns it and 
carries it out, it is indeed a saving and atoning form of teaching. 
This all puts us in a position to see a second point: friendship renders intelligible 
the way that one can make satisfaction for one’s friend, and thus also the way that Christ 
can make satisfaction on our behalf. There is an important qualification here, since 
Thomas does not draw this connection explicitly with reference to Christ, but he does 
draw it with respect to satisfaction through the sacrament of penance.205 As Schwartz 
suggests, probably the best interpretation here is that Christ’s satisfaction makes it 
possible for us to be friends of God in the first place; Christ makes satisfaction for those 
who are not friends of God (nor are they even capable of being friends of God since they 
do not possess charity) in order that they may become friends once he has merited grace 
for them.206 But once one has received grace the situation is different. One may sin even 
though one possesses grace, and then one needs the sacrament of reconciliation; in this 
situation, a friend can aid one in the performance of satisfaction, most importantly in the 
case that one cannot perform the appropriate satisfaction oneself, though one wills to do 
so. The role charity plays here is clear: the person performing the act fulfills the external 
debt and as far as possible reverses the consequences of the previous offense, while the 
one who committed the wrong is (or becomes) united to the satisfier in love, and in 
willing the specific wrong to be redressed through the act of satisfaction. This logic 
makes sense even in the case of Christ’s initial act of satisfaction; even then, friendship is 
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what enables merit to be shared, and friendship remains in a remarkably organic way the 
end of the act of satisfaction.  
V. Conclusion: A Revised Satisfaction Account 
 In this chapter, Thomas’s account of atonement has provided both correctives and 
elaborations to what we found in Anselm. While it is not true that Anselm’s approach to 
satisfaction via an argument to necessity prevents him (or those who would follow his 
approach) from appreciating the diverse concepts and effects attributed to Christ’s work 
in the Christian tradition, it is true that Thomas displays this diversity in a more visible 
way than Anselm did in CDH. Even if we take Anselm’s broader concept of satisfaction, 
we might do well to apply it precisely by gathering together these various concepts and 
meditating on how each one contributes to the work of restoring creation to God’s 
intended end, and in such a way that God’s act reveals His nature in a maximally fitting 
way. And since it does not have a problem with including a diverse array of concepts, the 
broader view is preferable on the whole, since it provides a unifying rationale for them.  
 On the question of necessity, we have tried to take both Anselm and Thomas 
seriously and perhaps found a middle course: accept a Thomistic sort of critique of 
Anselm’s confidence regarding what we can know about the range of options potentially 
open to divine power and wisdom, and how accurately we can assess their relative 
fittingness, while, nonetheless, maintaining with Anselm if that of such options, God only 
does what is maximally fitting, and that He is nonetheless free and gracious in doing so. 
But one other thing this dispute helps reveal is that one can accept an Anselmian 
satisfaction account of atonement even if one does not finally accept Anselm’s argument 




so when He could have done otherwise, and only given this contingent divine ordination 
of creation to a particular end, of Christ’s satisfying self-offering as the means to bring it 
to that end, is satisfaction truly necessary, and that this is knowable only in light of 
revelation.  
 Thomas’s inclusion (in a more obviously positive way) of aesthetic and literary 
connections within his reflection on the Passion helps to show how elements of 
atonement only mentioned briefly by Anselm can be developed further without any 
conflict. From a broad interpretation of satisfaction, we can say that such connections 
deepen our understanding of the full fittingness and beauty of Christ’s work, drawing out 
in us more and more the praise and love we have always owed to God. Likewise, the 
theme of friendship within Thomas’s work provided further conceptual depth to aspects 
only suggested briefly in CDH, especially the relationship between satisfaction and 
holiness. By situating satisfaction as aimed at establishing or restoring friendship, 
Thomas provided a rich and organic connection between satisfaction and holiness.  
 Our revised satisfaction account is thus somewhat broader than what we found in 
Anselm: it is compatible with a wider range of theological positions on other issues, and 
it is more obviously susceptible to addition and elaboration. Relatedly, it is easier to see 
that it does not have the weaknesses which are often attributed to Anselm’s view read in 
isolation—for example, that he cannot include other aspects of traditional Christian 
teaching on atonement, or that he reduces atonement to an impersonal exchange 
satisfying justice with no real connection to the Church or to a life of holiness. 
Nonetheless, satisfaction remains as the underlying rationale for everything Christ 




Christ has worked to bring about within humanity that relation to God for which we were 
created, satisfying that debt which above all others ought to be fulfilled, and bringing us 
thereby into friendship with God. In the next chapter, we will take up some contemporary 
lines of critique against satisfaction accounts, considering whether they hold against the 












SATISFACTION AND INJUSTICE: A RESPONSE TO CONTEMPORARY 




If the divine Wisdom did not impose these forms of recompense in cases where 
wrongdoing is endeavoring to upset the right order of things, . . . God would appear to be 
failing in his governance. 
   Anselm of Canterbury, Cur Deus Homo 
 
 With a revised Anselmian satisfaction account of atonement now in view, we can 
consider an important kind of contemporary critique that is generally taken to apply to 
satisfaction accounts. In particular, we will consider a form of critique offered mainly 
(though not exclusively) from feminist, womanist, and liberationist perspectives. This 
critique has to do with the apparent implications of a satisfaction account for how we 
should think about cases of injustice and oppression in human relationships, and alleges 
that accounts of atonement in which (like the one developed in this project) Christ makes 
satisfaction, pays the debt, or bears the punishment for the sin of humanity by passively 
undergoing unjust suffering and death support the ongoing suffering of the oppressed and 
abused. According to this critique, such accounts suggest that such undeserved suffering 
is like Christ’s, and therefore meritorious, or even sacred. It would follow, then, that 
accounts of atonement like the one developed here may appear to provide such sufferers 
with a reason not to resist or pursue justice against their abusers and oppressors. This 




Here, I will argue that our account actually does not support ongoing abuse, but rather 
suggests that such instances will themselves call for justice in the form of satisfaction or 
punishment.     
In this chapter, we will first try to spell out the general shape of the critique, and 
then offer an argument that our revised satisfaction account does not have the 
implications alleged by this critique; we will then develop this argument by applying it to 
two particular cases. Specifically, we will consider the case of spousal abuse, and the 
case of calls for reparations for the oppression of black people in the United for the 
injustice constituted by slavery and its legacy, since these cases (spousal abuse and 
slavery) are often given as examples in which some traditional accounts of atonement 
support the ongoing passive suffering of abuse as opposed to the pursuit of an end to or 
recompense for the unjust suffering.  
A brief terminological note: here, by “passive suffering,” I mean only suffering 
without active resistance—no attempt to end the suffering. By forgiveness (or “mere” 
forgiveness), I mean continuing relating to a wrongdoer without enacting or seeking to 
enact any punishment or withholding of goods, either as a preventative or punitive 
measure. In the case of spousal abuse, forgoing such actions as physically resisting, 
calling the police, or moving out, would count as passively suffering and forgiving; in the 
case of American slavery and its legacy, it would mean simply bearing this evil and its ill 
effects without resistance, and forgoing the pursuit of reparations once they are ended. By 
the term “forgive,” then, I do not mean to include any particular emotional state, but just 
a state of affairs in which no consequences are imposed on the wrongdoer and the 




I. The Critique 
Now, how exactly are satisfaction accounts of atonement supposed to support 
passive suffering of abuse or oppression? Theologians often take the connection to be 
well-established, so that one can find statements like James Poling’s: “. . . certain 
interpretations of the cross clearly create the occasion for sexual and physical abuse of 
women and children . . .” According to research Poling cites, “[s]urvivors of abuse are 
saying that an abusive God and an abusive clergyman do not contradict the church’s 
theology.”207 Many survivors of abuse learn from their churches that “[y]ou must 
sacrifice your own needs and wants, you mustn’t resist, mustn’t stand up for yourself . . 
.”208 But why does this practical inference follow from certain accounts of the atonement? 
Perhaps because, as Kathryn Tanner says, “In many [such models of atonement], one 
suspects God derives pleasure or satisfaction from death and suffering.”209 Marit Trelstad 
summarizes the critique I am describing this way:  
Feminist critiques of the cross image and atonement theories coordinate in 
four major issues. First, glorifying the cross potentially treats suffering as 
though it is God-given and inevitable. . . . Second, it valorizes passive 
suffering as redemptive. Third, the weight of ‘redemptive’ suffering is 
borne primarily by the oppressed and disadvantaged, and it is promoted 
and preached most often by those who stand to benefit from the suffering 
of others. Finally, it may lead to a human neglect of our individual and 
collective responsibility to end suffering and hold perpetrators of violence 
accountable. . . . Jesus’ vicarious suffering becomes critiqued as an 
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appropriate theological or anthropological model since it could disable 
one’s own ability or confidence to stand up to oppression.210 
Many other similar quotations could be adduced, but this is enough to see the 
basic shape of the critique. The assumption seems to be that whatever it is Jesus does to 
save according to an account of the atonement implies something about the character of 
God and about the kind of behavior that God values in human beings. These implications 
are then applied to particular kinds of cases. When such application turns out to be 
harmful and morally repugnant, then, we ought to reject the account of the atonement on 
which the application is based—and, in the case of ‘traditional’ accounts, they have the 
harmful and morally repugnant application that women and other marginalized or 
oppressed people should continue passively in their oppression rather than actively 
resisting. 
The details of this critique are spelled out in different terms in the work of 
different thinkers operating from distinct critical perspectives, but the crux of the issue 
seems to be that we are “saved by what should not happen.”211 It appears that by saving 
through the means of unjust suffering, that satisfaction accounts entails that God 
approves of the unjust suffering (however this is unpacked), which by definition should 
not happen. For instance, Delores S. Williams develops the concept of surrogacy (both 
voluntary and involuntary) as a particular experience of black women in the context of 
the American South, both in the antebellum and postbellum periods. She then identifies 
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Christ in traditional accounts of atonement as the ultimate surrogate, providing a sort of 
divine sanction to way black women are placed in surrogate roles, and thus hindering 
possibilities for resistance.212 Rita Nakashima Brock argues that Anselm’s theology in 
particular justified torture and imperialistic violence.213 As Lisa Sowle Cahill puts it, to 
such critics, any account like ours here “sets up violence as divinely sanctioned and 
encourages human beings to imitate or submit to it.”214 S. Mark Heim echoes this critique 
as well:  
In exalting Christ’s death, do we not glorify innocent suffering and 
encourage people to passively accept roles as surrogate sufferers for 
others, ‘in imitation of Christ?’ What earthy despot would not be glad to 
have the weak and oppressed adopt this as their spiritual ideal? By making 
the cross God’s recipe for salvation, do we validate violence as a divine 
way of doing business?215 
Rather than engage these various ways of articulating the critique in question 
individually, here I want to offer a set of general premises meant to capture its logical 
shape. These premises are not an exegesis of any text in particular, but hopefully they do 
justice to an underlying way of reasoning that is applied in diverse ways. I have put these 
theses in the language of satisfaction accounts of the atonement, so that I can then 
consider whether the critique hits home specifically with respect to them, without 
deciding whether it succeeds in other cases. As we have seen, the form of the critique 
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hinges first on a certain account of the atonement, and then on inferences which 
generalize from there, and finally on an apparent analogy between the case of the person 
being abused or oppressed and the work of Christ in the atonement.  
One final qualification is in order before we proceed further. Many of the authors 
who articulate versions of the critique we are considering here are interested at least as 
much in how religious people have applied traditional accounts of atonement to cases of 
injustice oppression—how such accounts have been used, and what they appear to 
encourage, practically speaking—as they are in the question of whether these applications 
are actually justified by these accounts of atonement. Without denying the importance of 
the former concern, or contesting the historical claims involved in it, I am focusing here 
on the latter. That is, granting that people have appealed to the sort of interpretation of 
Christ’s saving work I have offered here in order to justify what is unjust, I am concerned 
with whether they have done so correctly. I am concerned not with what pastors have in 
fact said to those suffering unjustly based on satisfaction accounts of atonement, but with 
what pastors ought to say to them if our satisfaction account is true. I will present an 
alternative account of what our satisfaction account of atonement entails for these cases, 
one which suggests it can be used to resist oppression and articulate a demand for justice.  
We can now move to the basic premises that seem to make for the analogy under 
critique. It seems that satisfaction accounts of atonement, among others, hold the 
following about Christ216 (C-propositions): 
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(C1) Christ’s passive suffering and forgiveness of undeserved violence is 
meritorious. 
(C2) The merit so produced can be transferred to others so as to satisfy for 
their sins, including those who inflicted the violence directly. 
(C3) Christ’s passive suffering and forgiveness of undeserved violence 
was God’s will for him.  
From these, we can then infer some general (G) propositions:  
(G1) Passive suffering and forgiveness of violence is possibly meritorious.  
(G2) This merit can possibly satisfy for the sins of others, even those who 
inflict the suffering.  
(G3) Passive suffering undeserved violence is possibly God’s will for a 
person.  
 And, specifically, in the case of a person undergoing abuse by spouse, an analogy 
is taken to apply as expressed in these case-specific (CS) propositions:  
(CS1) Undergoing spousal abuse passively and forgiving is meritorious.  
(CS2) The merit so produced can satisfy for sins, even perhaps the sin of 
the abuser. 
(CS3) Passively suffering and forgiving in a particular case is willed by 
God.  
What we have, then, is a movement from the work of Christ (what I have called C 
propositions) to more general claims about God’s attitude towards suffering (G 
propositions), and finally to the particular case of a person suffering unjustly (CS 
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propositions).217 This movement is encapsulated neatly in the advice which pastors are 
reported to give to suffering persons: “This is just your cross to bear.” In this one 
sentence, uttered in a context where the account of the atonement which undergirds it and 
provides its meaning is ubiquitous, the person suffering spousal abuse or oppression is 
advised to undergo their suffering passively and forgive, for doing so will make them like 
Christ and thus will be meritorious and pleasing to God. It follows then that any active 
steps to end or alleviate the suffering will amount to a deviation from God’s plan and 
perhaps a failure to behave in a Christ-like way towards the abusive spouse.  
Surely, many Christians who are otherwise sympathetic to satisfaction accounts of 
the atonement can agree that such a blanket recommendation is problematic and would 
reject the implication that persons undergoing spousal abuse in general ought to suffer it 
passively. Are they being inconsistent? Drawing on the satisfaction account have 
developed in the previous chapters, I will argue here that that they need not be. In fact, I 
will argue that the opposite is true: a satisfaction account of atonement implies that 
wrongdoers should be required to make satisfaction to the one wronged or otherwise be 
punished.    
II. Developing a Response: Does the Analogy Hold? 
In response to the chain of reasoning involved in the critique we are considering, 
the first thing one might observe is that while set G seems to follow from set C, set CS 
does not necessarily follow from either set C or G. Just given that certain things hold in 
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the case of the work of Christ does not imply that they must hold in some other case. 
Indeed, C and G are compatible with the possibility that the Cross is the only case in 
which passive suffering happens to be meritorious or willed by God. In other words, the 
analogy between Christ and any given passive sufferer may not hold. In the case of 
spousal abuse, it could be (as I will argue in due course) that the proper analogy is not 
with Christ as satisfier, but with God as wronged person—implying not that victims 
should passively suffer and forgive, but instead that they (and any who provide such 
sufferers with pastoral or moral care) should, however possible, insist on an act of 
satisfaction or else punishment.218 
The question of whether any instance of passive suffering is like Christ in the 
relevant ways will require a more detailed account of the conditions that make Christ’s 
passive suffering meritorious, so that we can say something about the range of cases in 
which affirming C and G would require affirming CS. In order to determine which 
analogy holds, we will turn back to our account of satisfaction in order to consider when 
satisfaction is appropriate, what its purpose is, and what are the conditions for a 
successful act of satisfaction. We need to consider, therefore, what the account of 
atonement we have developed in this project suggests; this will enable us to modify our 
inferential chain, qualifying it so as to clarify when an inference from C and G to CS 
would be appropriate. Applying this set of conditions to the case of ongoing spousal 
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abuse will make it clear that passively suffering and forgiving in such a case will not turn 
out to lead to satisfaction.  
The Purpose and Conditions of Satisfaction 
Let us briefly recall some central features of our account of satisfaction. The 
purpose of satisfaction is the restoration (or perhaps the establishment for the first time) 
of friendship; it is called for when there is a rupture between one party and another 
caused by injustice. Friendship is a union between persons that has most fundamentally to 
do with the will: friends share a common end or love which they come to love in one 
another, and both the love of the end of the good will of the other orients each one 
towards the common acts which embody friendship. In a friendship between just persons, 
the most fundamental shared end of their wills must be justice, or, said differently, God. 
Understood this way, injustice is contrary to friendship because it involves a break in this 
union; the one carrying out the injustice fails to love the other one in the appropriate way. 
Even if the friend who is treated unjustly simply consents to the injustice, her intrinsic 
dignity and honor is still not properly upheld. Even if there is union between their wills, it 
would not be a union in justice, and thus such friends are not properly oriented towards 
their true end.  
The most fundamental part of satisfaction, then, is the will. Satisfaction must be 
voluntary; if one does not will to set right the injustice one previously willed, then there 
is still no union of wills in justice and truth. In the absence of a will to set things right, 
one simply merits punishment. Even if one makes restitution, to do so unwillingly 
(perhaps to avoid some worse consequence) would turn the act of restitution into 




willingly as a way of making restitution can count as satisfaction. If the will remains 
unjust, moreover, friendship—union of wills—is not restored. On our account, Christ 
makes satisfaction for the sins of others, but ultimately believers must participate in this 
satisfaction by their mind and will; those who do not come to know the truth about their 
sin and will along with Christ’s will to set it right out of love for God do not share in his 
satisfaction. God requires satisfaction not out of an abstract sort of justice, but out of the 
immutability of His intentions in creating human persons, and out of His wisdom by 
which He selects the most suitable means to bring them to fulfill those His intentions. 
That is, satisfaction is required by the fact that God still graciously intends the same 
relationship to Him for which He made humans to begin with, namely friendship. 
Christ’s satisfaction on our behalf, then, is not an exchange disconnected from us that 
saves us independent of our actually coming to be friends of God; it is, rather, the means 
of establishing us as friends of God who were once enemies, and of restoring us to that 
friendship. Satisfaction thus embodies and enacts the love of God that friendship with 
Him entails in the context of human sin. It works by objectively rendering to God His 
due, but likewise subjectively by showing sinful humans how much God loves them and 
how much they ought to love Him, as well as inspiring them to do so, and meriting the 
grace by which they might do so on their behalf.  
Understanding satisfaction this way points us back to the pedagogical aspect of 
satisfaction. To some degree, any assigned act of satisfaction teaches the unjust one what 
he ought to will: it expresses and enacts a claim (at the very least) about the gravity of the 
wrong done, what the cost of setting it right is, and thus it may install a sense of how 




positive claim about what the dignity of the one wronged called for in the first place. This 
pedagogical function explains why those with moral or legal authority to require or 
legislate or simply encourage acts of satisfaction have to consider both the objective 
requirements of justice and the subjective efficacy of the acts of satisfaction they assign. 
A particular act of satisfaction is more wisely assigned the more apt it is to habituate the 
mind and will of the wrongdoer into thinking and acting justly in the future. One point 
follows from this that will be important later: satisfaction needs to be fitting to the 
particular wrong done at a subjective as well as objective level. That is, it should be 
pedagogically fitted to the particular deformation of mind and will involved in the 
specific sort of injustice committed.  
Relatedly, the pedagogical function of satisfaction, as well as its end of repairing 
a union of wills, helps to show how (and when) one friend can satisfy for another: when 
the act of satisfaction makes some degree of objective restitution to the one wronged, and 
when the will of the one who committed the wrong is joined to the satisfier in the act of 
satisfaction. Perhaps this is only appropriate when the one who owes satisfaction lacks 
the means to make it—this is certainly true, on our account, in the case of Christ’s 
satisfaction on behalf of sinful humanity. In any case, satisfying for another is only 
possible at all because an act of satisfaction carried out on one’s behalf can still fulfill 
both the objective and subjective sides of satisfaction: it can provide objective restitution 
to repair the injustice, and it can embody justice in such a way as to habituate the mind 
and will of the wrongdoer into truth and justice, and thus restore unity of wills.  
On the other hand, we may well wonder how one can make satisfaction for 




Passion satisfy specifically for the act of crucifying him? Satisfaction involves offering 
something of value to the person wronged. How could Christ’s murder constitute a gift to 
Christ? The answer to this marks something utterly unique about Christ’s saving work, 
and unlike other acts of satisfaction: the person who is the human being Jesus is also the 
God to whom Christ’s offering of faithfulness is directed. The one making the offering is 
also the one to whom the offering is given. It will not usually be the case that a victim’s 
unjust suffering can count as satisfaction for someone who inflicts that suffering, since 
that suffering is not gift of value to the one suffering. This is true by definition, it would 
seem, since anything which is truly a gift valued by the person to whom it is given will 
not be an injustice inflicted on that person; if it is an injustice inflicted, then it would be 
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Implications for the Analogy 
Drawing on our satisfaction account, we have observed two relevant points about 
the concept of satisfaction they applied to the atonement. (1) The purpose of satisfaction 
is to reunite the wills of wrongdoer and the one wronged in truth and justice, enabling a 
just reconciliation so that the parties can live in peace and concord of wills. (2) Given this 
purpose, satisfaction requires an acceptance of the truth and a consequent movement of 
the will on the part of the wrong-doer. Satisfaction can be made by someone other than 
the wrong-doer, but only if this movement of the will takes place in the wrong-doer—
only if the wrong-doer aligns his will with the satisfier, and thus also with the one 
wronged. In addition to this, we may now see a third point: suffering in itself, if it does 
not conduce to the achievement of this restorative purpose, is not meritorious or 
satisfactory. We must, on this view, admit that suffering in the pursuit of this end is 
praiseworthy—but, relevant to the critique we are considering, such suffering certainly 
cannot produce satisfaction unless it is part of an act that comes from the right kind of 
movement of the will (that is, one oriented towards a good end, and not towards the 
suffering for its own sake), and unless the wrong-doer’s will is aligned with that 
movement.     
With these points in hand, we are now in a position to reconsider and qualify our 
C and G propositions. First, consider the propositions about Christ: 
(C1) Christ’s passive suffering and forgiveness of undeserved violence is 
meritorious. 
(C2) The merit so produced can be transferred to others so as to satisfy for 
their sins, including those who inflicted the violence directly. 
(C3) Christ’s passive suffering and forgiveness of undeserved violence 




On our satisfaction account, we can now see passive suffering is not inherently 
valuable or meritorious, nor are the unjust wills and actions of those who inflicted that 
suffering on him; instead, suffering towards a good end and motivated by a just will is 
meritorious. Second, the merit produced by Christ’s offering of himself can apply to 
others only on the condition that they are united to his self-offering via their will. Third, 
since inflicting suffering on an innocent is evil, God cannot possibly have willed that 
simply. Instead, on this account, God willed the good end for which Christ suffered as 
well as his faithfulness in pursuit of that end even unto death. For Anselm, then, the merit 
does not come from what should not happen (the unjust suffering), but by the love and 
faithfulness out of which Christ was willing to undergo even what he did not deserve to 
undergo.    
So, our new, qualified C propositions will be: 
(C4) Christ’s passive suffering and forgiveness of undeserved violence 
towards a good end and motivated by a just will is meritorious. 
(C5) The merit so produced can be transferred to others so as to satisfy for 
their sins, including those who inflicted the violence directly on the 
condition that they are united to his self-offering via their will.  
(C6) The good end for which Christ suffered, the good will out of which 
he suffered it, and the faithfulness with which he suffered, was God’s will. 
In addition, we can add a condition of success for satisfaction; this will help 
clarify what the good end is, and from there we can think about what it means for 
suffering to be “for” that end: 
(C7) satisfaction has been made successfully if and only if the will of the 
sinner is restored to unity in truth and justice with the will of God. 




(G4) Passive suffering and forgiveness of undeserved violence can be 
meritorious if it is for a good end and motivated by a just will.220  
(G5) This merit can satisfy for a wrong committed by another, even those 
who inflict the suffering, if those others are united in will to the person 
who suffered, and if the suffering in some way constitutes a gift of 
appropriate value to the one wronged.  
(G6) The end of just renewal of friendship between a wrongdoer and a 
wronged person is sometimes God’s will, and therefore the will to pursue 
that end in the face of suffering may be God’s will for a person.  
(G7) Satisfaction has been made successfully if and only if the will of the 
wrongdoer is restored to unity in truth and justice with the will of the 
wronged person.  
How should we think about the relationship between the success condition of G7 
and the “for” and “end” clauses of G4-6? Minimally, I propose, if one is aware that an act 
cannot possibly contribute to the achievement of an end, then one cannot perform that act 
“for” that end, nor can one recommend it for that end. It probably would not make sense 
to require certainty or even knowledge that the success condition will actually be 
achieved—sometimes, surely, we ought to be willing to suffer towards an end that has 
low odds of success. Even so, it seems plausible that one must at least be in a position to 
think that an act is of the sort that it could possibly contribute to the achievement of an 
end in order to choose it for that end. So, finally, we can add: 
(G8) An act can be considered for the end of satisfaction if it can possibly 
contribute to the achievement of satisfaction and is intended for that end. 
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Application to the Case of Spousal Abuse 
We are now in a position to consider the case of spousal abuse. Can passively 
suffering and forgiving ongoing abuse ever be analogous to Christ’s act of satisfaction as 
we unpacked it above—that is, can it fulfill the conditions in G4-G8? It seems that 
abused persons do sometimes passively undergo abuse because they believe this to be the 
best path to reconciliation—perhaps some believe they deserve it or that passively 
undergoing the abuse and forgiving will eventually move the abuser to love them. But 
what we are interested in here is whether or not such a course of action actually can be 
recommended as an act of satisfaction by analogy with Christ’s act of satisfaction as 
understood above, and therefore whether such a course really ought to be recommended 
if our account is true. 
A brief analysis shows that passively suffering ongoing abuse cannot produce 
satisfaction for the abuse itself so as to reconcile the abused and the abuser: as long as 
abuse is ongoing, it is clear that the wills of the two parties are not restored to unity, or if 
they are, this unity is not in truth and justice. The wrong that is done against the dignity 
of the abused person needs to be redressed, both in will and in action, but, even if the 
abused spouse undergoes the violence willingly with the good of the abuser in mind, that 
violence cannot constitute a good for the victim. Indeed, even if the abuse stops and the 
former abuser does not sin any further against the dignity of the victim, a satisfaction 
account will imply that some further good ought to be required of the abuser in order to 
satisfy for the damage already done, whether we take an Anselmian view according to 
which it would be necessary, or a Thomistic view according to which it may usually be 




than the person who committed the abuse to aid in the act of satisfaction—even the 
victim herself. But the act which constitutes satisfaction must be a good for the victim. It 
is, therefore, hard to imagine how the passive suffering of the very abuse which requires 
satisfaction could turn out to be satisfactory.  
Therefore, passive suffering and forgiveness of abuse within a marriage should 
not be recommended on analogy with Christ’s act of satisfaction, either to preserve the 
marriage or simply for the sake of imitating Christ. In fact, quite the opposite; a 
satisfaction account provides a reason for a victim or anyone pastorally responsible for a 
victim to insist that the abuse must stop, since ongoing abuse will show that the wills of 
the abuser and the victim are still at odds, or at odds with justice, and the wrongdoer, or 
someone appropriately related to the wrongdoer, should do (or will to do) something 
beyond simply stopping the abuse. Even if there is no reason to think further abuse will 
occur, a satisfaction account does not recommend mere forgiveness, for this would not 
adequately respect the honor of the one who was abused, nor will the will of the 
wrongdoer be just if it does not will to do something in the opposite direction of what it 
willed before—that is, if it does not will to make satisfaction.  So, far from 
recommending passive suffering and forgiveness, the satisfaction account given above 
will actually lean against it rather strongly.221 In other words, one might suggest, if there 
                                                 
221 One might suppose, however, that since Christ has satisfied for all sin, that human beings included 
abused spouses ought to forgive one another on Christ’s account. But, for one thing, ongoing abuse would 
signal that the wrongdoer has not become united to Christ’s act in any case. But moreover, the right way to 
understand Christ’s act of satisfaction is that, as an offering to God, it merits forgiveness from God. It does 
not seem undo debts between human persons or institutions, otherwise it would have the result that 
criminals in general now ought to be forgiven so long as they repent. In fact, on the account offered by 
Aquinas, satisfaction still needs to be made between human beings. Indeed, human beings still need to 




is an appropriate analogy here, it is between the victim of abuse and God as wronged 
person rather than between the victim and Christ as satisfier.  
Note that we have not discarded the view that suffering can be meritorious when 
aimed at a good end. What, we may ask, if one suffers (rather than pursuing the justice 
one could demand, and which, we have suggested, one ought to demand) to preserve the 
peace of a household and a family? Surely this is the sort of good end for which one 
ought to be willing to endure some cost. Here, Thomas’s understanding of justice within 
friendship is helpful. Marriage can be thought of as a form of friendship, the kind of 
concord of wills that inclines the friends towards common acts in pursuit of a common 
good, and towards delight in each other’s good will. But spousal abuse constitutes a break 
in this concord; the abusive spouse has failed to will the other’s good—and the good of 
one’s spouse would seem to be included in a special way in the end towards which the 
friendship of marriage is oriented.  
When this severe sort of break has occurred, or (even worse) when it occurs 
habitually, the friendship cannot be upheld by forbearance. The peace which would be 
upheld this way is a false peace—a peace built on injustice. It is the sort of peace which 
ought to be disturbed so that true peace might possibly arise. Indeed, from this 
perspective we can see that allowing the abuse to continue will not even be good for the 
abuser—not truly. If compassion might motivate an abused spouse to forgo any pursuit of 
justice, she ought to be reminded that God’s good and compassionate will towards us 
expressed in the work of Christ is a will that never stops expecting us to be just, to be, in 
whatever sense creatures can, worthy of friendship with Him, even as He provides the 




making satisfaction, but we can imitate God at least in holding out hope for true justice 
and true peace. We do not necessarily do each other any favors, though, by settling for 
such grave injustice from those we love most. Out of love, then, we should expect that 
those whom we care about and hope to build genuine friendships with will desire and 
work to make satisfaction for serious wrongs they commit.  
We should recall here that, in considering what sort of satisfaction to require, we 
must aim at pedagogical efficacy, and this requires attending to the details of the habitual 
deformation of the mind and will involved in the particular injustice committed. There 
are wrongs for which a sincere apology might be an appropriate satisfaction. Perhaps this 
is the case when the wrong involves only the kind of intellectual and volitional errors that 
are easily set right once understood consciously. But it seems highly unlikely that spousal 
abuse is this sort of wrong. On the contrary, it seems that abusers may feel and express 
deep sorrow in one moment but still commit the same injustice again in another 
moment.222 If this is so, it would suggest that one who commits spousal abuse very likely 
suffers from deeper habitual deformations of the mind and will—deformations which 
would take much more than an emotionally sincere apology to repair. The appropriate act 
of satisfaction might well be more long term in nature, perhaps even indefinite. In any 
case, assigning a proper act of satisfaction to an abuser would involve judgments about 
what sort of act might express and teach the movement of the will the abuser needs to 
make, which will likely require detailed knowledge of the particular case as well as of the 
psychology of abuse more generally.    
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Application to the Case of Slavery and Reparations 
 Another case where contemporary critics argue satisfaction accounts support 
oppression and undermine resistance is that of American slavery. Like in the case of 
women who suffer spousal abuse, the message satisfaction accounts are alleged to have 
conveyed, and to continue to convey, to black American Christians who suffered under 
slavery, Jim Crow, and other racial injustices, is that all of this is simply their cross to 
bear, and they should accept it without resisting or seeking justice. Here, I suggest that, 
on the contrary, our satisfaction provides a conceptual framework within which a demand 
for justice can be expressed with great force for those who hold such an account to be 
true. To show this, we can consider one form in which the demand for justice for victims 
of slavery and its legacy has been put forth, namely the call for reparations.  
 Before proceeding, some qualifications are in order. I will not offer an argument 
that, all things considered, the government of the United States should take any particular 
course of action, such as offering some form of reparations to the descendants of slaves, 
or that Christians ought to advocate for any such policy. To do that would require 
consideration and analysis of many historical and legal arguments which go well beyond 
the scope of this dissertation (not to mention the competence of its author). Instead, I 
simply want to draw attention to the shape of one such argument and how it can be 
bolstered and illuminated by our account of atonement. In particular, I will consider the 
line of argument presented by Ta Nehisi Coates in his widely discussed article, “The 
Case for Reparations.”223 I argue that the form of Coates’s argument resonates with a 
                                                 






satisfaction approach to justice and reconciliation. This analysis will show, again, that a 
satisfaction account of atonement can be useful for analyzing cases of injustice and 
oppression, and provide language and conceptual tools for thinking about what is 
required to set things right, and why it is required. If my analysis is correct, it will not 
necessarily entail that a policy of reparations is obligatory or best—that would depend on 
the historical details of Coates’s case being essentially correct, and it would also depend 
on difficult judicial, legislative, and political judgments that cannot be pursued here.224 It 
will mean, however, that those who call for such measures can appeal to the atonement 
theology developed in this project in order to argue their case—and, conversely, that this 
account of atonement provides reasons for those who hold a satisfaction account of 
atonement to consider carefully the question of how to address the set of injustices to 
which some propose reparations as a form of redress. It would follow, then, that a 
satisfaction account of atonement does not have the implication that injustice or 
oppression should be accepted passively in this case; quite the opposite. Slavery and its 
                                                 
224 Take, for instance, the historical question of what role slavery played in the development of the 
American economy. There is a growing body of research among historians (including but not limited to that 
cited by Coates) arguing that slavery and the effect it had on the cotton trade was essential to the rise of 
capitalism and the Industrial Revolution, and played a pivotal role in making America wealthy, particularly 
through a competitive  (see, for instance, Edward E. Baptist, The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and 
the Making of American Capitalism, Reprint edition (New York: Basic Books, 2016), Sven Beckert and 
Seth Rockman, eds., Slavery’s Capitalism: A New History of American Economic Development 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), and Eric J. Hobsbawm and Chris Wrigley, Industry 
and Empire: From 1750 to the Present Day (The New Press, 1999). On the other hand, economic historians 
have challenged this account, arguing that slavery did not play such a pivotal role (see, for example, John 
E. Murray et al., “Roundtable of Reviews for The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of 
American Capitalism by Edward E. Baptist,” The Journal of Economic History 75, no. 3 (September 2015): 
919–31. Now, of course slavery would be a grievous wrong whatever economic impact it turned out to 
have, but, for reasons that will become clear as we proceed, Coates nonetheless seems to think the fact (as 
he sees it) that it did lead to great wealth entitles the descendants of slaves to more than what they would be 
entitled to otherwise, since it would seem that slavery would constitute a greater theft the more valuable 
slave labor turned out to be. This is just one point at which the argument Coates makes can be contested. It 
is, therefore, well beyond the scope of this chapter to take any particular stance on his—instead, I am 




legacy can be understood as injustices calling for satisfaction, and reparations as one 
possible form that satisfaction might take.  
 Now, let us consider Coates’s case and see what the concept of satisfaction I have 
sketched here might suggest about it. For much of his essay, Coates traces a history of the 
economic supremacy of white people in America. The institution of slavery holds a 
significant and foundational place in this history as Coates tells it. According to research 
he cites, in the antebellum period, cotton produced by slave labor accounted for 59 
percent of American exports, and slaves themselves “were the single largest . . . financial 
asset of property in the entire American economy.”225 On Coates’s telling, the 
foundational historical injustice is this: vast wealth was thus created by the forced labor 
of slaves, extracted through horrific violence, as well as the sundering of their families 
and the theft and sale of their children.  
The injustice Coates identifies, however, does not end with emancipation. It 
continues on in the political and economic marginalization of blacks under Jim Crow and 
segregation, and then to discriminatory policies enacted by the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) as well as real estate associations, banks, and other lending 
institutions. “Discrimatory laws,” he says, “joined the equal burden of citizenship to 
unequal distribution of its bounty.”226 The overall effect has been to produce and 
maintain a “wealth gap” between black families and white families. The policy of 
redlining by the FHA is a particularly striking example; while the FHA enabled white 
neighborhoods to grow and develop, essentially funneling public money into them to 
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subsidize home ownership, it considered any neighborhood in which blacks or foreigners 
lived to be unfit. Loans for homes in those neighborhoods usually could not receive FHA 
backing. This discrimination in the housing market paved the way for predatory lenders 
to take advantage of black families, who could not get legitimate loans even if they had 
decent income. By tracing individual stories as well as providing broader historical 
context and data, Coates provides a compelling argument that the policies which enabled 
white families to achieve greater levels of prosperity systematically excluded black 
families. 
 Coates draws attention to the role all of this unjustly accumulated and distributed 
wealth played in enabling the realization of core American ideals (disproportionately for 
whites), such as autonomy, independence, and prosperity (expressed especially, perhaps, 
through home ownership). These are ideals which seem to have moral freight for 
Americans. They are pieces of a broadly shared vision of the good life, the sort of good 
which our founding documents and laws and policies seem to proclaim that people ought 
to have, or at least they ought to be able to have them. For these goods to be realized and 
preserved for one segment of the population by systematically denying them to another 
seems to be a serious injustice, not just between one citizen and another, or one group and 
another group, but of the body politic, the nation as such, towards the marginalized 
group. For this historically extended injustice, Coates argues the US government itself 
ought to pursue reparations, specifically through an act of Congress empowering a 
commission to study the damage done to black Americans through this whole history of 




comprehensively, we would be in a position to consider what possible reparation could be 
made.  
 What Coates is calling for is, in other words, an act of satisfaction. He is 
attempting to identify a grave injustice which has not been righted. Slavery was ended, 
and this is good, but its full gravity was not publicly recognized. Or, if it was, the truth of 
that gravity was not manifested in an appropriate act of satisfaction. The result has been a 
situation of deeply embedded moral incoherence. The story we tell ourselves about our 
values does not fit with the reality of our history. Once we recognize the truth, however, 
we must see that an act of satisfaction is called for; satisfaction would then make possible 
a just reconciliation. This idea of coming to admit the truth is a central feature of Coates’ 
argument. He equates reparations with  
the full acceptance of our collective biography and its consequences . . . 
the price we must pay to see ourselves squarely . . . an airing of family 
secrets, a settling with old ghosts . . . a healing of the American psyche 
and the banishment of white guilt . . . a national reckoning that would lead 
to spiritual renewal . . . a revolution of the American consciousness, a 
reconciling of our self-image as the great democratizer with the facts of 
our history.227 
Of course, it seems likely that a full accounting might reveal to us that no 
adequate satisfaction is possible. Coates admits as much. Even so, he insists,  
wrestling publicly with these questions matters as much as—if not more 
than—the specific answers that might be produced. An America that asks 
what it owes its most vulnerable citizens is improved and humane. An 
America that looks away is ignoring not just the sins of the past but the 
sins of the present and the certain sins of the future. More important than 
any single check cut to any African American, the payment of reparations 
would represent America’s maturation out of the childhood myth of its 
innocence into a wisdom worthy of its founders.228 







Critics of the idea of reparations, of course, remain skeptical at various points, and 
perhaps rightly so. Even given the accuracy of Coates’s historical narrative, they may 
wonder why it was not enough simply to end slavery. Or, they may wonder how a failure 
to do justice to freed slaves should have any bearing on their descendants, why the sins of 
the past have bearing on the present. They may wonder why or how the different 
injustices Coates traces through different eras are connected such that their damage 
should be counted together, and a single act of satisfaction should be offered as a redress. 
They may wonder how it could help matters to discover that no amount could possibly be 
considered adequate as satisfaction. They may also have important practical concerns: 
can reparations be made in this case without being made in many other cases? Can it 
feasible economically? Would such a transfer of wealth at the expense of taxpayers not 
greatly increase racial tensions? Coates makes his own attempts to answer these 
questions, as have other advocates of reparations, but adjudicating them decisively is 
beyond the scope of this project. I simply want to note here that a satisfaction account of 
Christ’s atoning work provides us with some things to say about some of these issues, 
even if it cannot provide enough to settle the matter.  
According to the Anselmian account of atonement we have developed here, our 
first parents put us in a situation of moral disorder and debt towards God. If this is so, it 
would appear that past injustices, carried out by people long dead, may need to be set 
right in the present. After all, according to our account of atonement, an ancient, original 
sin plays a crucial (though not exhaustive) role in explaining the current status of the 
human family before God, and, indeed, the proclivity of individual humans towards sin. 




and that the mere passage of time does not erase or put an end to the moral damage that is 
done by injustice. 
The pedagogical aspect of the need for satisfaction helps illuminate this further. A 
community’s response to an injustice expresses a moral valuation of that injustice; a 
failure to make or require satisfaction expresses a false moral valuation. Those who 
accept this false moral valuation will be more inclined to commit similar injustices. The 
history Coates tells illustrates this process: a nation which grew prosperous in a grossly 
unjust way owed something to the segment of its citizens of whom it took violent 
advantage. When it failed to make good on this debt, the nation thereby expressed an 
overall moral judgment. Slavery was ended, but the great disparity in wealth and political 
status was allowed to continue—affirmed, in effect, as natural and just. It would not be 
surprising, then, if, even though slavery itself was ended, the project of establishing and 
maintaining a “wealth gap” continued in various ways. The particular means of slavery 
had to be discarded, but its results had to be protected as if they were just. The 
satisfaction account we have developed suggests that a full and true accounting of the 
gravity of that wrong will be needed, or at least more naturally conducive, to set all of 
this right, and enable genuine friendship between the wronged people and the 
government of the nation who wronged their ancestors, as well as those who have 
benefited to greater or lesser degrees from that wrong.  
We have seen that the aim of satisfaction is the restoration or establishment of 
friendship, but would an act of reparation achieve this? Certainly it must be said that 
governments cannot effectively force parties at odds with one another to become friends. 




which friendship is genuinely possible between the various groups of its citizens. 
Performing an imposed act of satisfaction does not, of course, entail that the one carrying 
it out truly wills justly towards the wronged party, nor that the wronged party will now 
welcome the former wrongdoer in friendship. Even so, once justice is established, the 
possibility of friendship is greater than it was before. At the very least, an imposed act of 
satisfaction expresses a kind of call to the wrongdoer to repent, along with guidance 
regarding how to do so, along with an opportunity for the wronged party to forgive with 
dignity. Even if such acts are not strictly necessary, it is often the case that they are the 
most conducive towards friendship.  
What follows, however, if satisfaction cannot be made? On an Anselmian 
account, of course, we appeal to Christ’s infinitely valuable self-offering to make it 
possible for us to become just before God. The infinitely valuable gift of Christ—at one 
and the same time God’s gift to humanity and humanity’s gift to God—may well enable 
Christians to forgive each other on Christ’s behalf beyond what would be possible 
outside of the order of grace. Perhaps a nation as deeply fractured by injustice as the 
United States must, ultimately, look to God’s just mercy for any chance of genuine 
reconciliation and healing. Still, it must be said, this hope does not excuse us from doing 
what is possible. The just soul will desire to make satisfaction; if full satisfaction is 
impossible (or, perhaps, if it is not possible without incurring worse evils), then surely we 
must do whatever is possible, and only then appeal to Christ to make up what we lack. 
Satisfaction may not require objective equality with the wrong when it is not possible, but 





III. Satisfaction as a Resource for Responding to Injustice 
 In both of the cases we have considered, a satisfaction account of Christ’s work 
provides a powerful set of concepts to which Christians might appeal in order to advocate 
for justice to those who have been wronged. We have not done away with the idea that 
suffering can, at least when unavoidable or when it is for a morally compelling purpose, 
unite one to the sufferings of Christ—but this idea has deep roots in Christian thought 
and spirituality (to say nothing of its roots in the New Testament), and there are other 
reasons why it does not seem desirable to discard this idea entirely. After all, if 
oppressors and despots would find it beneficial for their victims to see passive suffering 
as praiseworthy because it makes them like Christ, then surely those despots would also 
benefit if their victims believed that all suffering, even for the sake of justice, should 
always be avoided, and is never praiseworthy or Christ-like.  
We have tried, instead, to develop an account that allows us to maintain a difficult 
tension. On the one hand, unjust suffering calls for justice and is not valuable for its own 
sake—indeed, we might more accurately say that it is of negative value. On the other 
hand, suffering can be borne for the sake of justice in a beautiful and praiseworthy way—
and, precisely as beautiful and praiseworthy, such suffering for the sake of justice can 
provide for positive value required to set right an injustice. It is the latter, and not the 
former, which we attribute to Christ, and which we are called to imitate. While such a 
message can certainly be twisted to ill purpose, the abuse of this principle does not negate 
its proper use. And, if it provides comfort to despots that they might suppress resistance 
by enjoining their victims to imitate Christ, it ought to trouble them to that imitators of 




Moreover, in both cases, we can see how a satisfaction account of atonement 
provides a conceptual basis for victims of injustice to articulate a demand for justice from 
those who have wronged them. The basis of such a demand would include the victims’ 
own dignity, which has its part to play within the moral beauty and integrity of their 
larger communities and indeed the universe as a whole. It would also include the true and 
proper dignity of the ones who wronged them: satisfaction is the way to restore justice to 
both, albeit in different modes. In our satisfaction account of atonement, even though in 
the Christ God bears the cost of setting things right, He does it in such a way that the 
payment is truly offered by the ones who need to pay it, since they join their wills to 
Christ the satisfier. God provides for satisfaction rather than simply forgive and passively 
bear the injustice of human sin precisely because it is better that justice be done towards 
God’s honor. On the other hand, God provides for satisfaction rather than simply 
punishing, because satisfaction restores the wrongdoers to their proper dignity as well. 
So, our account provides a way for victims of injustice to call for justice, and to do so 
while also maintaining a Christ-like concern for the good of those who wronged them.  
 Returning to our earlier summaries of the critiques leveled against ‘traditional’ 
atonement theology, we can now ask, do these critiques apply to our satisfaction account? 
Does this account “treat suffering as though it is God-given and inevitable”? No; it 
presents suffering in general as the result of sin; it does (realistically, it seems) take for 
granted that sometimes setting things right has a high cost. Does it “valorize passive 
suffering as redemptive”? No, passive suffering is not seen here as redemptive in and of 
itself, though for a good end it is certainly admirable. Does it place “the weight of 




stand to benefit from the suffering others in preaching that their victims ought to 
passively suffer? No, for although atonement language certainly has been used in this 
way, properly understood, a satisfaction view like the one outlined above provides the 
terms in which such use can be corrected. On this view, it is those who commit 
oppression who need to make satisfaction; the continued suffering of oppressed people is 
not analogous to the suffering of Christ—except insofar as Christ’s death also involved a 
grievous wrong. This recognition that what oppressors do to the oppressed is like what 
was done to Christ, however, only underlines the dignity and worth of the oppressed, and 
therefore the moral horror of oppression. Does it, when properly understood, lead to the 
neglect of our individual and collective responsibility to end suffering and hold 
perpetrators of violence accountable? Again, the answer is no; if a satisfaction account 
like Anselm’s holds true, then good governance requires (for Anselm, even of God) that 
perpetrators of violence be held accountable. On the view we have developed here, the 
moral integrity of a community depends on (or at least is facilitated by) satisfaction for—
















For this reason . . . I present . . . the enclosed little work . . . with the aim that those items 
in it which are acceptable may receive approval . . . and those which are in need of 
correction may be put right. 
   Anselm of Canterbury, Cur Deus Homo, Commendatio 
 
 Let us briefly recapitulate what I have tried to accomplish in this project. My goal 
has been to develop and defend an Anselmian satisfaction account of Christ’s atoning 
work. I began, in Chapter 2, by articulating a motivation for the project through a critical 
analysis of the paradigm under which atonement theology is most commonly done, the 
atonement theory paradigm. Under that paradigm, we are to assume that the basic 
elemental claims of scripture and tradition about the atonement are fundamentally 
alternatives, if taken as straightforwardly literal theological proposals. Some make a 
narrow selection within the tradition to the exclusion of others, while some attempt to 
rescue the set of concepts applied to Christ’s work in the tradition by naming them 
metaphors or models held together in some loose or functional arrangement, each one 
being at best useful insofar as it communicates some theological truth besides what it 
seems to claim directly. I argued that in fact these basic elemental claims (viz. that on our 
behalf Christ overcame the devil, that he heals our natures, that he offers himself as a 
perfect sacrifice, that he provided us with a saving teaching and example, and so on) are, 




the point of view of faith seeking understanding to have an account of atonement which 
holds these claims together coherently, taken as straightforward theological claims 
whenever possible.  
 While Anselm is usually taken to be perfectly in line with the atonement theory 
paradigm, offering a new theory as opposed to other theories, in Chapter 3, I develop a 
revised interpretation of his thought, one that presents his approach as a genuine 
alternative to the atonement theory paradigm. This re-reading involved close attention to 
Anselm’s background theological commitments, laid out in more detail in his earlier 
treatises. With these in view, we are able to see that satisfaction is not, for Anselm, a 
matter of God feeling insulted, or of the Son changing the Father’s mind about humanity. 
Instead, satisfaction is rooted in the God’s immutable commitment to accomplish His 
supremely good purposes in creating, which included that human persons should receive 
the reward of beatitude for fulfilling the highest purposes of their nature: striving to know 
God and to love Him above all things. Satisfaction means that God is committed to 
bringing humanity to fulfill its intrinsic purpose, and give us a place in beatitude as a 
reward, even though we have fallen into sin.  
Indeed, God grants a greater dignity to us by providing with the means to fulfill 
the purpose of our nature and to offer to Him, in Christ, a gift which fittingly merits the 
reward of beatitude, than if He simply gave us beatitude in spite of sin. Since God needs 
nothing at all, and His own intrinsic honor is rooted in His own nature and cannot be 
harmed, satisfaction is not to God’s benefit, but to ours, because of His profound 
goodness and mercy. In providing for us to make satisfaction, God grants us by grace the 




not Christ’s suffering or murder, which are intrinsically evil acts and as such cannot be 
willed by God per se, but rather Christ’s good, beautiful, and just will to be faithful to 
God even at the cost of His own life. It is that will and obedience towards God which 
constitutes at the same time humanity’s fitting offering to God, and the highest exercise 
of human nature and dignity.  
In light of the fall of the devil, God called humanity to embody the intrinsic 
purpose of their natures through a specific task, namely resisting the devil’s temptation in 
the Garden. Satisfaction is just the restoration to God of what He justly asked for, and in 
a way that honors Him even further than what He initially asked for. So Christ’s work 
fittingly includes a human victory of the devil. Further, since the purpose of satisfaction 
is to restore human persons to the state for which God created them, and since human 
beings learn by example and instruction of one who has overcome their same struggles, it 
is fitting that Christ’s satisfying work also include an example for us to follow who also 
suffers as a human person. In this way, Anselmian satisfaction is not an alternative to the 
Christus Victor and moral exemplar theories; on the contrary, it provides them with an 
underlying logic which binds them together and enables us to understand them (along 
with other facets of Christ’s work) in a unified way. Anselm’s account thus has much to 
recommend from the perspective of faith seeking understanding.  
With this satisfaction account in view, in Chapter 4, I attempt to broaden and 
develop it beyond simply expositing Anselm’s thought. Through engagement with the 
thought of Thomas Aquinas, we can see some important ways in which Anselm’s 
satisfaction account can be expanded and corrected. For one thing, although Anselm’s 




critiques which have been leveled against it, nonetheless Thomas’s approach which 
refuses to assert necessity of divine acts seems a wise and helpful corrective. For another, 
although Anselm’s treatise is not comprehensive, Thomas provides further material that 
is easily compatible with it, such as can be seen in his more clearly positive reflection on 
the role of aesthetic and literary fittingness, and his more detailed account of the 
relationship between Christ’s atoning work and the growth of believers into holiness and 
friendship with God. The result of this detour through Thomas’s thought, hopefully, is a 
fuller and broader sense of what is possible for a satisfaction account than we could get 
from Anselm alone.  
Finally, in Chapter 5, I attempt to defend the account developed up to this point 
against a common form of critique normally leveled against satisfaction accounts. The 
critique I consider alleges that satisfaction accounts inherently support ongoing 
oppression. Examples usually cited include cases of spousal abuse (where women are 
told, on the basis of accounts of atonement like and including satisfaction, that abuse is 
their cross to bear) and racial oppression (where slaves or those suffering under 
subsequent oppression are told essentially the same thing). I have tried to offer a fair 
analysis of the inference involved in saying that an oppressed person must simply accept 
their oppression in imitation of Christ; I argued, however, that this inference does not 
quite follow from the satisfaction account developed in this project. Suffering for justice 
out of a good will is valuable, of course—that sort of suffering is indeed an imitation of 
Christ. But if the injustice that is causing the suffering can itself be set right, and if 
continuing to suffer it achieves no particular good, then it is perfectly appropriate to seek 




a restoration of genuine friendship between wrongdoer and wronged person, as evidenced 
by the fact that this is how God achieves our reconciliation with Him.  
 More positively, I have tried to show that this account can provide a compelling 
resource for analyzing cases of human injustice. I consider two sorts of cases in order to 
show how our satisfaction account can actually illuminate what is happening and why 
passive suffering and mere forgiveness often are not conducive to justice. In the cases of 
spousal abuse and calls for reparations for slavery and racial injustice in the United 
States, the pedagogical aspect of satisfaction, along with its role in establishing or 
restoring friendship between wrongdoer and wronged, helps us to see why an act of 
reparation is good for the oppressor, as well as what is ideally involved in a proper act of 
satisfaction. Among other things, an act of satisfaction should be fitted to the wrong, not 
just in terms of proportionality, but also in terms of teaching the wrongdoer (through the 
required act) what he really ought to will with respect to the one he wronged. Moreover, 
an act of satisfaction enables the wronged party to forgive without doing damage to his 
own intrinsic dignity.   
What is the upshot of all of this? There are certainly other important critiques of 
satisfaction accounts that I have not taken up. There are also other ways of trying to 
gather together the various theological claims known as atonement theories into a 
coherent and unified account, and I have not provided an argument that these are each 
less successful than my Anselmian account. There is, too, much more to say than I have 
been able to do in detail about how a satisfaction account gives us a framework within 
which we can understand many diverse aspects of Christ’s work besides those central 




of the Law and of Israel’s mission, for instance). To the extent that I have argued 
successfully, however, I have provided a substantial set of reasons for finding a 
satisfaction account plausible and promising over and against single-theory and 
kaleidoscopic accounts. I have also provided a basis for future work which would address 
these shortcomings, considering other critiques and expanding my account into a more 
comprehensive interpretation of the Gospel narratives and of the growth of the Christian 
into holiness through the Church’s sacramental, liturgical, and devotional life. This much 
would merit a genuine contribution to contemporary atonement theology. My most 
ambitious hope, however, is that my project might in some way contribute to the 
intellectus fidei, and enable the faithful to enter more deeply, joyfully, and gratefully into 
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